Suchergebnisse

"Using case studies ranging from cross-border bank resolution to sovereign debt, the author analyzes the role of international law in protecting financial sovereignty, and the risks for the global financial system posed by the lack of international cooperation. Despite the post-crisis reforms, the global financial system is still mainly based on a logic of financial nationalism. International financial law plays a major role in this regard as it still focuses more on the protection of national interests rather than the promotion of global objectives. This is an inefficient approach because it encourages bad domestic governance and reduces capital mobility. In this analysis, Lupo-Pasini discusses some of the alternatives (such as the European Banking Union, Regulatory Passports, and international financial courts), and offers a new vision for the role of international law in maintaining and fostering global financial stability. In doing so, he fills a void in the law and economics literature, and puts forward a solution to tackle the problems of international cooperation in finance based on the use of international law"--

ABSTRACT
Sovereign debt markets are rapidly venturing into the world of sustainable finance. Sovereign and sub-sovereign borrowers increasingly use 'green', 'social', and 'sustainability' bonds and loans to finance their domestic sustainability agenda. The rationale behind those instruments is to leverage the power of financial markets to incentivize public borrowers to pursue sustainability reforms and projects that would otherwise be difficult to implement. At the same time, given its clear objective to influence domestic policies, some see sovereign sustainable finance as an invasion of national sovereignty and a new form of private conditionality. This article assesses these claims. It sets out a theory of sovereign sustainable bonds that highlights the incentives of the two contractual parties—institutional investors and sovereign borrowers—to use finance as a tool for domestic sustainability reforms. I demonstrate that neither of the two parties has any incentive to use debt instruments to pursue a change in domestic policies and sustainability practices. A lack of financial incentives for investors and constitutional and political limitations on the sovereign borrower's side make the environmental, social, and governance (ESG) contractual bargain very difficult to negotiate and implement. At the same time, both parties share the common goal of tapping into the ever-expanding ESG market. This results in a sustainable bond structure that only superficially addresses the sustainability objective for which it is marketed to investors.

Fundamentals of environmental permitting : from traditional to integrated regulatory approach -- The EU legislation on integrated environmental permits : scope, regulatory instruments and application of integrated pollution prevention control and industrial emission directives -- The application of IPPC and IED in Italy : towards the achievement of sustainable development -- Potential and constraints of China's regulatory framework on environmental permits -- Proposals to enhance effectiveness and ensure integration in the development of China's legislation on environmental permits -- Conclusion.

The question of adjudication in international financial law has rarely been analysedcomprehensively in the legal literature. This can probably be explained with the factthat, unlike in other areas of international economic law, there is no internationalfinancial court specifically designed to adjudicate international disputes between financial regulators, or between governments and financial institutions or investors.Moreover, the informality of regulatory cooperation through Transnational RegulatoryNetworks (TRNs), the use of soft laws to regulate international financial relations, andthe presence of prudential carve-outs in international treaties was supposed to keepfinancial supervisory and regulatory authorities free from international scrutiny and tolimit the judicial review of regulatory measures to a purely domestic exercise. Yet, financial measures are increasingly challenged in international investment tribunals, human rights courts, and regional courts. From 1995 to 2016, there have been more than 100 known international disputes on financial services, of which roughly two thirds involved a supervisory measure such as the resolution or bankruptcy of an insolvent bank or the imposition of supervisory fines. The remaining claims mostly included violation of sovereign debt contracts, or emergency legislation affecting financial services. Investment arbitrations, in particular, are considerably on the rise. The increased number of regulatory disputes represents fundamental implications for the financial regulatory community in terms of domestic governance, regulatory cooperation, and global financial stability.This essay empirically investigates and maps for the first time the patterns of international adjudication in financial law, and comments on what the rise of international litigation means for the global financial architecture.

In the current interdependent global economic system, measures adopted nationally by governments to safeguard financial stability sometimes produce cross-border spillovers. A question arises as to how international economic law shall treat states' regulatory powers to tackle internal and external economic and financial threats. The goal of the research is to analyze (i) how international law distributes between different international subjects the social costs of global instability in the event of emergencies, and (ii) how regulatory powers are attributed in a situation of economic and financial interdependence. To do so, this essay sets out a law and economics theory that conceptualizes financial stability in international law as the result of a trade-off between three competing regulatory objectives: domestic stability, global stability, and financial integration. The way in which the interplay between these objectives is represented in law crucially influences the balance of rights and obligations in the formulation of national economic and financial policies, and the level of protection against economic threats. This essay argues that current international law is largely inefficient because it structures the protection of financial stability as a matter of the individual rights of each state, rather than a social problem of the international community.