Suchergebnisse

This book is an ethnographic account of education and migration from the perspective of three groups of South Koreans in contemporary China: migrant parents, children/students, and educational agents. The book reveals how these temporary migrants make choices, plan their trajectories and engage with the authorities, both in China and South Korea. Migrant subjectivities among these groups are driven by and respond to the education-migration regimes of both the sending and receiving countries. As 'people in between', they occupy flexible and multiple positionalities that are transnationally distributed. However, paradoxically, they experience a juxtaposition of privilege, integration and separation, which is indicative of the Chinese style of internationalisation. The book adds weight to the argument that China is a temporary destination for foreigners and not one for long-term settlement.

Xiao Ma offers a rich description and a novel theory of intergovernmental bargaining that explains the unfolding of China's high-speed railway. He shows that the bottom-up bargaining efforts by territorial authorities-whom the central bureaucracies rely on to implement various infrastructure projects-shaped the allocation of investment in the railway system. Demonstrating how localities of different types invoke institutional and extra-institutional sources of bargaining power in their competition for railway stations, Ma sheds new light on the how the nation's massive economy actually functions.

How does the size of local state-owned sector affect the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) to that region? Using an original county-level dataset for China's Yangtze Delta Region, this article finds that counties inheriting a larger state-owned sector from the planned-economy era have attracted more FDI since the outset of the market reform. The article argues that early foreign investors tended to invest in locales with a robust state sector to build joint ventures with local state-owned firms, as doing so helped them satisfy state regulations and reduce various political and market risks. The legacies of the planned economy also shaped local states' preferences, leading to persistent variations in local economic structure. An instrumental variable analysis suggests that the association is likely causal. (J Contemp China/GIGA)

AbstractTerm limits that effectively govern leadership transition play an important role in authoritarian power sharing. A fixed term and a pre-appointed successor – two crucial components of term limits – credibly commit the incumbent ruler to share power with other elites, and also allow the elites to monitor and coordinate against the ruler's transgression of the power-sharing agreement. While the successful adoption of term limits often requires an even balance of power among the ruling elites in the first place, once adopted it initiates an evolving bargain over allocation of political power among multiple generations of leaders that further keeps any one faction from dominating the others. I corroborate this argument using a biographical dataset of elite members of the Chinese Communist Party from 1982 to 2012. The findings suggest that the Party's incumbent leaders and their rivals (i.e., predecessor and heir-apparent) shared equal chances in promoting their associates—which proxy their political influence—and this pattern has become more salient since the 16th party congress, when the term limits that currently govern China's leadership transition became fully fledged. This result also sheds light on the role of informal, patronage-based promotion in the institutionalization of authoritarian politics.