Suchergebnisse

Since the beginning of the eighties, there is a significant increase in the number of banking crises at a worldwide level, in parallel with a surge in financial system development. The subprimes crisis, because of its recessive length and intensity without equivalent since the Great Depression of the thirties, has re-launched the debate on the role played by financial development in the amplification of both financial instability and economic shocks. Despite a large number of studies stressing that banking sector is a key factor to understand the outbreak and consequences of banking crises, no econometric analysis as so far assessed precisely the effect of financial development, viewed from the standpoint of both size and activity of financial intermediaries, on the occurrence and consequences of banking crises. It is precisely the goal of this thesis. In chapter I, we put our analysis into a long term perspective by proposing a history of financial crises from the 17th century until now. Then, based on a sample covering the main banking crises that happened in developing and developed countries over the last forty years, the thesis analyzes the effects of financial development on banking crises through four dimensions. We investigate the role played by financial development in the occurrence (chapter II), the duration and the cost for the real economy (chapter III) and also the redistributive impact (chapter IV) of banking crises. The results of these three chapters converge and highlight that more developed financial systems are associated with banking crises that are more numerous, last longer, are more costly for the real economy and lead to a larger surge in economic inequalities. Our work thus brings an insightful analysis of the effect of financial development on the causes and consequences of banking crises. In an international environment still facing the recessive impact of the subprimes crisis, the general conclusion of the thesis supports the view that in order to promote financial stability and a greater ability for economies to deal with negative shocks, governments should implement public policies aiming at strictly limiting the size and activity of the banking sector. ; Depuis le début des années 1980, on observe une augmentation importante du nombre de crises bancaires, combinée en parallèle à un essor important des systèmes financiers. La crise des subprimes de 2007-2008, par sa durée et son intensité récessive sans précédent depuis la Grande Dépression des années 1930, a relancé le débat sur le rôle joué par le développement financier dans l'accroissement de l'instabilité financière et l'amplification des chocs économiques. Or, bien qu'un grand nombre d'études soulignent que le fonctionnement du secteur bancaire constitue un facteur essentiel pour comprendre les dynamiques associées à la survenue ainsi qu'aux conséquences des crises bancaires, aucune analyse économétrique n'a jusqu'à présent évalué précisément l'effet qu'exerce le développement financier, considéré sous l'angle de la taille et de l'activité des intermédiaires financiers, sur l'origine et l'amplification des conséquences des crises bancaires. Il s'agit précisément de l'objectif de cette thèse. Pour cela, nous proposons dans le chapitre I de replacer notre étude dans une perspective de long terme au travers d'une histoire des crises financières du XVIIe siècle jusqu'à nos jours. Puis, sur la base d'un échantillon couvrant les principales crises bancaires qui se sont produites dans les pays développés et en développement durant les quarante dernières années, cette thèse analyse l'effet qu'exerce le développement financier sur les crises bancaires selon quatre dimensions. Nous nous intéressons au rôle que joue le développement financier sur la probabilité d'occurrence (chapitre II), l'amplification de la durée et du coût pour l'économie réelle (chapitre III), ainsi que l'impact redistributif (chapitre IV) des crises bancaires. Les résultats de ces trois chapitres vont dans le même sens et mettent en évidence que des systèmes financiers plus développés sont associés à des crises bancaires caractérisées par une probabilité d'occurrence, une durée, une contraction de la production et une hausse des inégalités de revenus significativement plus importantes. Notre travail apporte donc un éclairage précis et univoque quant au rôle joué par le développement financier tant au niveau des causes que des conséquences des crises bancaires. Dans un environnement international encore marqué par l'impact récessif de la crise des subprimes, la conclusion générale de la thèse soutient l'idée selon laquelle la promotion de la stabilité financière, ainsi que de la capacité de résilience des économies aux chocs passent par la mise en œuvre de la part des gouvernements de mesures visant à limiter de façon plus contraignante la taille et l'activité du secteur bancaire.

International audience ; Although the empirical literature on the determinants of economic growth volatility highlights a robust stabilizing effect of democratic regimes compared to dictatorships, no study focused so far on identifying the precise political institutions explaining this stabilizing effect. We open the political institutions black-box associated to democratic regimes, and study the effects of disaggregated political institutions on macroeconomic volatility along five institutional dimensions, namely forms of government, electoral rules, state forms, the number of veto players, and the age of democracies. Using a large panel of 140 countries over 1975-2007, we show that institutional details are of crucial importance, since the stabilizing effect of democracies depends on the precise institutional dimensions at work. Thus, our study contributes to the institutional design debate, by showing that the simple promotion of democratic regimes might not be sufficient to foster a more stable development path.

International audience ; Although the empirical literature on the determinants of economic growth volatility highlights a robust stabilizing effect of democratic regimes compared to dictatorships, no study focused so far on identifying the precise political institutions explaining this stabilizing effect. We open the political institutions black-box associated to democratic regimes, and study the effects of disaggregated political institutions on macroeconomic volatility along five institutional dimensions, namely forms of government, electoral rules, state forms, the number of veto players, and the age of democracies. Using a large panel of 140 countries over 1975-2007, we show that institutional details are of crucial importance, since the stabilizing effect of democracies depends on the precise institutional dimensions at work. Thus, our study contributes to the institutional design debate, by showing that the simple promotion of democratic regimes might not be sufficient to foster a more stable development path.

International audience Although the empirical literature on the determinants of economic growth volatility highlights a robust stabilizing effect of democratic regimes compared to dictatorships, no study focused so far on identifying the precise political institutions explaining this stabilizing effect. We open the political institutions black-box associated to democratic regimes, and study the effects of disaggregated political institutions on macroeconomic volatility along five institutional dimensions, namely forms of government, electoral rules, state forms, the number of veto players, and the age of democracies. Using a large panel of 140 countries over 1975-2007, we show that institutional details are of crucial importance, since the stabilizing effect of democracies depends on the precise institutional dimensions at work. Thus, our study contributes to the institutional design debate, by showing that the simple promotion of democratic regimes might not be sufficient to foster a more stable development path.

Etudes & documents ; The political economy of finance literature emphasizes the critical role of political institutions in promoting financial development. Related empirical findings highlight a robust positive effect of democratic regimes on financial development compared to dictatorships. However, no study focused so far on identifying the precise political institutions explaining the financial development enhancing effect of democracies. In this paper, we study the effects of disaggregated political institutions on financial development along three institutional dimensions, namely forms of government, electoral rules and state forms. Using a large panel of 140 countries over 1984-2007, we show that institutional details are of crucial importance, since the positive effect of democracies on financial development clearly depends on the precise institutional dimensions at work, namely: parliamentary governments and, to a lesser extent federal states. Thus, our study contributes to the institutional design debate, by showing that the simple promotion of democratic regimes might not be sufficient to foster financial development.

Etudes & documents ; The political economy of finance literature emphasizes the critical role of political institutions in promoting financial development. Related empirical findings highlight a robust positive effect of democratic regimes on financial development compared to dictatorships. However, no study focused so far on identifying the precise political institutions explaining the financial development enhancing effect of democracies. In this paper, we study the effects of disaggregated political institutions on financial development along three institutional dimensions, namely forms of government, electoral rules and state forms. Using a large panel of 140 countries over 1984-2007, we show that institutional details are of crucial importance, since the positive effect of democracies on financial development clearly depends on the precise institutional dimensions at work, namely: parliamentary governments and, to a lesser extent federal states. Thus, our study contributes to the institutional design debate, by showing that the simple promotion of democratic regimes might not be sufficient to foster financial development.

Etudes & documents ; The empirical literature on the political economy of finance emphasizes the importance of political institutions as crucial determinants of financial development and shows that democratic regimes are positively and robustly correlated with financial development. By using a three years periodic panel of 140 countries over 1984-2007, we show that democratic regimes appear to be significantly and positively correlated with financial development, but the opposition between democracies and dictatorships is not sufficient to account for differentials in financial development between countries. Indeed, our results highlight a significant and highly heterogeneous relationship between democratic regimes and financial development since the positive effect induced by democracies on financial development is explained by the presence of specific democratic political institutions, namely: parliamentary form of government and to a lesser extent federal state form. Thus, democracies seem to better foster financial development if its constitutional arrangement allows horizontal flexibility and vertical stability in the political decision-making process.

Etudes & documents ; The empirical literature on the political economy of finance emphasizes the importance of political institutions as crucial determinants of financial development and shows that democratic regimes are positively and robustly correlated with financial development. By using a three years periodic panel of 140 countries over 1984-2007, we show that democratic regimes appear to be significantly and positively correlated with financial development, but the opposition between democracies and dictatorships is not sufficient to account for differentials in financial development between countries. Indeed, our results highlight a significant and highly heterogeneous relationship between democratic regimes and financial development since the positive effect induced by democracies on financial development is explained by the presence of specific democratic political institutions, namely: parliamentary form of government and to a lesser extent federal state form. Thus, democracies seem to better foster financial development if its constitutional arrangement allows horizontal flexibility and vertical stability in the political decision-making process.

Etudes & documents ; This paper develops a new classification of non-banking currencies projects based on a lexical analysis from web data. The advantage of this method is to derive an endogenous typology of monetary projects, based on how currencies are depicted on the internet. Therefore, it allows to by-pass issues face for now in the literature to uncover a clear classification of non-banking currencies projects from exogenous elements. Our textual corpus consists in 320 web pages, corresponding to 1210 text pages. We first applied to our data a downward hierarchical clustering, which enables us to endogenously derive five different classes, allowing us to operate distinctions not only between non-banking currencies projects, but also between these latter and the standard monetary system. Then, we resorted to a similarity analysis and according to our results; all non-banking currencies projects define themselves in relation to the standard monetary system, with the exception of Local Exchange Trading Systems (LETs).

Etudes & documents ; This paper develops a new classification of non-banking currencies projects based on a lexical analysis from web data. The advantage of this method is to derive an endogenous typology of monetary projects, based on how currencies are depicted on the internet. Therefore, it allows to by-pass issues face for now in the literature to uncover a clear classification of non-banking currencies projects from exogenous elements. Our textual corpus consists in 320 web pages, corresponding to 1210 text pages. We first applied to our data a downward hierarchical clustering, which enables us to endogenously derive five different classes, allowing us to operate distinctions not only between non-banking currencies projects, but also between these latter and the standard monetary system. Then, we resorted to a similarity analysis and according to our results; all non-banking currencies projects define themselves in relation to the standard monetary system, with the exception of Local Exchange Trading Systems (LETs).