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In: Journal of economics, Band 116, Heft 2, S. 179-181
ISSN: 1617-7134
Many firms offer employees a remuneration package that links pay to performance as a means of motivation. It also improves efficiency and reduces turnover and absenteeism. The effects on productivity depend on the type of scheme employed (individual or group performance) and its design (commissions, piece-rate or sharing schemes). Individual incentives demonstrate the largest effect, while group or team incentives are smaller in magnitude. The case for government intervention through tax breaks and other financial incentives is highly debated due to differences across firms and the potential for economic inefficiencies.
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In this study, we investigate the role that some institutional features play in shaping the distribution of wages across a number of OECD countries. While considerable attention has been devoted in recent years to the evolution of earnings inequality and to the analysis of the competing explanations for the observed phenomena, also the existence (and persistence) of considerable structural differences - across countries - in the level of wage inequality and the incidence of low pay can shed some light on a different dimension of inequality patterns. In particular, we focus on three specific features: the effects of trade unions, the structure of collective bargaining and the existence of regulations on wages. By looking at the different moments of the distribution of earnings various dimensions of low pay have been analysed, namely the effects of the institutional setting on the mean, the dispersion and the (time) covariance of earnings. Consistent with previous work, our results suggest that institutions are a relevant factor in shaping the distribution of earnings and the incidence of low pay. We show that institutional settings differ substantially across countries and that institutional variety in the labour market is able to explain a great deal of the observed patterns in low pay across countries.
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In: Ricerche. Economia
In: Economica, Band 89, Heft 356, S. 884-907
ISSN: 1468-0335
Turning a 'blind eye' to non‐compliance with minimum wage standards is sometimes presented as a pragmatic way to accommodate higher wages while not harming employment opportunities for workers employed in marginal firms. In this paper, we model firms' wage and employment decisions, and show that there may be a trade‐off between non‐compliance and employment. The main predictions of the model are tested empirically using data from the Italian labour force survey. We find evidence of a positive employment non‐compliance effect, though elasticities are smaller than typically thought as employers internalize the expected costs of non‐compliance. We also show that employment effects are larger at low levels of non‐compliance (when the risk of being referred to court is very low). The implications for policy and the role of regulators in monitoring and sanctioning non‐compliance are discussed.
A growing number of firms offer compensation packages that link pay to performance. The aim is to motivate workers to be more efficient while also increasing their attachment to the company, thereby reducing turnover and absenteeism. The effects of performance-related pay on productivity depend on the scheme type and design, with individual incentives showing the largest effect. Governments often offer tax breaks and financial incentives to promote performance-related pay, though their desirability has been questioned due to large deadweight losses involved. The diffusion of remote work will increase the relevance of performance-related pay.
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In: Journal of human capital: JHC, Band 14, Heft 4, S. 584-616
ISSN: 1932-8664
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 39, S. 201-221
In the public debate, poor employment performance has often been associated with the existence of extensive labour market regulations and a lack of commitment to far- sighted public policies. This paper investigates the relation between policy myopia and labour market institutions. We develop a theoretical model in which policy myopia leads an incumbent government to choose institutions that allow the creation of rents in the labour market and reduce resources available to public goods provision and social expenditure. We test these predictions empirically using panel data for 21 OECD countries for the period 1985{2006. We show that policy myopia is associated with more regulated labour markets, lower unemployment benefit replacement rates, and smaller tax wedges on labour.
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This paper investigates the relationship between political instability and labor market institutions. We develop a theoretical model in which some features of the political process, by reducing the future yields of policy interventions, induce an incumbent government to choose labor market institutions that create wage rents and divert resources from public good provision and social insurance. We test these predictions empirically using panel data for 21 OECD countries for the period 1985-2006. We find strong evidence that political turnover and political polarization - our measures of political instability - are associated with a more regulated labor market, lower unemployment benefit replacement rates, and a smaller tax wedge on labor. We show also that there are strong complementarities between different dimensions of political instability, and evaluate their impact on labour market institutions across countries.
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This paper investigates the causal effect of a switch from fixed wages to collective performance-related pay on firm productivity, exploiting an exogenous variation in the institutional environment regulating collective bargaining. We find that the introduction of collective performance related pay significantly increases productivity by around 3-5 per cent, but such effect varies greatly by firm size, industry and union density. We show that the design of the PRP scheme - in terms of number and type of parameters used - is also relevant for firm productivity.
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In: The Manchester School, Band 80, Heft 1, S. 1-5
ISSN: 1467-9957