Suchergebnisse

FOR SEVERAL DECADES, NUCLEAR DETERRENCE THEORISTS HAVE DEBATED THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF RATIONALITY AND PSYCHOLOGY IN EXPLAINING THE BEHAVIOR OF NATIONAL POLICY MAKERS DURING INTERNATIONAL CRISES. R. HARRISON WAGNER HAS CASTIGATED PSYCHOLOGICAL CRITICS FOR IGNORING RECENT ADVANCES IN GAME THEORY THAT PROVIDE A MEANS TO INCORPORATE MISPERCEPTION AND OTHER PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS INTO RATIONAL MODELS OF DETERRENCE SITUATIONS. IN THIS PAPER, THE AUTHOR CONTESTS WAGNER'S ASSERTION THAT THIS LINK CAN BEST BE ACHIEVED BY SIGNALLING GAME MODELS OF NUCLEAR AND OTHER FORMS OF DETERRENCE. INSTEAD, HE ARGUES THAT CONTINUED RELIANCE ON THESE MODELS WILL WIDEN THE GAP BETWEEN RATIONAL DETERRENCE THEORISTS AND THEIR CRITICS. ALTHOUGH SIGNALLING GAME MODELS CONTRIBUTE TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE RATIONAL BASIS OF DETERRENCE THEORY, THESE SAME MODELS DIVERT ATTENTION FROM ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES THAT OFFER MORE PROMISE FOR LINKING FORMAL MODELS AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS.