Suchergebnisse

In the wake of the latest financial crisis, the International Monetary Fund returned to its core business - providing liquidity to cope with external imbalances. The crisis also seemed to mark an ideological break with-the past. At the London G20 summit in 2009, leading politicians declared the 'Washington Consensus' dead and anti-cyclical economic policy the order of the day. This article analyzes elements and driving forces of a paradigm change in the crisis policy of the IMF. I argue that a transformation towards a new economic philosophy of a 'flexible Keynesianism' is proceeding, driven both by large member states and the IMF staff. Adapted from the source document.

As each others' most important investment and trading partner, the European and U.S. American economies are closely interlinked. The growing intensity of economic interdependence has spurred the transatlantic coordination of rules and standards that could form non-tariff barriers to transatlantic commerce. But despite impressive government-to-government efforts to eliminate market barriers, the EU and the U.S. have frequently clashed over each other's regulatory policies. The aim of this special issue is to explore the domestic sources of cooperation or conflict in transatlantic regulation. The papers analyze the role of domestic factors through three theoretical lenses that are well-established in the study of multilevel systems: the principal-agent approach, the two-level game metaphor, and through a wider concept of institutionalism which emphasizes the interlinkages of societal interests and regulatory ideas with institutional frameworks. The papers reveal that domestic factors embody more obstacles to than opportunities for horizontal coordination. It is argued that transatlantic relations will likely undergo a 'double movement' of being simultaneously shifted upwards to become part of the global governance architecture, and downwards towards broader involvement of legislators in regulatory matters. Hence, transatlantic regulation might in the near future be more shaped by political leaders, rent-seeking interest groups and legislators than by networks of technocrats. Adapted from the source document.

Finance used to be the cornerstone of the coordinated model of German capitalism. Restricted competition within the banking sector & stable network relations between industry, banks & also regional governments were seen as preconditions for longer term investment strategies & regional industrial policy. Since the early 1990s, a substantial restructuring has taken place leading to the commodification & re-regulation of financial relations. Despite this overall trend, elements of the stakeholder model are either being sustained or remodelled thus leading to a greater variety of organisational models within the national system of capitalism. It is argued that domestic change is mostly a response to exogenous forces, such as European competition policy, financial globalisation & the re-regulation of finance on different political levels. Exogenous forces are not necessarily constraining domestic actors, but turn into 'opportunity structures' for those willing to push reforms through. Adapted from the source document.

The international political economy literature often expects that states end up in regulatory races to the bottom while competing for the most mobile segments of capital. While multilateralism argues that states are able to overcome prisoner dilemma situations by converging on international standards of regulation, comparative historical institutionalists assume ongoing diversity of regulatory frameworks. The paper shows that reforms of banking regulation in the US, GB, & Germany exemplify a pattern of 'convergence within national diversity'. It is argued that a combination of comparative institutionalism with a multilateral perspective captures the causes & patterns of regulatory reform in finance. While convergence on a certain 'hegemonic regulatory model' is due to intergovernmental coordination on the regime level, national diversity with respect to timing & the extent of regulatory change depends to a large extent on the existence or absence of institutional veto points in the domestic political system. 2 Tables, 74 References. Adapted from the source document.

The concept of government is defined & explored in this comprehensive analysis. The notion is related to the fields of political science, sociology, & economics. Issues such as taxation & currency reform & numerous concerns facing the business world & world market are touched on. The relative health of the capitalistic environment as it ranges from a setting of stability to one of constant change & flux is also discussed. Charts are included that compare & contrast major coordinated & uncoordinated market economies such as those belonging to Germany & to the US. The study concludes with a discussion & analysis of future research perspectives. 2 Tables, 43 References. A. Simms-Clark

Deregulation, technological change, & the integration of markets increase the competitive pressures on forms of national & sectoral governance. The heart of the issue is whether the continental, consensus-oriented model of capitalism is gravitating toward the Anglo-Saxon, market-oriented model. This essay examines the heuristic value of this convergence thesis, using the German financial sector & its relations to industry & government as a case in point. It will be argued that while the institutional restructuring that is taking place within Germany reflects characteristics of Anglo-Saxon capitalism, institutional hurdles, such as federal structures & the veto power of certain societal lobbies, have thus far prevented such a convergence throughout the entire system. Adapted from the source document.

In the 1980s, international banking regulation was considered a good example of successful regime activities. National regulators engaged in intergovernmental negotiations that led to an international standard of protection against financial risks. During the 1990s, a multilevel system of regulation developed that stresses the cooperation of public & private actors & the interplay between domestic & international levels. The article deals with the reasons for the transition from the first to the second institutional setting. It is argued that regulators choose different regulatory models depending on the type of regulatory problem they have to solve & on the strategic situation they face. In the 1980s, the strategic situation resembled a distributional conflict that could be solved by intergovernmental negotiations. In the 1990s, more complex types of financial risks have evolved that are turning regulation into a "game against nature." Negotiations are gradually being replaced by communication-based learning processes. Adapted from the source document.

The global financial crisis has transformed the relationship between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU). Until the crisis, the IMF had not lent to EU member states in decades, but now the two organisations closely coordinate their lending policies. In the Latvian and Romanian programmes, the IMF and the EU advocated different loan terms. Surprisingly, the EU embraced 'Washington Consensus'-style measures more willingly than did the IMF, which much of the contemporary literature still portrays as an across-the-board promoter of orthodox macroeconomic policies. We qualify this stereotypical characterisation by arguing from a constructivist perspective that the degree of an organisation's autonomy from its members depends on the interpretation of its mandate. IMF staff viewed the Fund's technical mandate as an opportunity to react rather flexibly to the challenges of the latest crisis. By contrast, European Commission, as well as European Central Bank (ECB), staff interpreted the vast body of supranational rules as necessitating stricter adherence to economic orthodoxy. Thus, IMF lending policies were more flexible and, at least on fiscal issues, also less contractionary. Adapted from the source document.

Our article seeks to enrich the debate on the 'hyridisation' of the German corporate governance system in both an empirical & a theoretical sense. Empirically, we are focusing on the rules which shape the distribution of influence & control over company policy among different groups of stakeholders. We perceive German corporate governance regulation as an institutional element of Germany's coordinated capitalism. We assume that conflicts over the design of the regulatory regime suggest conclusions about the willingness of important actors to defend or reform existing structures. Adapted from the source document.