Does the empirical trust literature tell us how to restore trust?
In: Critical review of international social and political philosophy: CRISPP, Volume 26, Issue 4, p. 593-600
ISSN: 1743-8772
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In: Critical review of international social and political philosophy: CRISPP, Volume 26, Issue 4, p. 593-600
ISSN: 1743-8772
In: Applied Economics, Volume 41, Issue 18, p. 2369-2384
This paper analyses the voting and abstention patterns in French departments in the 1992 referendum on the Maastricht treaty, in light of the potential impact of monetary union. We observe that departmental characteristics implying either greater benefits or lower costs from monetary union are significantly correlated with the approval rate. This supports the view that the voting behaviour of individual agents depended on their self-interest. The impact of economic characteristics on the abstention rate is less clear. Indeed, the variable that is most significantly correlated with abstention in the referendum is average abstention in other elections.
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 24, Issue 1, p. 269-279
In: The Manchester School, Volume 72, Issue 3, p. 298-316
ISSN: 1467-9957
In this paper we investigate the consequences of elections on the willingness of office‐motivated governments to defend a pre‐announced parity in the presence of output shocks in a fixed exchange rate regime with an escape clause. Knowing that voters rationally interpret realignments as a sign of incompetence, incumbents refrain from realigning before elections. They can do so either when they are competent or when shocks are small enough. Realignments are therefore more likely and output is less volatile on the morrow than on the eve of elections. The welfare impact of elections is ambiguous.
In: Revue économique, Volume 55, Issue 1, p. 21
ISSN: 1950-6694
In: Revue économique, Volume 50, Issue 1, p. 87-112
ISSN: 1950-6694
In: Journal of institutional economics, p. 1-15
ISSN: 1744-1382
AbstractWe study the impact of democratic transitions on institutional outcomes. Using an event study method and a sample of 135 countries over the period 1984–2016, we observe that democratic transitions improve institutional outcomes. The effect appears within 3 years after the transition year. The results are robust to alternative definitions of transitions, alternative codings of pre- and post-transition years, and changing the set of control variables. We also find that both full and partial democratizations improve institutional outcomes. Transitions out of military regimes or communist autocracies do not. The effect of democratization depends on GDP per capita, education, and the regularity of the transition. Finally, the evidence suggests that the effect is particularly clear on the corruption, law and order, and military in politics dimensions of the index.
In: European journal of political economy, Volume 67, p. 101962
ISSN: 1873-5703
The relationship between decentralization and corruption has been discussed extensively, but little is known about the variation of corruption across government levels. Using an original survey where French citizens were asked to assess corruption at all levels of government, we observe that corruption perceived at a government level is higher, the higher the government level in the government hierarchy. Specifically, municipal governments are perceived as the least corrupt, followed by local governments, senators, deputies, and the national cabinet. The president of the Republic is perceived as slightly less corrupt than the national cabinet, but more corrupt than any other level of government. The relationship is robust to alternative specifications, controlling for a series of individual and regional characteristics, and to alternative definitions of the dependent variable. The finding is not reducible to geographic distance. We observe it in several other countries. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/inPress
BASE
In this online appendix, we provide extra evidence complementing our paper "A time to throw stones, a time to reap: How long does it take for democratic transitions to improve institutional outcomes?" accepted for publication in the Journal of Institutional Economics. First, we provide additional information on the dataset and the sample. Second, we discuss four democratic transitions that illustrate our main finding: Bangladesh in 1991, Senegal in 2000, Hungary in 1990, and Nicaragua in 1990. Third, we report a series of robustness checks: a non-parametric test, using alternative definitions of transitions, using an alternative set of control variables, dropping former socialist countries, including region-specific effects, distinguishing types of transitions, conditioning the effect of democratic transitions on GDP per capita, education, and whether the transfer of power was regular or not. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published
BASE
An experiment using a representative survey of the German population shows that letting respondents report a number rather than asking them to choose from a list of predefined ranges lowers the response rate for both perceived past and expected inflation and decreases (increases) reported past (expected) inflation. Income, education, gender, objective and subjective knowledge about monetary policy, and political affiliation affect the effect's size but not its sign. East and West German respondents who were 15 or older when the Berlin Wall fell have reactions different from those who were younger at that time, which supports the 'impressionable years' hypothesis based on different inflation experiences.
BASE
The relationship between decentralization and corruption has been discussed extensively, but little is known about the variation of corruption across government levels. Using an original survey where French citizens were asked to assess corruption at all levels of government, we observe that corruption perceived at a government level is higher, the higher the government level in the government hierarchy. Specifically, municipal governments are perceived as the least corrupt, followed by local governments, senators, deputies, and the national cabinet. The president of the Republic is perceived as slightly less corrupt than the national cabinet, but more corrupt than any other level of government. The relationship is robust to alternative specifications, controlling for a series of individual and regional characteristics, and to alternative definitions of the dependent variable. The finding is not reducible to geographic distance. We observe it in several other countries. ; SCOPUS: ar.j ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published
BASE
In: British journal of political science, Volume 51, Issue 3, p. 1332-1339
ISSN: 1469-2112
Using an original survey where French citizens were asked to assess corruption at all levels of government, we observe that institutional distance increases perceived corruption. Specifically, municipal governments are perceived as the least corrupt, followed by local governments, senators, deputies, and the national cabinet. The president of the Republic is perceived as slightly less corrupt than the national cabinet, but more corrupt than any other level of government. The relation is robust to alternative specifications, controlling for a series of individual and regional characteristics, and to alternative definitions of the dependent variable. It is not reducible to geographical distance. We observe similar results in other countries. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published
BASE
In: Review of International Economics, Volume 26, Issue 1, p. 37-59
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