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The theory in Mancur Olson's The Logic of Collective Action is built from historically uncontroversial assumptions about interpersonal communication. Today, evolving technologies are changing communication dynamics in ways that invalidate some of these once uncontroversial assumptions. How do these changes affect Olson's thesis? Using research tools that were not available to Olson, we differentiate collective actions that new communication technologies help from the endeavors that they hurt. In the process, we refine some of Olson's best-known ideas. For example, we find that evolving communication technologies eliminate many of the organizational advantages that Olson attributed to small groups. 1 Figure, 10 References. Adapted from the source document.

Cabinet coalitions in multiparty parliamentary democracies lead a precarious existence. Legislative majorities can typically dismiss the cabinet at will and can sometimes force early elections through parliamentary dissolution. Since coalition termination can have substantial political consequences, it is important to understand when and why such decisions are made. To this end, we develop a model of coalition bargaining in a legislature with dismissal and dissolution powers. We use the model to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for both coalition termination and parliamentary dissolution. In contrast to several widely held maxims, we find that coalition terminations need not be the automatic consequence of exogenous shocks. Nor do opportunistic parties with favorable electoral prospects always dissolve parliament to enhance their power. Instead, decisions to terminate coalitions or call new elections result from party leaders' rational responses to the constraints of legislative and electoral institutions and the anticipated feelings of the electorate.

In this paper, we attempt to clarify some of the confusion that surrounds the measurement of racially polarized voting. This clarification is necessary because the determination of whether or not racially polarized voting exists is often a critical component of the evidence presented in Voting Rights Act (Section 2) litigation. We first show that the correlation coefficient should never be used to measure voting polarization by relating the statistic to the individual behavior that it is supposed to be describing. We then compare the estimates of polarized voting that are provided by other commonly used measures with individual behavior in order to show that the Voting Rights disputes of the 1990s will require different and more carefully specified measures than are currently in use.

Political actions and outcomes depend on people's preferences over candidates, policies, and other politically relevant phenomena. For this reason, a great deal of political activity entails attempts to change other people's preferences. When do politically relevant preferences change? Addressing this question requires recognition of two realities: (a) Many stimuli compete for every person's attention, and (b) every person's capacity to pay attention to information is limited. With these realities in mind, we review research on preference change in competitive environments. We discuss how individuals allocate attention and how individuals' values and identities affect their use of the information to which they attend. We then discuss how this work has been applied to a new problem: improving the communication of scientific facts in increasingly politicized environments.