Suchergebnisse

hrsg. von Jürgen Miethke und Christoph Flüeler ; Rez.: Historische Zeitschrift 281 (2005), S. 170-171 (Volker Leppin); MIÖG 114 (2006), S. 170-172 (Konrad Ubl); Zeitschrift für historische Forschung 33 (2006), S. 454 (Michael Menzel); Berliner Beiträge zur Editionswissenschaft 2008,7, S. 272-276 (Marie-Luise Heckmann) ; Inhaltsverzeichnis ; Volltext // Exemplar mit der Signatur: München, Monumenta Germaniae Historica -- C 50 b (4

Switzerland was for a very long time characterised by a strong tradition of self-regulation by private actors in the economic sphere rather than by an extensive and detailed legal framework. This is particularly true in the field of corporate governance and more precisely visible in the Stock Corporation Law, the supervision of the stock exchanges and accounting rules. Due to very lax legal rules, mechanisms of "private governance" complemented the minimal legal framework in these three fields. Over the last twenty or so years, these mechanisms of self-regulation have nonetheless undergone profound change. In fact, private self-regulation has been incrementally formalised and replaced by more specific public regulations in five important fields: the transferability of shares, proxy-voting by banks, takeover bids, supervision of the stock exchanges and accounting rules. Due to changes in the international context, to the shifting preferences of important economic actors, and to the emergence of new actors (institutional investors and accountants), the legal framework of Swiss corporate governance has been reformed in a significant way.

Switzerland was for a very long time characterised by a strong tradition of self-regulation by private actors in the economic sphere rather than by an extensive and detailed legal framework. This is particularly true in the field of corporate governance and more precisely visible in the Stock Corporation Law, the supervision of the stock exchanges and accounting rules. Due to very lax legal rules, mechanisms of "private governance" complemented the minimal legal framework in these three fields. Over the last twenty or so years, these mechanisms of self-regulation have nonetheless undergone profound change. In fact, private self-regulation has been incrementally formalised and replaced by more specific public regulations in five important fields: the transferability of shares, proxy-voting by banks, takeover bids, supervision of the stock exchanges and accounting rules. Due to changes in the international context, to the shifting preferences of important economic actors, and to the emergence of new actors (institutional investors and accountants), the legal framework of Swiss corporate governance has been reformed in a significant way. Adapted from the source document.

Switzerland was, for a very long time, characterised not by an extensive & detailed legal regulatory framework but by its strong tradition of self-regulation of the economic sphere by private actors. This was particularly the case in the field of corporate governance &, especially, where the Stock Corporation Law, the supervision of stock exchanges & accounting rules were concerned. Due to the very general nature of relevant legislation, mechanisms of "private governance" were use to complete the very limited legal framework in all three fields. However, for the last twenty or so years, these mechanisms of self-regulation have undergone extensive transformation. In fact, private self-regulation has been progressively formalized & replaced by more precise public regulations in five important areas: the transferability of shares, proxy voting by banks, takeover bids, supervision of stock exchanges & accounting rules. Due to changes in the international context, the changing preferences of important economic actors & the emergence of new actors, both institutional investors & accountants, the legal framework of Swiss corporate governance has been significantly reformed. Tables, Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.