Suchergebnisse

Abstract
We evaluate the welfare cost of housing transaction taxes with a new assignment model-based framework, where welfare effects are driven by distortions in the matching of houses and households. We calibrate the model with data from the Helsinki metropolitan region to assess the impact of a reform where an ad valorem transaction tax is replaced with a revenue-equivalent property tax. The aggregate welfare gain from this reform increases rapidly with the initial transaction tax rate, with the Laffer curve peaking at about 10%. The proportion of households that lose out from the reform is nevertheless increasing in the tax rate. We compare our model-based counterfactual aggregate welfare results with welfare calculations based on reduced-form estimates from previous policy evaluation studies; they are broadly in line, despite the latter using data from different housing markets at various levels and changes of the tax rate.

We consider the private economic incentives and the fiscal consequences related to informal long-term care by e.g. family members and formal care in institutions. We focus on the case where providing informal care implies less market work. In such cases, informal care reduces both private wage income and government tax revenue compared to formal care. On the other hand, the cost of formal care may be borne largely by the state. We provide a detailed quantitative analysis of the Finnish case. We describe how the private economic incentives and fiscal consequences relate to the wage level of the potential informal care provider and the income of the care receiver. We find that they vary greatly across individuals. It seems likely, however, that in most cases the fiscal cost of informal care is smaller than that of formal care. The private monetary incentives, on the other hand, tend favor formal care over informal care.

We develop an augmented Olley–Pakes (OP) decomposition that allows us to examine how entering and exiting firms contribute to the popular OP covariance measure of allocative efficiency. Applying the decomposition to a comprehensive micro‐level data, we find that a large part of the OP covariance component can be attributed to entrants and exiting firms. We also build a model of firm dynamics that is consistent with our main empirical results. In the model economy, the standard OP covariance component tends to increase with certain type of distortions because of endogenous changes in firm entry and exit.

We analyze housing taxation from a political economy perspective. Our aim is to understand why the US tax system favors owner housing with respect to business capital despite the efficiency losses involved. The starting point of our analysis is the observation that housing wealth is much more evenly distributed than total wealth. We build a simple dynamic general equilibrium model where households vote over the effective capital income tax rates for housing and business capital under a government budget constraint. We calibrate the model so that it roughly matches the joint distribution of total wealth and housing wealth among US households. The median voter turns out to be a household with a large share of his wealth in the form of housing. The key trade-off he faces is that a low tax rate on housing 1) shifts the tax burden to wealthier households but 2) leads to a high tax rate on business capital and hence low wages and high interest rates. In our calibrated model economy, the first effect dominates, and the equilibrium tax rate on housing is much lower than the tax rate on business capital. ; Tarkastelemme omistusasumisen verotuksellista asemaa poliittisen taloustieteen näkökulmasta. Pyrimme ymmärtämään, miksi verojärjestelmä suosii omistusasumista siitä aiheutuvista tehokkuustappioista huolimatta. Lähtökohtana on havainto, että asuntovarallisuus on paljon tasaisemmin jakautunut kotitalouksien kesken kuin finanssivarallisuus. Asuntovarallisuuden suosiminen finanssivarallisuuden kustannuksella siirtää tämän vuoksi suuren osan verorasituksesta kaikkein varakkaimmille kotitalouksille. Analyysiä varten rakennamme suhteellisen yksinkertaisen, neoklassiseen kasvumalliin perustuvan dynaamisen yleisen tasapainon mallin. Kalibroimme mallin siten, että se replikoi suhteellisen tarkasti kokonais- ja asuntovarallisuuden empiiriset jakaumat yhdysvaltalaisten kotitalouksien keskuudessa. Mallissa taloudenpitäjät äänestävät asuntoverotuksen ja muun pääomaverotuksen suhteesta. Suurin osa mediaaniäänestäjän kokonaisvarallisuudesta on asuntovarallisuutta. Tällöin asuntovarallisuuden suosiminen vähentää hänen omaa verorasitustaan. Toisaalta se myös vähentää tuotannollisen pääoman kertymistä laskien yleistä palkkatasoa ja nostaen korkotasoa. Mallissa ensimmäinen vaikutus dominoi ja poliittis-taloudellisessa tasapainossa omistusasumisen tuottoa verotetaan selvästi finanssivarallisuuden tuottoa kevyemmin. – Asuntoverotus ; pääomaverotus ; poliittinen taloustiede

Abstract
The draft treaty establishing a constitution for the European Union states that each member state may withdraw from the European Union following its own constitutional requirements. We argue that such a rule could lead into an increased use of threat of withdrawal to extract concessions in intergovernmental negotiations. This problem would be exacerbated by national electorates facing an incentive to elect more confrontational politicians. We also suggest a remedy: EU constitution should require that withdrawal from EU membership must be approved by the voters of the withdrawing member state in a referendum.

The draft treaty establishing a constitution for the European Union states that each member state may withdraw from the European Union following its own constitutional requirements. We argue that such a rule could lead into an increased use of threat of withdrawal to extract concessions in intergovernmental negotiations. This problem would be exacerbated by national electorates facing an incentive to elect more confrontational politicians. We also suggest a remedy: EU constitution should require that withdrawal from EU membership must be approved by the voters of the withdrawing member state in a referendum. ; Euroopan Unionin perustuslakiluonnoksen mukaan jokainen jäsenvaltio voi erota Unionista omien perustuslaillisten säädöstensä mukaisesti. Osoitamme, että tämä eroamista koskeva sääntö saattaa johtaa erouhkauksen käyttämiseen jäsenvaltioiden välisissä neuvotteluissa. Lisäksi se kannustaa jäsenvaltioiden äänestäjiä valitsemaan peräänantamattomia poliitikkoja, jotka ovat valmiita käyttämään erouhkausta saavuttaakseen omat neuvottelutavoitteensa. Ratkaisuna näihin ongelmiin ehdotamme EU:n perustuslakiluonnosta muutettavaksi siten, että jäsenvaltio voi erota Unionista ainoastaan, mikäli enemmistö sen kansalaisista kannattaa eroamista suorassa kansanäänestyksessä.

The Nordic welfare model has received a lot of positive attention around the world. High standard of living, small income disparities and substantial social mobility looks like a very attractive package. Moreover, sound public finances and strong emphasis on environmental sustainability suggest that today's success has not been accomplished at the expense of future generations. But is there really a unique "Nordic Supermodel", unshaken by the global economic crisis and capable of producing continuous high growth and world class welfare services when many developed economies struggle with the impacts of global competition and population ageing? This book shows that Nordic performance has not been quite as unique or uniform as often claimed. The recent global and European crisis and country specific shocks have affected also the Nordic countries, some of them very strongly. And there are as many variants of the Nordic model as there are Nordic countries. Going forward, also the Nordic countries will be challenged by ageing, globalisation and technological change, some more than the others. On the other hand many fundamentals remain strong in the Nordic countries, and, what is perhaps most important, the Nordics have proved themselves capable of adjusting. Labour market practices, pension policies, and production of public services have been reformed to match new circumstances. Public policies have been aimed at creating new jobs and helping people in transition, not at protecting uncompetitive businesses. There is a strong, rational tradition of consensual policy making. Further reforms are needed, and some widening of income disparities may be inevitable. The message of the book is, however, that refocused and recalibrated in a realistic scale the Nordic model has good chances of thriving well into the future.