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AbstractAt the end of 1983, after a long and bitter political struggle, the Swedes adopted a system of wage earner funds. The five regionally-based funds are directed by boards dominated by employees. Using funds transferred to them by government, they invest in Swedish companies, primarily by buying shares on the stock market. The fund scheme will enable employees collectively to own about 10 per cent of Swedish business by 1990. They could control far more. Only experience can determine the impact of this new form of social ownership. But possibly the Swedes have found a socially and democratically appealing means of retaining the advantages of a market system while integrating social and economic forces.

Collectively owned funds, financed by a system of compulsory profit sharing and administered by employees and their unions.

AbstractOntario's two minority governments provide political scientists an opportunity to analyze how a government and legislature will function when executive control is curtailed by the electorate. It also affords an opportunity to observe the dynamics of legislative reform in a situation where backbenchers have unaccustomed clout. Relying on a survey of "insider" opinion, the article finds that MPPs showed little interest in reforms other than those which improved their services. Further, it finds that all the normal functions attributed to the legislature were performed better in a minority situation. However, while the majority of respondents had positive overall assessments of the minority experience, they had a variety of reservations about perpetuating it in some way. The article points up the dilemma that there appears to be no way to "capture" the widely recognized positive aspects of minority administrations within the norms of parliamentary government accepted by legislators and no willingness on their part to vary these norms.