"There has been increasing pressure from several parts of civil society for greater transparency around corporate political action. This volume puts forward a new norm of corporate political responsibility (CPR) to go alongside corporate social responsibility, exploring what it means and what will be required to make that norm a reality"--
"Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play an increasingly prominent role in addressing complex environmental issues such as climate change, persistent bio-accumulative pollutants, and the conservation of biodiversity. At the same time, the landscape in which they operate is changing rapidly. Markets, and direct engagement with industry, rather than traditional government regulation, are often the tools of choice for NGOs seeking to change corporate behavior today. Yet these new strategies are poorly understood'by business, academics, and NGOs themselves. How will NGOs choose which battles to fight, differentiate themselves from one another in order to attract membership and funding, and decide when to form alliances and when to work separately?
This is the first book to provide a hard-headed economic view of voluntary approaches to environmental issues. Both corporate and government initiatives are viewed within a political framework where special interest groups have powerful influence. It will appeal to business strategists and policy practitioners, as well as scholars and researchers
Zugriffsoptionen:
Die folgenden Links führen aus den jeweiligen lokalen Bibliotheken zum Volltext:
A key role of science-based non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is to communicate scientific knowledge to policymakers. However, recent evidence has emerged showing that industry-backed groups often attempt to undermine the credibility of such NGOs and weaken their ability to influence policy. To investigate the mechanisms by which a firm can profitably create doubt about scientific information, we use a signaling model of interest-group lobbying in which the policymaker has fixed costs of taking action. We explore two mechanisms for the creation of doubt. The first involves using Bayesian persuasion to imply that the NGO may be a radical extremist whose lobbying is not credible. The second involves the creation of a think tank which can offer its own testimony on scientific matters. We show the firm prefers that the think tank does not act as a credible moderate, but instead sometimes takes radical, non-credible, positions. We identify conditions under which each mechanism is preferred by the firm.