Corrigendum to "Brown coal exit: A market mechanism for regulated closure of highly emissions intensive power stations" [Econ. Anal. Policy Vol. (48) (2015) 71–81]
In: Economic Analysis and Policy, Band 50, S. 131-132
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In: Economic Analysis and Policy, Band 50, S. 131-132
In this paper we propose a market mechanism for regulated exit of highly emissions intensive power stations from the electricity grid. The starting point is that there is surplus capacity in coal fired power generation in Australia. In the absence of a carbon price signal, black coal generation capacity may leave the market instead of high emitting brown coal power stations. We lay out options for a mechanism of regulated power station closure using a market mechanism. Plants bid competitively over the payment they require for closure, the regulator chooses the most cost effective bid, and payment for closure is made by the remaining power stations in proportion to their carbon dioxide emissions. This could overcome adverse incentive effects for plants to stay in operation in anticipation of payment for closure and solve the political difficulties and problems of information asymmetry that plague government payments for closure and direct regulation for exit. We explore the issues theoretically and provide empirical illustrations. These suggest that closure of a brown coal fired power station in Australia could yield emissions savings at costs that are lower than the social benefits. The analysis in this paper is applicable to other countries.
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In: Economic Analysis and Policy, Band 48, S. 71-81
In: Economic Analysis and Policy, 48 (2015) 71-81
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The worldwide economy is evolving in an unstable environment, characterized by quick changes that companies, governments, and other entities must adapt. This daunting challenge requires certain vigilance and permanent updates to hope climb the ladder and grow. The new global context emphasizes knowledge, technological revolutions, innovation, all of them have a strongly intangible character, and we are talking about a new economy "The knowledge economy". Given this observation, an economic and social emergence based on education, knowledge and innovation is highly recommended to fit into this model of development. Based on this premise, the primary objective of this article is to draw a parallel between the achievements of the Kingdom of Morocco in terms of education, innovation and knowledge, and those of Singapore, knowing that any breach at this level could generate failures in the development of a country. Therefore, it will be a question of clarifying and understanding the model adopted by the two aforementioned countries, which takes into consideration intangible capital, particularly knowledge, by giving a primary importance to education, from a qualitative point of view. Finally, Morocco has a lot to achieve in order to subscribe to this logic based on education, as being globally the catalyst for development.
BASE
The worldwide economy is evolving in an unstable environment, characterized by quick changes that companies, governments, and other entities must adapt. This daunting challenge requires certain vigilance and permanent updates to hope climb the ladder and grow. The new global context emphasizes knowledge, technological revolutions, innovation, all of them have a strongly intangible character, and we are talking about a new economy "The knowledge economy". Given this observation, an economic and social emergence based on education, knowledge and innovation is highly recommended to fit into this model of development. Based on this premise, the primary objective of this article is to draw a parallel between the achievements of the Kingdom of Morocco in terms of education, innovation and knowledge, and those of Singapore, knowing that any breach at this level could generate failures in the development of a country. Therefore, it will be a question of clarifying and understanding the model adopted by the two aforementioned countries, which takes into consideration intangible capital, particularly knowledge, by giving a primary importance to education, from a qualitative point of view. Finally, Morocco has a lot to achieve in order to subscribe to this logic based on education, as being globally the catalyst for development.
BASE
We analyse the long-term efficiency of the emissions target and of the provisions to reduce carbon leakage in the Australian Government's Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, as proposed in March 2009, and the nature and likely cause of changes to these features in the previous year. The target range of 5-15 per cent cuts in national emission entitlements during 2000-2020 was weak, in that on balance it is too low to minimise Australia's long-term mitigation costs. The free allocation of output-linked, tradable emissions permits to emissions-intensive, trade-exposed (EITE) sectors was much higher than proposed earlier, or shown to be needed to deal with carbon leakage. It plausibly means that EITE emissions can rise by 13 per cent during 2010-2020, while non-EITE sectors must cut emissions by 34-51 per cent (or make equivalent permit imports) to meet the national targets proposed, far from a cost-effective outcome. The weak targets and excessive EITE assistance illustrate the efficiency-damaging power of collective action by the 'carbon lobby'. Resisting this requires new national or international institutions to assess lobby claims impartially, and more government publicity about the true economic importance of carbon-intensive sectors.
BASE
We analyse the long-term efficiency of the emissions target and of the provisions to reduce carbon leakage in the Australian Government's Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, as proposed in March 2009, and the nature and likely cause of changes to these features in the previous year. The target range of 5-15 per cent cuts in national emission entitlements during 2000-2020 was weak, in that on balance it is too low to minimise Australia's long-term mitigation costs. The free allocation of output-linked, tradable emissions permits to emissions-intensive, trade-exposed (EITE) sectors was much higher than proposed earlier, or shown to be needed to deal with carbon leakage. It plausibly means that EITE emissions can rise by 13 per cent during 2010-2020, while non-EITE sectors must cut emissions by 34-51 per cent (or make equivalent permit imports) to meet the national targets proposed, far from a cost-effective outcome. The weak targets and excessive EITE assistance illustrate the efficiency-damaging power of collective action by the 'carbon lobby'. Resisting this requires new national or international institutions to assess lobby claims impartially, and more government publicity about the true economic importance of carbon-intensive sectors.
BASE