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Working paper
Democracy and its Vulnerabilities: Dynamics of Democratic Backsliding
In: Quarterly journal of political science: QJPS, Band 18, Heft 1, S. 105-130
ISSN: 1554-0634
Ruling the Ruling Coalition: Information Control and Authoritarian Power-Sharing
In: Quarterly journal of political science: QJPS, Band 18, Heft 2
ISSN: 1554-0634
Ruling the Ruling Coalition: Information Control and Authoritarian Power-Sharing
In: Quarterly Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
SSRN
Working paper
Leadership Styles and Political Survival of Chinese Communist Party Elites
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 83, Heft 2, S. 777-782
ISSN: 1468-2508
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Working paper
(In)excusable Backsliding under Contested Oversight
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Why Are the Fastest Growing Countries Autocracies?
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 81, Heft 2, S. 663-669
ISSN: 1468-2508
Leadership Styles and Political Survival of Chinese Communist Party Elites
SSRN
Working paper
Strategies of Election Rigging: Trade-Offs, Determinants, and Consequences
In: Quarterly journal of political science: QJPS, Band 13, Heft 1, S. 1-28
ISSN: 1554-0634
The Election Monitor's Curse
In: American journal of political science, Band 62, Heft 1, S. 148-160
ISSN: 1540-5907
AbstractElection monitoring has become a key instrument of democracy promotion. Election monitors routinely expect to deter fraud and prevent post‐election violence, but in reality, post‐election violence often increases when monitors do expose fraud. We argue that monitors can make all elections less fraudulent and more peaceful on average, but only by causing more violence in fraudulent elections. Due to this curse, strategic election monitors can make a positive impact on elections only if their objectives are aligned in a very specific fashion. Monitors who do not aim to prevent violence can be effective only if they are unbiased, whereas monitors who do aim to prevent violence can be effective only if they are moderately biased against the government. Consequently, election monitors with misaligned objectives will fail to prevent violence, whereas monitors with well‐aligned objectives will be blamed for causing violence.
The Election Monitor's Curse
In: American Journal of Political Science, Band 62(1), S. 148-160
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Strategies of Election Rigging: Trade-Offs, Determinants, and Consequences
In: Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Band 13(1), S. 1-28
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Political Stake and Policy Experimentation
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