Suchergebnisse

The article presents a generalised portrait of civil governors of the Belarusian-Lithuanian Region under Paul I in 1796–1801. The social characteristics (origin, religion, age, educational level, career, awards) of eight Lithuanian, Belarusian and Minsk civil governors are analysed. The conditions and motives for the appointment and dismissal of these officials are established. It is noted that the governor corps of the Belarusian-Lithuanian Region under Paul I was characterised by both all-Russian tendencies (frequent turnover, a higher rank according to the Table of Ranks, the absence of a clearly established amount of pensions), and some features (regional and confessional affiliation, elderly age (50 years on average)). It is concluded that in the personnel policy, Paul I continued Catherine's practice of appointing former military governors, which was explained both by political (disloyalty of part of the population) and ethno-confessional (Jews, Catholics, Uniates, Orthodox) features of the region. The daily life of governors is reconstructed on the basis of socio-cultural characteristics (number of duties, perception of time, personal qualities, material support, marital status and interests). It is concluded that the origin, patronage and military experience played an important role in the appointment. However, the duration of tenure under Paul I depended on the business qualities of the governors. It is noted that some bosses, having no managerial experience, made numerous mistakes. They led to dissatisfaction with the emperor and, as a result, to premature resignations. At the same time, the reign of Paul I turned out to be quite effective in the Belarusian-Lithuanian Region in terms of achieving managerial results.

The article reveals the problem of the participation of the Russian Empire in the war of 1809 against Austria, which is little studied in historiography. It is shown that Russia considered Austrian Galicia as its geopolitical field (historical heritage), and therefore opposed its possible inclusion in the Duchy of Warsaw. It is noted that the Russian army, despite allied commitments to France, crossed the border only with the threat of the occupation of Galicia by Polish troops. At the same time, she was passive in actions against Austria (in order to preserve good-neighborly relations), and shied away from helping the Poles. All this led to a tense relationship between the Russian and Polish troops. The article traces in detail the course of hostilities, reveals the mood in Russian army circles (discontent in the officer corps and the escape of soldier). It is shown that the events of 1809 had a significant impact on the aggravation of the situation in the western provinces of the Russian Empire. In general, it is concluded that Russia's participation in the war against Austria has undermined its image in Europe and contributed to the strengthening of French influence, but only in the short term.

The article reveals the administrative activities of General Peter Albedinsky as the Riga (1866-1870), Vilna (1874-1880) and Warsaw (1880-1883) Governor-General. A comparative analysis of the historical image formed by contemporaries with reality is carried out. It is concluded that the historical myth of Peter Albedin-sky is superficial, due to the subjectivity of the estimates of the general. It is noted that negative assessments of the administrative activity of Peter Albedinsky pre-vailed in Russian society. They were due to the liberalization of the government policy in the Baltic States and Poland. ; В статье раскрывается административная деятельность генерала Петра Альбединского в качестве рижского (1866-1870), виленского (1874-1880) и варшавского (1880-1883) генерал-губернаторов. Проводится сравнительный анализ исторического образа, сформированного современниками, с реальностью. Делается вывод о том, что исторический миф о Петре Альбединском носит поверхностный характер, что обусловлено субъективностью оценок личности генерала. Отмечается, что в русском обществе превалировали негативные оценки административной деятельности Петра Альбединского, обусловленные либерализацией правительственного курса в Прибалтике и Польше.

The article analyzes the transformation during the 100-year period of the his-torical memory of the population of Belarus in relation to national holidays (Days of the Republic). The mechanism of formation of the historical myth regarding the date of July 11, 1920 is revealed. It is noted that despite the enormous intellectual efforts and material costs aimed at constructing this myth, when the political situation changed, it remained in the memory of only one generation of citizens of the republic. ; В статье анализируется трансформация в течение 100-летнего периода исторической памяти населения Беларуси в отношении национальных праздников (Дней республики). Раскрывается механизм формирования исторического мифа в отношении даты 11 июля 1920 г. Отмечается, что несмотря на огромные интеллектуальные усилия и материальные затраты, направленные на конструирование этого мифа, при смене политической конъюнктуры он сохранился в памяти только одного поколения граждан республики.

The article analyzes Russian projects to create "national" troops on Belarus-ian lands, formed from representatives of the nobility at the end of the XVIII - beginning of the XIX century. The features of the creation and acquisition of regiments from Lithuanian Tatars, recruiting regiments from the local gentry are revealed. Particular attention is paid to the projects of mobilization of the Chinshey nobility in the ranks of the Russian army in 1808 (A. Arakcheev, M. Filosofov, State Council) and 1811 (M. Barclay de Tolly). It is concluded that all attempts by the Russian government to draw the Chinshee nobility of the Belarusian lands to their side on the eve of the war of 1812 were unsuccessful. ; В статье анализируются российские проекты по созданию на белорусских землях "национальных" воинских частей, сформированных из представителей шляхетского сословия в конце XVIII - начале XIX в. Раскрываются особенности создания и комплектования полков из литовских татар, вербуночных полков из местной шляхты. Особое внимание уделяется проектам мобилизации чиншевой шляхты в ряды российской армии в 1808 г. и 1811 г. Делается вывод, что все попытки российского правительства перетянуть чиншевую шляхту белорусских земель на свою сторону накануне войны 1812 г. оказались неудачными.