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This book studies the variety of organizational strategy selection when coping with critical uncertainties during a crisis. In dealing with uncertainties, some organizations rely on organizational routines developed over time, while some others analyze uncertainty in an ad hoc way to provide a workable interpretation of that uncertainty. However, we do not know why some organizations select a rule-based strategy to cope with uncertainties whereas others follow a more ad hoc-based strategy. This study addresses this question by formulating and applying an institutional sensemaking model to explain the selection of strategies to cope with uncertainties during a crisis. This study builds on the insight that organizational sensemaking might vary in different organizational contexts, which are defined by different levels of institutionalization. This research explores how different levels of institutionalization influence the selection of organizational sensemaking strategies during a crisis, thus explaining the selection of different strategies to cope with uncertainty in crises. The empirical chapters describe four major crises in the US and the major response organizations in these four major crises. The organizations are selected based on the level of institutionalization, and they are: the Federal Emergency Management Agency in the 2005 New Orleans Flood, the National Aeronautic Space Administration in the 2003 Space Shuttle Columbia Disaster, the Los Angeles Police Department in the 1992 Los Angeles riots, and BP in the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in 2010. The dissertation finds that the level of institutionalization does not make a difference for strategy selection in the initial phase of responding to crises; three rigidity effects exist in the selection of sensemaking strategies after organizations had faced the failure of their selected strategies; the discontinuities in the feedback loop of sensemaking do not necessarily cause the switch of sensemaking strategies, but interact with institutionalization to ...

The need for a well‐prepared response to hurricanes and typhoons2 has become increasingly evident given the catastrophic impacts. While much research has focused on how American governmental and non‐governmental organizations operate in response to hurricanes, the response in developing countries has received less attention. This article describes the progress and challenges evidenced in Chinese local government operations during typhoon evacuations, and is based on field research in Wenzhou City in September 2008, which includes historical official document analysis, on‐site observation of the 2008 Typhoon Sinlaku response process and face‐to‐face interviews with one NGO director and 16 officials. Mass evacuation response in China has changed: there are basic shelters, emergency plans and legislation supports. But there are still problems that block effective and efficient response.

This book studies the variety of organizational strategies selected to cope with critical uncertainties during crises. This research formulates and applies an institutional sense-making model to explain the selection of strategies for coping with uncertainties during crises to answer the question why some organizations select a rule-based strategy to cope with uncertainties, whereas others pursue a more ad hoc-based strategy. It finds that the level of institutionalization does not affect strategy selection in the initial phase of responding to crises; that three rigidity effects can be identified in the selection of sense-making strategies once organizations have faced the failure of their selected strategies; that discontinuities in the feedback loop of sense-making do not necessarily move organizations to switch their sense-making strategies, but interact with institutionalization to contribute to switching sense-making strategies. This book bridges the gap between institutional thinking and crisis management theorizing. A major step forward in the world of crisis management studies!----Professor Arjen Boin, Leiden University, the NetherlandsIn a world of increasingly complex, sociotechnical systems interacting in high-risk environments, Professor Lu's analysis of how organizations manage uncertainty is both timely and profound.

AbstractChina built a new National Emergency Management System (NEMS) after the 2003 SARS crisis to cope with the challenges of crisis and disaster management, particularly the challenge of joint sense‐making. This article investigates how the NEMS addresses joint sense‐making challenges in crisis management. It explores several recent crises in China to uncover factors that undermine or facilitate joint sense‐making. Our study unearths a low degree of professionalization, plans that do not match crisis events, a lack of accountability, and the absence of unified leadership. These critical factors make it hard for the newly built NEMS to establish a common understanding of a crisis. This article concludes with lessons for China's NEMS that may also be useful for other large countries.