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ObjectivesWe examine political connections at the horizontal level of local government officials and their impacts on economic growth in China.MethodsWe identify two types of horizontal networks: hometown tie and alumni tie, and analyze the biographic data of the top officials of 256 prefecture‐cities during the period of 1999–2013.ResultsWe find a positive relationship between city leaders' hometown tie and economic growth, measured by either the relative GDP per capita growth rate or the GDP per capita growth rate. Furthermore, we find the positive relationship is more profound in the low market‐open cities. However, we do not find any significant impacts of the alumni tie on economic growth.ConclusionsThe hometown tie improves the city leaders' economic performance.

Using a unique dataset based on a survey conducted by the Guangzhou Land Resources and Housing Administrative Bureau from November 2009 to January 2010, this article examines the sources and distribution of the hidden income of residents from different occupational backgrounds, taking into consideration their explicit income and other socio-economic characteristics. The results show that government officials not only had the highest but also the most stable hidden income, followed by employees in state-owned enterprises and employees in colleges or research institutions. Among government officials, those holding higher-level positions possessed more hidden income than those in lower-level positions. These findings have implications for China's labour market, taxation and resource allocation, and need to be taken into consideration in future economic and political policy designs and implementations. (J Contemp China/GIGA)

We analyze data on Chinese non-state-listed firms and find that it is easier for firms with political connections to obtain long-term loans with extended debt maturities than it is for firms without political connections. Our investigation indicates that this phenomenon is significantly less common with increased media monitoring. Houston et al. (2011) find strong evidence that the state ownership of media is associated with higher levels of bank corruption in China, but our study shows that, to a certain extent, media monitoring can curb corruption.

AbstractIn this article, we investigate the influence of local official turnover on litigation efficiency using manually collected data from listed companies in China from 1995 to 2013. Our findings indicate that official turnover leads to a decrease in litigation efficiency, with a 16.3% increase in the duration of litigation cases. This effect is more pronounced when newly appointed officials are working in different locations. It is more significant when the involved enterprise is a private entity, suggesting that political cycles contribute to the selective enforcement of private enterprises. Further analysis reveals that the adverse impact of official turnover on litigation efficiency is short‐lived. The conclusions contribute to the existing literature on official turnover and litigation efficiency and hold potential implications for judicial independence reforms.