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In: Economics as social theory
In: Journal of social ontology, Band 6, Heft 2, S. 245-263
ISSN: 2196-9663
Abstract
The suggestions outlined here include the following. Money is a bundle of institutionally sustained causal powers. Money is an institutional universal instantiated in generic currencies and particular money tokens. John Searle's account of institutional facts is not helpful for understanding the nature of money as an institution (while it may help to illuminate aspects of the nature of currencies and money particulars). The money universal is not a social convention in David Lewis's sense (while currencies and money particulars are characterized by high degrees of conventionality). The existence of the money universal is dependent on a larger institutional structure and cannot be understood in terms of collective belief or acceptance or agreement separately focusing on money. These claims have important implications for realism about money.
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 50, Heft 3, S. 215-237
ISSN: 1552-7441
Idealization is ubiquitous in human cognition, and so is the inclination to be puzzled by it: what to make of ideal gas, infinitely large populations, homo economicus, perfectly just society, known to violate matters of fact? This is apparent in social science theorizing (from J. H. von Thünen, J. S. Mill, and Max Weber to Milton Friedman and Thomas Schelling), recent philosophy of science analyzing scientific modeling, and the debate over ideal and non-ideal theory in political philosophy (since John Rawls). I will offer a set of concepts and principles to improve transparency about the precise contents of idealizations (in terms of negligibility, applicability, tractability, and early-step status) and their distinct functions (such as contributing to minimal modeling, benchmark modeling, and how-possibly modeling).
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 39, Heft 3, S. 351-380
ISSN: 1552-7441
The paper seeks to offer [1] an explication of a concept of economics imperialism, focusing on its epistemic aspects; and [2] criteria for its normative assessment. In regard to [1], the defining notion is that of explanatory unification across disciplinary boundaries. As to [2], three kinds of constraints are proposed. An ontological constraint requires an increased degree of ontological unification in contrast to mere derivational unification. An axiological constraint derives from variation in the perceived relative significance of the facts explained. An epistemological constraint requires strong fallibilism acknowledging a particularly severe epistemic uncertainty and proscribing against over-confident arrogance.
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 180, Heft 1, S. 47-63
ISSN: 1573-0964
The cultural and epistemic status of science is under attack. Social and cultural studies of science are widely perceived to offer evidence and arguments in support of an anti-science campaign. They portray science as a mundane social endeavour, akin to religion and politics, with no privileged access to truthful information about the (socially unconstructed) real world. Science is under threat and needs defence. Old philosophical legitimations have lost their bite. Alarm bells ring, new troops have to be mobilised. Call economics, the good old friend of the status quo depicting it as a generally beneficial social order while accommodating a rather mundane picture of human behaviour. In contrast to constructivist and relativist sociology of scientific knowledge, economic accounts of science seek to provide a rigorous defence of the cultural and epistemic legitimacy of science by accommodating plausible elements in the sociological accounts and by embedding them in invisible-hand arguments about the functioning of some market-like structure within science. Viewed through economic spectacles, science re-emerges from the ashes as stronger and more beautiful than ever. A spectator raises an innocent question: is economics itself strong and beautiful enough to offer such alleviating services? In order to examine the emerging issue of disciplinary credibility, we need to look at economics itself more closely, and we need to address traditional issues in the philosophy of science as well as less traditional issues of reflexivity. We will see that the above caricature concerning the role of economics in the science wars calls for heavy qualifications if not wholesale rejection (no comment here on the caricatured role of the SSK). ; Peer reviewed
BASE
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 31, Heft 4, S. 488-506
ISSN: 1552-7441
Explanatory unification—the urge to "explain much by little"—serves as an ideal of theorizing not only in natural sciences but also in the social sciences, most notably in economics. The ideal is occasionally challenged by appealing to the complexity and diversity of social systems and processes in space and time. This article proposes to accommodate such doubts by making a distinction between two kinds of unification and suggesting that while such doubts may be justified in regard to mere derivational unification (which serves as a formal constraint on theories), it is less justified in the case of ontological unification (which is a result of factual discovery of the actual degree of underlying unity in the world).
In: Kyklos: international review for social sciences, Band 53, Heft 3, S. 317-335
ISSN: 1467-6435
In an insightful article published in this journal, Alan Musgrave (1981) has argued that once we distinguish between three types of assumptions, Milton Friedman's F‐twist – according to which the truth of the assumptions of an economic theory is irrelevant to its acceptability – can be untwisted. It is shown that once we bring in more clarity on the formal identity of the different kinds of assumptions, Musgrave's contribution can be further defined: distinctions can be drawn between detectability and negligibility assumptions, and between domain and acceptability assumptions; the suggested gap between as‐if assumptions and other kinds can be removed; another type, that of joint neglibility assumption, can be introduced; the untwisting of the F‐twist can be accepted in all cases except in the case of early‐step (heuristic) assumptions; and the art of paraphrase is shown to constitute the basis for Musgrave's strategy and to have limits.
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 5-31
ISSN: 1552-7441
Ronald Coase has been a vigorous critic of mainstream economic theory, arguing that it is unrealistic and that a good theory is realistic. The attributes "realistic" and "unrealistic" appear in three senses at least in Coase: one related to narrow ness and breadth; another related to abstracting from particularities (and the issue of "blackboard economics"); and the third related to correspondence with the legal. This does not yet make Coase an advocate of realism. It is therefore separately argued that each of the three kinds of "realisticness" as a property of theories is consistent with realism as a theory of theories.
In: Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae
In: Dissertationes humanarum litterarum 55
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 54, Heft 5, S. 412-441
ISSN: 1552-7441
The literature on pluralism in economics has focused on the benefits expected from the plurality of theories, methods, and frameworks. This overlooks half of the picture: the costs. Neither have the multifarious costs been systematically analyzed in philosophy of science. We begin rectifying this neglect. We discuss how the benefits of plurality and diversity in science presuppose distinct types of plurality and how various benefit and plurality types are associated with different types of costs. Finally, we ponder how the general mechanisms that give rise to the costs of plurality and diversity are aggravated by various disciplinary characteristics of economics.