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This paper provides an overview of our adaptation ofNortonLong's concept of the "ecology of games" into a theoretical framework for analyzing institutional complexity. I discuss the basic concepts of the framework, discuss hypotheses related to fundamental questions in governance and policy, and outline some basic analytical approaches. The conclusion assesses the future prospects of the ecology of games framework, including future research needs for theoretical and empirical development.

AbstractMany analysts view collaborative institutions that attempt to forge consensus and build cooperation among conflicting stakeholders as a potential remedy to the pathologies of conventional environmental policy. However, few analyses have demonstrated that collaborative institutions actually increase levels of cooperation, and critics accuse collaborative institutions of all talk and no action. This paper reports the use a quasi‐experimental design to compare the levels of consensus and cooperation in coastal watersheds with and without U.S. EPA's National Estuary Programs, one of the most prominent national examples of collaborative institutions in the environmental policy domain. Panel survey data from more than 800 respondents shows that while the level of consensus is higher in NEP estuaries, there is no difference between NEP and non‐NEP estuaries in the level of cooperation. © 2004 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.

The literature on environmental activism has failed to produce a model of individual decision making explicitly linked to the logic of collective action. To remedy this problem, this article adapts the collective interest model developed by Finkel, Muller, and Opp to explain protest behavior and argues environmental activism is a function of citizen beliefs about collective benefits, the ability to influence collective outcomes, and the selective costs/benefits of participation. The author tests the hypotheses of the collective interest model using data from a survey of 460 residents of a coastal watershed and national data on 1,606 respondents from the 1993 General Social Survey Environment Battery. The author's findings corroborate several central propositions of the collective interest model and provide a theoretical account of environmental activism that synthesizes many previous results.

The consensus-building processes that characterize many environmental partnerships are often thwarted by cognitive conflict, which occurs when stakeholders have conflicting beliefs about the parameters of environmental problems and institutional performance. The author argues cognitive conflict results from stakeholders behaving like intuitive lawyers, who interpret uncertain situations in ways consistent with their self-interest. The implications of this argument are tested using survey data from stakeholders in the Environmental Protection Agency's National Estuary Program. The findings suggest cognitive conflict is a significant source of transaction costs for consensus-building processes, a barrier that should be directly addressed within partnership decision-making structures.