In general, firm‐level data are not available among foreign sellers to enable researchers to compute market concentration in open markets, and especially trade's contribution to this concentration. We implement a theory‐based procedure from a generalized Brander–Krugman framework that can be used to estimate foreign contribution to market concentration, using industrial trade and activity data only and without any need for firm‐level data. The results suggest a foreign contribution to concentration of around 30%–50% for small European economies and 20%–30% for larger European countries. Market structure is less affected by openness in the USA and Japan.
In this article, we assess the impact of counterterrorism measures on trade. Our work brings three value addition to the literature: (1) it develops a simple theory to emphasize the endogeneity between terrorism acts, counterterrorism measures, and trade; (2) it delivers an original strategy to identify empirically the effect of counterterrorism security measures on trade flows (using third country incidents); and (3) it uses a new data set on business visas issued by the United States to test further the hypothesis that terrorism is affecting trade through the security channel. Our results suggest that counterterrorism security measures matter for US imports. The level of the impact is up to three times higher when the acts result in a relatively high number of victims, when the products are sensitive to shipping time, or when they ask for networks and business people mobility in order to be sold. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]
In this article, we assess the impact of counterterrorism measures on trade. Our work brings three value addition to the literature: (1) it develops a simple theory to emphasize the endogeneity between terrorism acts, counterterrorism measures, and trade; (2) it delivers an original strategy to identify empirically the effect of counterterrorism security measures on trade flows (using third country incidents); and (3) it uses a new data set on business visas issued by the United States to test further the hypothesis that terrorism is affecting trade through the security channel. Our results suggest that counterterrorism security measures matter for US imports. The level of the impact is up to three times higher when the acts result in a relatively high number of victims, when the products are sensitive to shipping time, or when they ask for networks and business people mobility in order to be sold.
Recent economic geography and trade empirical studies based on monopolistic competition suggest high levels of trade price elasticities (between 3 and 11). However, price elasticity estimations in trade equations using unit values as price proxies usually lead to lower values of around unity. We show that those inconclusive results may be due to some misspecification in these equations as well as measurement errors in prices. When suitable instrumental variables are used, within a panel of industrialized countries, we obtain high price elasticities, the majority ranging from 1 to 13. The highest estimates correspond to industries producing homogeneous goods. JEL classification: C2, C3 and F1. Les élasticités prix des importations : un nouveau coup d'oeil aux résultats. Plusieurs études empiriques récentes fondées sur des modèles de concurrence monopolistique exhibent des élasticités prix estimées des échanges élevées (entre 3 et 11). Or, la plupart des élasticités prix estimées dans la littérature approchant les prix par des valeur unitaires sont plus faibles, de l'ordre de 1. Nous montrons que ces résultats non concluants pourraient provenir d'une mauvaise spécification des équations d'échanges ou d'erreurs de mesure sur les prix. Quand ceux‐ci sont correctement instrumentés, sur un panel de pays industrialisés, nous obtenons des élasticités prix élevées (de 1 à 13). Les plus fortes correspondent aux secteurs produisant des biens homogènes.
AbstractIn this paper, we study how free labor mobility agreements in Europe, usually thought to favor inward migration, might actually create good incentives for already settled migrants to exit their host country. Using outmigration data between 1990 and 2011, a period of observation where some countries entered the EU and especially a period during which Schengen agreements have been progressively implemented by a large number of European countries, we could test this conjecture. While the evidence for EU is mixed, we find very strong evidence that Schengen did increase migrations outflows by 40 to 53%. The effect appears to be even higher for outmigrants originating from Eastern Europe after their countries' accession to Schengen. Also, and consistent with the hypothesis of preferences for living at home or in a country with a close culture to home, the effect of Schengen on outmigration happens to be smaller when the countries of origin and of residence of the outmigrants are close in terms of their cultural traits. Also, we document that the Schengen effect is significantly higher for outmigration flows than for immigration flows by almost 20 percentage points.
This paper adds to the scant literature on the impact of terrorism on consumer behavior, focusing on household spending on goods that are sensitive to brain-stress neurocircuitry. These include sweet-and fat-rich foods but also home necessities and female-personal-hygiene products, the only female-targeted good in our data. We examine unique continuous in-homescanner expenditure data for a representative sample of about 15,000 French households, observed in the days before and after the terrorist attack at the Bataclan concert-hall. We find that the attack increased expenditure on sugar-rich food by over 5% but not that on salty food or soda drinks. Spending on home maintenance products went up by almost 9%. We detect an increase of 23.5% in expenditure on women's personal hygiene products. We conclude that these effects are short-lived and driven by the responses of households with children, youths, and those residing within a few-hours ride of the place of the attack.
This paper adds to the scant literature on the impact of terrorism on consumer behavior, focusing on household spending on goods that are sensitive to brain-stress neurocircuitry. These include sweet-and fat-rich foods but also home necessities and female-personal-hygiene products, the only female-targeted good in our data. We examine unique continuous in-homescanner expenditure data for a representative sample of about 15,000 French households, observed in the days before and after the terrorist attack at the Bataclan concert-hall. We find that the attack increased expenditure on sugar-rich food by over 5% but not that on salty food or soda drinks. Spending on home maintenance products went up by almost 9%. We detect an increase of 23.5% in expenditure on women's personal hygiene products. We conclude that these effects are short-lived and driven by the responses of households with children, youths, and those residing within a few-hours ride of the place of the attack.
This paper adds to the scant literature on the impact of terrorism on consumer behavior, focusing on household spending on goods that are sensitive to brain-stress neurocircuitry. These include sweet-and fat-rich foods but also home necessities and female-personal-hygiene products, the only female-targeted good in our data. We examine unique continuous in-homescanner expenditure data for a representative sample of about 15,000 French households, observed in the days before and after the terrorist attack at the Bataclan concert-hall. We find that the attack increased expenditure on sugar-rich food by over 5% but not that on salty food or soda drinks. Spending on home maintenance products went up by almost 9%. We detect an increase of 23.5% in expenditure on women's personal hygiene products. We conclude that these effects are short-lived and driven by the responses of households with children, youths, and those residing within a few-hours ride of the place of the attack.
This paper adds to the scant literature on the impact of terrorism on consumer behavior, focusing on household spending on goods that are sensitive to brain-stress neurocircuitry. These include sweet-and fat-rich foods but also home necessities and female-personal-hygiene products, the only female-targeted good in our data. We examine unique continuous in-homescanner expenditure data for a representative sample of about 15,000 French households, observed in the days before and after the terrorist attack at the Bataclan concert-hall. We find that the attack increased expenditure on sugar-rich food by over 5% but not that on salty food or soda drinks. Spending on home maintenance products went up by almost 9%. We detect an increase of 23.5% in expenditure on women's personal hygiene products. We conclude that these effects are short-lived and driven by the responses of households with children, youths, and those residing within a few-hours ride of the place of the attack.
This paper adds to the scant literature on the impact of terrorism on consumer behavior, focusing on household spending on goods that are sensitive to brain-stress neurocircuitry. These include sweet-and fat-rich foods but also home necessities and female-personal-hygiene products, the only female-targeted good in our data. We examine unique continuous in-homescanner expenditure data for a representative sample of about 15,000 French households, observed in the days before and after the terrorist attack at the Bataclan concert-hall. We find that the attack increased expenditure on sugar-rich food by over 5% but not that on salty food or soda drinks. Spending on home maintenance products went up by almost 9%. We detect an increase of 23.5% in expenditure on women's personal hygiene products. We conclude that these effects are short-lived and driven by the responses of households with children, youths, and those residing within a few-hours ride of the place of the attack.
This paper adds to the scant literature on the impact of terrorism on consumer behavior, focusing on household spending on goods that are sensitive to brain-stress neurocircuitry. These include sweet-and fat-rich foods but also home necessities and female-personal-hygiene products, the only female-targeted good in our data. We examine unique continuous in-homescanner expenditure data for a representative sample of about 15,000 French households, observed in the days before and after the terrorist attack at the Bataclan concert-hall. We find that the attack increased expenditure on sugar-rich food by over 5% but not that on salty food or soda drinks. Spending on home maintenance products went up by almost 9%. We detect an increase of 23.5% in expenditure on women's personal hygiene products. We conclude that these effects are short-lived and driven by the responses of households with children, youths, and those residing within a few-hours ride of the place of the attack.
This paper adds to the scant literature on the impact of terrorism on consumer behavior, focusing on household spending on goods that are sensitive to brain-stress neurocircuitry. These include sweet-and fat-rich foods but also home necessities and female-personal-hygiene products, the only female-targeted good in our data. We examine unique continuous in-homescanner expenditure data for a representative sample of about 15,000 French households, observed in the days before and after the terrorist attack at the Bataclan concert-hall. We find that the attack increased expenditure on sugar-rich food by over 5% but not that on salty food or soda drinks. Spending on home maintenance products went up by almost 9%. We detect an increase of 23.5% in expenditure on women's personal hygiene products. We conclude that these effects are short-lived and driven by the responses of households with children, youths, and those residing within a few-hours ride of the place of the attack.
