Suchergebnisse

Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol is likely to leave Russia and other Eastern European countries with market power in the market for emission permits. Ceteris paribus, this will raise the permit price above the competitive permit price. However, Russia is also a large exporter of fossil fuels. A high price on emission permits may lower the producer price on fossil fuels. Thus, if Russia coordinates its permit market and fossil fuel market policies, market power will not necessarily lead to a higher permit price. Fossil fuel producers may also exert market power in the permit market, provided they conceive the permit price to be influenced by their production volumes. If higher volumes drive up the permit price, Russian fuel producers may become more aggressive relative to their competitors in the fuel markets if the sale of fuels is coordinated with the sale of permits. The result is reversed if high fuel production drives the permit price down.

Background: Multiple principles are relevant in priority setting, two of which are often considered particularly important. According to the greater benefit principle, resources should be directed toward the intervention with the greater health benefit. This principle is intimately linked to the goal of health maximization and standard cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA). According to the worse off principle, resources should be directed toward the intervention benefiting those initially worse off. This principle is often linked to an idea of equity. Together, the two principles accord with prioritarianism; a view which can motivate non-standard CEA. Crucial for the actual application of prioritarianism is the trade-off between the two principles, and this trade-off has received scant attention when the worse off are specified in terms of lifetime health. This paper sheds light on that specific trade-off and on the public support for prioritarianism by providing fresh empirical evidence and by clarifying the close links between the findings and normative theory. Methods: A new, self-administered, computer-based questionnaire was used, to which 96 students in Norway responded. How respondents wanted to balance quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) gained against benefiting those with few lifetime QALYs was quantified for a range of different cases. Results: Respondents supported both principles and were willing to make trade-offs in a particular way. In the baseline case, the median response valued a QALY 3.3 and 2.5 times more when benefiting someone with lifetime QALYs of 10 and 25 rather than 70. Average responses harbored fundamental disagreements and varied modestly across distributional settings. Conclusion: In the specific context of lifetime health, the findings underscore the insufficiency of pure QALY maximization and explicate how people make trade-offs in a way that can help operationalize lifetime prioritarianism and non-standard CEA. Seen through the lens of normative theory, the findings highlight key challenges for prioritarianism applied to priority setting. ; publishedVersion

Abstract Background The implementation of decentralisation reforms in the health sector of Tanzania started in the 1980s. These reforms were intended to relinquish substantial powers and resources to districts to improve the development of the health sector. Little is known about the impact of decentralisation on recruitment and distribution of health workers at the district level. Reported difficulties in recruiting health workers to remote districts led the Government of Tanzania to partly re-instate central recruitment of health workers in 2006. The effects of this policy change are not yet documented. This study highlights the experiences and challenges associated with decentralisation and the partial re-centralisation in relation to the recruitment and distribution of health workers. Methods An exploratory qualitative study was conducted among informants recruited from five underserved, remote districts of mainland Tanzania. Additional informants were recruited from the central government, the NGO sector, international organisations and academia. A comparison of decentralised and the reinstated centralised systems was carried out in order to draw lessons necessary for improving recruitment, distribution and retention of health workers. Results The study has shown that recruitment of health workers under a decentralised arrangement has not only been characterised by complex bureaucratic procedures, but by severe delays and sometimes failure to get the required health workers. The study also revealed that recruitment of highly skilled health workers under decentralised arrangements may be both very difficult and expensive. Decentralised recruitment was perceived to be more effective in improving retention of the lower cadre health workers within the districts. In contrast, the centralised arrangement was perceived to be more effective both in recruiting qualified staff and balancing their distribution across districts, but poor in ensuring the retention of employees. Conclusion A combination of centralised and decentralised recruitment represents a promising hybrid form of health sector organisation in managing human resources by bringing the benefits of two worlds together. In order to ensure that the potential benefits of the two approaches are effectively integrated, careful balancing defining the local-central relationships in the management of human resources needs to be worked out.

Background: The implementation of decentralisation reforms in the health sector of Tanzania started in the 1980s. These reforms were intended to relinquish substantial powers and resources to districts to improve the development of the health sector. Little is known about the impact of decentralisation on recruitment and distribution of health workers at the district level. Reported difficulties in recruiting health workers to remote districts led the Government of Tanzania to partly re-instate central recruitment of health workers in 2006. The effects of this policy change are not yet documented. This study highlights the experiences and challenges associated with decentralisation and the partial re-centralisation in relation to the recruitment and distribution of health workers. Methods: An exploratory qualitative study was conducted among informants recruited from five underserved, remote districts of mainland Tanzania. Additional informants were recruited from the central government, the NGO sector, international organisations and academia. A comparison of decentralised and the reinstated centralised systems was carried out in order to draw lessons necessary for improving recruitment, distribution and retention of health workers. Results: The study has shown that recruitment of health workers under a decentralised arrangement has not only been characterised by complex bureaucratic procedures, but by severe delays and sometimes failure to get the required health workers. The study also revealed that recruitment of highly skilled health workers under decentralised arrangements may be both very difficult and expensive. Decentralised recruitment was perceived to be more effective in improving retention of the lower cadre health workers within the districts. In contrast, the centralised arrangement was perceived to be more effective both in recruiting qualified staff and balancing their distribution across districts, but poor in ensuring the retention of employees. Conclusion: A combination of centralised and decentralised recruitment represents a promising hybrid form of health sector organisation in managing human resources by bringing the benefits of two worlds together. In order to ensure that the potential benefits of the two approaches are effectively integrated, careful balancing defining the local-central relationships in the management of human resources needs to be worked out. ; publishedVersion