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This study examines how the growing competition over immigration and welfare between social democratic parties and populist radical right parties impacts electoral outcomes. The study argues that the historical legacies of the social democratic and conservative welfare regimes influence how voters respond to this competitive struggle. The findings support this argument. In the social democratic regime, populist radical right parties gain more support when they compete over welfare, although Nordic social democratic parties can mitigate this trend by appearing tough on immigration. However, populist radical right parties' emphasis on welfare is the main source of electoral mobilization, particularly among voters with anti-immigration sentiments. In the conservative regime, the competitive dynamic is less connected to immigration, and populist radical right parties' welfare discourse appeals primarily to economically vulnerable voters, while social democratic parties lose votes by taking a strict stance on immigration. These results have important implications and suggest that welfare regimes shape voting behaviour differently today than in previous eras.

AbstractLittle is known about whether and under which conditions populist radical right parties' (PRRPs') nativist welfare politics matters to the voters. I address this gap in the research and test the argument that the electoral appeal of this electoral discourse varies among welfare regimes. The study compares the conservative and social-democratic welfare regimes and focuses on the vote choices of the two core constituencies of PRRPs – economically exposed and immigration-sceptic voters. The results show that these electorates support PRRPs' nativist welfare positions for very different reasons in the two welfare regimes. First, in the conservative regime, economically exposed citizens vote for PRRPs, the more they stress nativism and welfare expansion. By contrast, in the social-democratic regime this group of voters is more likely to support positions combining nativism and dismantled welfare benefits. Second, immigrant-sceptic voters in the social-democratic regime support PRRPs who pledge to preserve the welfare state, and increased migration considerably boosts the probability that they do so. By contrast, this group of voters in the conservative regime is more likely to support PRRPs who seek to partly dismantle the welfare state, and the inflow of immigrants is unrelated to these choices. These results have important implications and suggest that welfare regimes moderate public opinion differently in the current age of populism compared to previous eras.

In light of Sweden's exceptionally high levels of generalised trust, a widely argued view is that this country is well equipped to counterbalance contemporary challenges of xenophobia and build trust between diverse groups. However, while trust remains at high levels in Sweden, the same, somewhat paradoxically, goes for xenophobic attitudes. Therefore, the main question addressed in this article is why many Swedes report that they trust 'most people in general' while simultaneously displaying high levels of xenophobia. Drawing on unique survey-data, the article presents three main answers. First, the article shows that Swedish respondents place much more trust in their cultural in-group – which they tend to equate with 'most people' – than in their cultural out-group. Second, when relating these different measures of trust to respondents' degree of xenophobia, on the one hand, and their party preferences, on the other hand, the article shows that an overwhelming majority of the electorate report that they trust people from Western Europe, while only a minority report that they tolerate and trust non-Europeans. Third, and most crucially, the article finds that high trust in the cultural out-group is associated with tolerance, whereas high trust in the in-group instead appears to breed xenophobia.

In contrast to previous studies on the political opportunity structures of anti‐immigrant parties, this article argues that voters' perceptions of policy convergence between mainstream alternatives affect their short‐term propensity for supporting such partisan challengers. Drawing upon leading research in the field, two hypotheses about voters' perceptions of policy convergence, in two policy areas (economic redistribution and immigration), are presented. The main findings in the article suggest that policy convergence between mainstream parties has a more immediate impact on the electorate than commonly recognised. Using unique data from Sweden, the article shows that perceived convergence between Swedish mainstream parties in the field of immigration policy increases potential support for the anti‐immigrant party, the Sweden Democrats (SD). Yet the results are the opposite when it comes to perceptions of convergence in the field of economic‐distributive policies. In contrast to widespread assumptions, the article thus finds that policy convergence between mainstream parties only appears to create short‐term opportunities for anti‐immigrant parties if it takes place on their own policy turf. These results indicate, in other words, that the potential electorate of the SD – which is a wider group than hard‐core xenophobes – is largely driven by preferences about immigration policy, rather than the short‐term urge to protest against mainstream parties. The article, therefore, concludes that the cordon sanitaire to isolate the SD in Sweden – which is underpinned by de facto convergence between mainstream parties on immigration policy – could improve, and is unlikely to curb, the short‐term electoral opportunities of this party.

In light of Sweden's exceptionally high levels of generalised trust, a widely argued view is that this country is well equipped to counterbalance contemporary challenges of xenophobia and build trust between diverse groups. However, while trust remains at high levels in Sweden, the same, somewhat paradoxically, goes for xenophobic attitudes. Therefore, the main question addressed in this article is why many Swedes report that they trust 'most people in general' while simultaneously displaying high levels of xenophobia. Drawing on unique survey-data, the article presents three main answers. First, the article shows that Swedish respondents place much more trust in their cultural in-group – which they tend to equate with 'most people' – than in their cultural out-group. Second, when relating these different measures of trust to respondents' degree of xenophobia, on the one hand, and their party preferences, on the other hand, the article shows that an overwhelming majority of the electorate report that they trust people from Western Europe, while only a minority report that they tolerate and trust non-Europeans. Third, and most crucially, the article finds that high trust in the cultural out-group is associated with tolerance, whereas high trust in the in-group instead appears to breed xenophobia.

This article argues that the widespread hypothesis stating that intra-party democracy has declined since the glory days of the mass party is too sweeping and, largely, empirically groundless. In order to test it the article draws on a comparison between two internal policy-making processes within the Swedish social democratic party (SAP), one concerning an expansion of welfare benefits in the 1950s and the other concerning a retrenchment in the 1990s. If intra-party democracy is in a state of decline, the results of the comparison most likely should confirm this tendency. Yet the article concludes that party leaders exercised considerably less control, while activists were much more influential in the 1990s than in the days of mass party mobilization in the 1950s. Therefore, drawing on a single case study, the article casts doubts over the influential decline hypothesis and proposes new venues for research on the fate of intra-party democracy. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

Eftersom organisationsförändringar i New Public Management filosofins fotspår har blivit allt vanligare i svenska kommuner, ofta med oklara regler som följd, menar flera forskare att en ny riskzon för korruption kan ha uppstått också i det traditionellt icke-korrupta Sverige. Genom att påbörja den empiriska kartläggningen av hur korruption upplevs bland politiskt ansvariga i Sveriges kommuner syftar artikeln till att granska om det finns någon grund för denna misstanke. Resultaten visar att den formaliserade uppmärksamheten kring korruption är långt mer utvecklad i de kommuner som tidigt införde kundvalssystem. Sambandet mellan en högre grad av formaliserad uppmärksamhet mot korruption och införandet av kundvalssystem håller också med kontroll för kommunens befolkningsstorlek. Trots att artikeln inte kan säga något om den faktiska utbredningen av korruption i svenska kommuner visar resultaten att politiker och tjänstemän i kommuner som mer helhjärtat än andra har genomfört långtgående marknadsreformer själva tycks bedöma att det finns en risk för korruption. Följaktligen ger resultaten indikationer om att formella åtgärder mot korruption i svenska kommuner är mer omfattande där teoretiska förväntningar gör gällande att riskerna är mest utbredda.

This article argues that the widespread hypothesis stating that intra-party democracy has declined since the glory days of the mass party is too sweeping and, largely, empirically groundless. In order to test it the article draws on a comparison between two internal policy-making processes within the Swedish social democratic party (SAP), one concerning an expansion of welfare benefits in the 1950s and the other concerning a retrenchment in the 1990s. If intra-party democracy is in a state of decline, the results of the comparison most likely should confirm this tendency. Yet the article concludes that party leaders exercised considerably less control, while activists were much more influential in the 1990s than in the days of mass party mobilization in the 1950s. Therefore, drawing on a single case study, the article casts doubts over the influential decline hypothesis and proposes new venues for research on the fate of intra-party democracy.

Even in a 'least corrupt' case like Sweden, scholars have begun to argue that rapid NPM reform has increased the risks for corruption. With the aim of scrutinizing this argument, this article sets out to map the degree to which the risk for corruption is brought to attention by politicians and civil servants in Swedish municipalities. The article concludes that corruption is a much more salient issue in municipalities with far-reaching NPM-reforms than in municipalities lacking such reform. It is concluded, furthermore, that corruption is likely to become an increasingly important issue on the political agenda if municipalities, regardless of their population size, have a history of client-choice models. Accordingly, the article shows that corruption is framed as a political problem precisely in those contexts where theory predicts that problems ought to be most extensive. Even though the results cannot say anything about the actual levels of corruption in Sweden, they indicate that politicians and civil servants with more extensive experience from NPM appear to acknowledge the increased risks for corruption pointed out by scholars.

Has intra-party democracy deteriorated over time? A widely held view in contemporary party research is that intra-party democracy, especially in traditional mass parties, has deteriorated in the age of the cartel party. This common assessment, however, relies on insufficient empirical evidence, and is scrutinized in the article. The notion of a gradual progress towards the cartel party implicitly shares common characteristics with the classic theory of Michels. In order to investigate the actual fate of intra-party democracy, central aspects of Michels theory are explored over time in a critical case, namely the Swedish SAP. If intra-party democracy is declining, this tendency should be most likely to be observed in this case. Two internal decision-making processes, surrounding two major pension reforms – one expansion in the 1950's and one retrenchment in the 1990's – are compared based on criteria deducted from Michels. Instead of finding a decline in intraparty democracy, the results conclusively demonstrate major improvements. ; Sociologisk Forsknings digitala arkiv