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Each approach has its own inherent limitations. The human terrain approach was a 'quick-fix'. But maybe the US Air Force's model of cross-cultural competence offers more promise.

In this Article, I review the military and security uses of robotics and "unmanned" or "uninhabited" (and sometimes "remotely piloted") vehicles in a number of relevant conflict environments that, in turn, raise issues of law and ethics that bear significantly on both foreign and domestic policy initiatives. My treatment applies to the use of autonomous unmanned platforms in combat and low-intensity international conflict, but also offers guidance for the increased domestic uses of both remotely controlled and fully autonomous unmanned aerial, maritime, and ground systems for immigration control, border surveillance, drug interdiction, and domestic law enforcement. I outline the emerging debate concerning "robot morality" and computational models of moral cognition and examine the implications of this debate for the future reliability, safety, and effectiveness of autonomous systems (whether weaponized or unarmed) that might come to be deployed in both domestic and international conflict situations. Likewise, I discuss attempts by the International Committee on Robot Arms Control (ICRAC) to outlaw or ban the use of autonomous systems that are lethally armed, as well an alternative proposal by the eminent Yale University ethicist, Wendell Wallach, to have lethally armed autonomous systems that might be capable of making targeting decisions independent of any human oversight specifically designated "mala in se" under international law. Following the approach of Marchant, et al., however, I summarize the lessons learned and the areas of provisional consensus reached thus far in this debate in the form of "soft-law" precepts that reflect emergent norms and a growing international consensus regarding the proper use and governance of such weapons.

The article of record as published may be found at http://doi.org/10.37974/ALF.25 ; U.S. President Barack Obama, in his annual State of the Union address to the American public on the 12th of February 2013, pleaded specifically for legislation that would address the grave security threats to vital national infrastructure posed by relentless cyber-attacks, while simultaneously protecting the privacy of individual U.S. citizens. His very public plea in this respect was the most recent voice in a rising chorus of concern from political and military leaders in Europe, include the U.K., and elsewhere, lamenting the explosion of cyber espionage (military and industrial), the theft of state secrets and technological innovations, and the increasing vulnerability of the world�s energy, financial, and transportation sectors to potentially devastating cyber-attacks.

This article traces the increasing pressures exerted upon interna-tional law and international institutions from two sources: the humanitarian military interventions (and failures to intervene) in the aftermath of the Cold War during the decade of the 1990s; and the ―global war on terror‖ and wars of counterinsurgency and regime change fought during the first decade of the 21st century. Proposals for legal and institutional reform in response to these challenges emerge from two distinct and largely indepen-dent sources: a ―publicist‖ or theoretical discussion among scholars in philosophy, law, and international relations; and a formal or procedural discussion among diplomats and statesmen, both focusing upon what the latter group defines as a ―responsibility to protect‖ (R2P). This study con-cludes with recommendations for reform of international humanitarian law (or Law of Armed Conflict), and for reformulations of professional ethics and professional military education in allied militaries, both of which will be required to fully address the new challenges of ―irregular‖ or hybrid war. ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.