Suchergebnisse

The article is devoted to the study of the system of communicative freedoms in Ukraine and Germany and their constitutional and legal regulation. The theoretical basis of the study were the works of Ukrainian, German and Swiss legal scholars devoted to the analysis of these freedoms of individuals. The study analyzed the provisions of the legislation of Ukraine and the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as acts of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine and the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany on constitutional and legal regulation and interpretation of the protection of communication freedoms. The research methodology consisted of general scientific and special legal methods of scientific cognition, in particular: historical method, structural-systemic and comparative-legal research methods. Based on the study, it was concluded that the Constitution of Germany, in contrast to the Basic Law of Ukraine, established a systematic approach to communication freedoms of individuals. The elements of this system are: freedom of opinion, freedom of speech (press); freedom of speech, freedom of cinema, freedom of information, freedom of science and teaching, freedom of art. The purpose of such freedoms is, on the one hand, to guarantee everyone a real opportunity to freely express and disseminate their views orally, in writing, graphically, and, on the other hand, to ensure public interest in providing unbiased information from various sources public opinion and the democratic decision-making process. Certain communication freedoms in Ukraine do not have constitutional and legal regulation, for example, freedom of cinema. For some of them, the scope of constitutional and legal protection is not clearly defined, for example, regarding academic freedom, freedom of art, freedom of information. In our opinion, the definition of the scope of such protection should take place not at the level of the Constitution of Ukraine, but at the level of acts of interpretation of the Basic Law of Ukraine by the Constitutional Court ...

The article is devoted to the study of the limits of the constitutional and legal guarantee and protection of the freedom of cinema as a communicative freedom. The research methodology consisted of general scientific and special legal methods of scientific cognition, in particular: historical method, structural-systemic and comparative-legal research methods. The theoretical basis of the study were the works of Ukrainian, German and Swiss legal scholars, devoted to the analysis of this freedom of individuals. The study analyzed the legislation of Ukraine and the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as some decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, which are devoted to justifying the limits of protection and guarantee of freedom of cinema in Germany. Based on the study, it was concluded that Ukraine has not developed a comprehensive approach to the constitutional and legal protection of cinema freedom. At the level of Ukrainian legislation, a clear concept of protection of this communicative freedom has not been formed. At the same time, this freedom in Germany has not only been constitutionally regulated, but is also an element of the system of communicative freedoms. Freedom of cinema as a communicative freedom is subject to the common goal that is inherent in any communicative freedom - to be a means of conveying views, beliefs and other information from the author of the film to the audience. The boundaries of the constitutional and legal protection of freedom of cinema are determined by the following criteria: a) the concept of the film; b) the concept of reporting; c) the field of personal protection. We propose to establish a constitutional and legal protection of freedom of cinema through the protection of freedoms of art. To do this, we propose to make changes and additions to Part 1 of Art. 54 of the Constitution of Ukraine and enshrine the following provision: "Everyone is guaranteed freedom of art, scientific and technical creativity, protection of intellectual property, their ...

The article is devoted to the study of the right to state compensation and the resulting institution of material responsibility of the state in Ukraine and Germany. The research methodology consisted of general scientific and special legal methods of scientific cognition, in particular structural-systemic and comparative-legal research methods. The study analyzed the legislation of Ukraine and the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as some decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, which are devoted to this topic. As a result of the study, the following conclusions can be drawn: The formation of the institution of material responsibility of public administration in Ukraine can be divided into two periods: a) to the 90s of the twentieth century. During this historical period, those states that existed on the territory of modern Ukraine either rejected the idea of such responsibility (Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires), or it was not implemented (UPR, Hetman Skoropadsky, Directory), or deliberately restrained the development of this Institute of General Administrative Law (Ukraine during the Soviet Union); b) the period from the 90s of the twentieth century - until now. This is the period of recognition of the obligation of the state to compensate material damage to an individual for his decisions, actions or omissions. De facto, the right to state compensation was also recognized. There was a primary system of norms, which is the legal basis for this right of individuals and the institution of material responsibility of the state, represented by public administration. At present, they are not enough for the effective functioning of this institution of General Administrative Law. In Germany, the formation of the right to state compensation and the institution of material responsibility of the state covers a period of more than two hundred years. During this period, not only the system of normative-legal regulation of legal relations arising in this regard between the state and individuals, but ...

The article is devoted to the study of the limits of the constitutional and legal guarantee and protection of the freedom of art as a communicative freedom. The research methodology consisted of general scientific and special legal methods of scientific cognition, in particular structural-systemic and comparative-legal research methods. The theoretical basis of the study were the works of Ukrainian, German and Swiss legal scholars, devoted to the analysis of this freedom of individuals. The study analyzed the legislation of Ukraine and the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as some decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, which are devoted to justifying the limits of protection and guarantee of freedom of cinema in Germany. As a result of the study, the following conclusions can be drawn: The Constitution of Ukraine has not properly defined the limits of constitutional and legal protection of freedom of art. The solution to this problem is possible either by making changes and additions to Part 1 of Art. 54 of the Constitution of Ukraine through the direct consolidation of this freedom, or through the adoption of a special interpretative act by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, which would extend the protection of freedom of literary and artistic creativity to all types of freedom of art. Freedom of art is one of the communicative freedoms, the purpose of which is to convey views, beliefs and other information from one person (artist) to another individual. This functional purpose of these freedoms specifies the scope of protection and the limits of guaranteeing the freedom of art. At the same time, this freedom does not guarantee the property rights and interests that arise in connection with the dissemination of a work of art. The category "art" is crucial for understanding the essence of freedom of art as communicative freedom. In Germany, the idea of enshrining the list of arts at the legislative level was rejected. Instead, three concepts have been introduced that, in combination, make ...

The article is devoted to the study of criteria for restricting the right to unite in political parties through the prism of international law, legal regulation of Ukraine and Germany. The research used a wide range of general scientific and special legal methods of scientific knowledge, in particular: the method of dialectical logic, comparative law, formal law and system-structural research methods. As a result of the study, the author substantiates the scientific position that international law, the legislation of Ukraine and the Federal Republic of Germany recognizes the possibility of restricting the right to freedom of association in political parties and defines a system of criteria for such restriction. A comparative legal analysis of the norms of international law, the provisions of the legislation of Ukraine and the legislation of Germany allows us to conclude that the system of restriction of this political human right introduced in Ukraine generally meets international standards. It includes the following criteria for restricting this right: unconstitutional goals of a political party; propaganda by the political party of the communist and National Socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes in Ukraine and the use of their symbols; formal criterion; violation of the ban on paramilitary formations; formal existence of a political party without the actual participation of the latter in the political life of Ukraine. It is proved that the legal regulation of the restriction of the right to unite in political parties needs to be improved, in particular through amendments to the special Law of Ukraine "On Political Parties in Ukraine". They should concern: the ban on the existence of armed groups at the disposal of a political party; prohibition of the use of the official name and symbols of a registered political party by those cells that have officially left its membership; improving the mechanism of control over the implementation of the decision to ban the activities of a political party by the public ...

The article is devoted to the study of "youth protection" as a separate criterion for restricting the right to information. During the research a wide range of general scientific and special-legal methods of scientific cognition was used, in particular: the method of dialectical logic, comparative-legal, formal-legal and system-structural methods of scientific research. Their application allowed to explore this topic in the unity of legal form and social content. The conducted comparative legal study of the legislation and law enforcement practice of "youth protection in the field of mass media" of Ukraine and Germany allows to make the following conclusions and proposals to strengthen its regulatory and institutional support. The absence of a comprehensive mechanism for the protection of youth in the media in Ukraine is stated. Instead, there is a fragmented set of elements of this mechanism, which does not allow for systematic protection of young people from harmful information coming from different media. It is proved that the German model of "protection of youth in the media" is quite effective and consists of a normative component, primarily in the form of a special Jugendschutzgesetz - JuSchG (Federal Law "On Youth Protection") and an institutional component, which is presented primarily by the BundesprüfstellefürjugendgefährdendeMedien (BPjM) (Federal Inspectorate for Mass Media Harmful to Youth). The necessity of strengthening normative and institutional support of "protection of young people in the field of mass media" in Ukraine is substantiated. It is proposed to develop and adopt a special law "On the Protection of Children in the Media", which will be the legal basis for the protection of young people in this area in Ukraine. Institutional support is proposed to be strengthened through the creation of a separate state inspection for media that are harmful to children, which should be subordinated to the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine. This subject of public administration should ...

The article is devoted to the study of public and legal support of human dignity in Ukraine. The article analyzes the normative regulation of this fundamental human right at the level of the Constitution of Ukraine, laws of Ukraine and decisions of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. Separately, domestic and foreign studies are devoted to the legal study of human dignity. On the basis of the conducted research it is found out that legal relations arising from guaranteeing, securing and protecting the right of human dignity are regulated by the norms of public (constitutional, administrative and criminal) and private (civil) law. At present, public-law regulation of the human dignity right in Ukraine is truncated, since the Constitution of Ukraine does not specify the directions of guaranteeing, ensuring and absolute protection of this fundamental human right, and the Criminal Code regulates only certain aspects of its protection. Strengthening public-law protection of the human dignity right should be done first and foremost by improving the legal regulation of this fundamental human right. We propose to adopt a special law on the protection of human dignity, which should become the legal basis for the protection of this fundamental human right by the state and individuals. In addition, it is necessary to make changes to Art. 28 of the Constitution of Ukraine and change the constitutional formula "respect for human dignity" to "absolute protection of human dignity". Human dignity should be central to the system of constitutional values. We propose to introduce in Ukraine a system of constitutional values, which is now embodied in Germany and provides for the division of such values into: a) intact (human dignity) and b) those that may be interfered with and restricted in cases defined by law (human life, her health, human freedom, property, etc.). Given this, we propose to amend Art. 3 of the Constitution of Ukraine and normatively establish in it an appropriate system of constitutional values.

The article is devoted to the concretization of the content of the right to human dignity as a foundation for other human rights, measures the definition of their essence and the criterion of admissibility of restrictions on human rights and freedoms. To achieve the goal of the study, the author analyzes the provisions of Ukrainian and German legislation on the legal regulation of human rights, as well as studies of domestic and German researchers on the content and characteristics of this fundamental human right. As a result of the study, the following conclusions were made: The Constitution and national legislation of Ukraine do not develop the idea that the right to human dignity is a value that fills human existence with meaning, is the foundation for all other constitutional rights, a measure of their essence and a criterion for possible limitations of such rights. A holistic, systematic approach to the right to human dignity is formed within the framework of the German fundamental doctrine of human rights. This is due to the fact that the current doctrine of this fundamental human right in Germany is the result of long-term evolution and scientific research of German legal scholars. The status of the right to human dignity as the highest value is due to the following characteristics: it is an integral property of every person; excludes the possibility of transforming a person into an object, primarily in relations with the state; belongs to everyone regardless of age, gender, race, religion, political beliefs and other characteristics; exists as in the conceived, however, not yet born man and continues to exist in man after his death; cannot be violated under any circumstances. The right to human dignity is the foundation of all other constitutional rights. This characteristic of this fundamental right is due to the fact that everyone is a free individual, a spiritual a nd moral being who has the right to freely define and develop themselves. This reveals the connection between the right to human dignity ...

The article is devoted to the study of the doctrine of formalized and non-formalized basic human rights in Ukraine and Germany. To achieve this research goal, the following research objectives have been identified: 1) to outline a subsystem of formalized fundamental human rights and freedoms in accordance with the German fundamental doctrine of fundamental human rights; 2) identify the subsystem of unformalized basic human rights and freedoms in accordance with the German fundamental doctrine of fundamental human rights, to name the problems of its functioning; 3) to analyze the national doctrine of formalized and non-formalized human rights and freedoms, to make proposals on the development of the theory and practice of affirmation and maintenance of human rights and freedoms in Ukraine. As a result of the study, the following conclusions are made: a) It is found that one of the dimensions of the existence of the human rights and freedoms system in Germany is its division into: formalized (written) and unformalized (unwritten) human rights. However, both types of human rights have equal constitutional status; b) It is stated that the formation of the human rights system, both formalized and unformalized, is not monopolized by the state. Legal science is actively involved in the formation of this system. Scientists' conclusions and suggestions, both on the list and on the content of individual human rights, are applied at the same level as the legislation in the exercise of a specific human right or freedom in Germany; c) it is determined that the list of unformalized (unwritten) human rights in Germany is open, as new informal human rights can emerge as a result of the activities of both the judiciary and the state; d) it is stated that in Ukraine only formalized human rights that have a normatively defined mechanism of their realization are able to be asserted and secured by the Ukrainian state. Informal rights can exist only in the form of scientific theories and concepts, but do not have a real dimension of ...

The article analyzes the stages of prenatal human development, scientific approaches to understanding the legal nature of the embryo and fetus, identifies the grounds and limits of the limitations on the right to an expected life. The legal and moral aspects of prenatal human development, the system of regulatory and institutional guarantees in Ukraine and Germany are considered. The right of every person to be born is one of the fundamental natural human rights as well as an element of the constitutional right to life. The specificity of the realization of this right lies in the fact that, in order for the embryo to begin with a fruit, and eventually a person, has acquired legal capacity, the consent of his future mother is required. Thus, the realization of the right to a still unborn child depends on the subjective desire of the woman to leave the child or to interrupt the pregnancy. From the moment of the conceiving of the child, the human embryo has all the characteristics of the human individual, while throughout the fetal development of the new human body cannot be considered part of the mother's body, it is genetically different from the mother and bodily independently. Moreover, one cannot consider the embryo as an object, for which there may be a relationship of property character. The right to future life requires a high level of protection and guarantees from the Ukrainian state. It is advisable to take over the experience of the Federal Republic of Germany in the field of human rights protection, where the protection of even the early forms of a child's life was protected at the legislative level, and to consolidate the right to protect the life of the future child to the mother as an independent legal interest throughout the pregnancy. This protection should have the advantage over the right of women to self-determination. We propose to establish the mechanism of such guarantee in the special Law of Ukraine "On Guaranteeing and Protecting the Right to Expected Life in Ukraine", and also consider it ...