Suchergebnisse

Many studies have been or are about to be published on options for structuring national emission commitments after the first Kyoto period:' providing a large 'toolbox' for use if and as the world moves towards negotiations on future commitments.' The widespread assumption is that negotiations will rapidly extend to include quantified commitments for most, if not all, developing countries in the second period; indeed this is being more actively pursued by the Kyoto Annex I Parties as a way of 'getting the US back on board'. However, progress is highly implausible until the US first re-enters the global negotiations. The impasse at COP8 in Delhi and the long history of attempts to discuss developing-country commitments before it illustrate the need to explore the political process, and what lies beneath it, before ideas on the merits of different designs can find application in negotiations. This study considers these more fundamental questions.

The decision at the recent UN climate change conference in Nairobi to adopt a 'one-country-one-vote' procedure for the governance of the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund could help secure political acceptance for that fund, particularly among the many small and weaker constituents. But only if voting can be guaranteed. This paper argues that in order to safeguard the voice of these constituents, the voting procedure should be augmented by the right for (groups of) countries to force a secret vote, and to introduce motions to be decided by the Adaptation Fund governing body. The decision, in turn, to place the Adaptation Fund under the direct authority of the Kyoto Protocol governing body (COP/MOP) implies, the paper argues, that the climate change (UNFCCC) focal points of the relevant countries should be the voting constituency, and that they should have their own representative committee – selected by the COP/MOP – on the executive body of the Adaptation Fund.

There is a strongly held view in the policy analysis community and beyond that developing countries will play a significant role in determining the success of the multilateral climate change regime under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC). It is equally widely understood that, consequently, success will not be forthcoming unless the key concerns of these countries - particularly those pertaining to inequities - are sufficiently taken into account in the future development of the regime. In 'Diagnosing the Divide,' this study detects a clear North-South Divide in the views on the nature of the paramount climate change equity problem. In the Northern hemisphere, where the relevant discussion is spearheaded by non-government stakeholders (academic, EGO), it is regarded to be the issue of allocating emission mitigation targets; in the South, the concern - reflected by many governments - is above all about the discrepancy between the responsibility for, and the sharing of climate impact burdens. Acknowledging the importance for the global climate change regime to continue its efforts in avoiding and limiting future anthropogenic climate-related disasters, the second part of this study ('Bridging the Divide: Redressing The Balance') argues that we have passed the point where complete avoidance could have been assured, and that consequently the regime must face up to this inevitability and begin to prepare appropriate impact/disaster response measures. Given the existing threat, particular urgency is attached to a proposal for reform of the relevant disaster relief funding mechanism by creating an FCCC Climate Impact Relief (CIR) Fund to achieve an international relief system adequate to the challenge. Because this is to involve merely a more efficient funding mode, such a reform could be carried out with little or no additional costs (no 'new money'), yet with significant benefits to the international community.

The world has reached a stage where even a rapid stabilisation and significant reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions could no longer prevent significant climate change. While all countries will experience impacts, the developing world is most vulnerable. Significant financial assistance for adaptation is needed (and would be cost-effective), but current proposals are inadequate. At the same time, aviation emissions are increasing rapidly and are likely to continue to do so in the absence of major policy changes. Solutions to the challenges of adaptation finance and aviation emissions are both urgently required. This paper highlights political advantages and moral reasons to link the problems together (and absence of reasons in economic theory not to). Solving both problems by an International Air Travel Adaptation Levy (IATAL) – or an emissions trading scheme with auction revenues hypothecated for adaptation – is ethically, economically and politically attractive.