Suchergebnisse

Within the context of upstream operations, one must engage with events within particular boundaries of space and time. Understanding processes within these areas can also result in awareness of the emergence of particular groups and ideas. The emergence of Da'ish in 2014, was the result of the fragmentation of Iraq and the increasingly sectarian attempts to fill the post-Saddam vacuum. Mabon considers political organisation in Iraq across the 20th century, focussing upon the rise and fall of the sovereign state, and suggests that by considering events through the lens of sovereignty, we are better equipped to understand events. Mabon analyses the Iraqi state, before turning to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, considering the process of deba'athification and the establishment of Shi'a government in Baghdad, mass unemployment, and sectarian violence. The penetration of the Iraqi state by external actors, namely Saudi Arabia and Iran, whose geopolitical agendas—framed as support for sectarian kin—fed into the continued fragmentation of the state. From this, it is possible to see how Sunni communities became marginalised and securitised, resulting in what Giorgio Agamben (Homo sacer: Sovereign power and bare life. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995) has termed 'bare life'. It is these conditions that gave rise to the emergence of Da'ish.

In recent years, the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran has become increasingly influential in shaping the nature of Middle Eastern politics, with the two exerting influence across the region in an attempt to increase their own power and to reduce that of the other. Amidst an increasingly fractious region, this article explores Saudi Arabia's attempts to securitize Iran to actors in the US. The signing of the nuclear agreement and the failure of the US to move beyond normal politics signal the failure of Riyadh's efforts to securitize Iran. Understanding the nature of relationships in the region, particularly between Riyadh and Tehran and between Riyadh and Washington, helps to understand the changing nature of regional politics and ultimately, the emergence of a more pro-active Saudi foreign policy.

This article applies the concept of securitization to the Middle East with a focus upon the securitization of the Shi'a other. Such processes occur across time and space and are not restricted to state borders, escaping the Westphalian straitjacket. As a consequence, one must consider the construction of space and political structures across the region in order to understand the traction that such moves can find. It appears then, that in seeking to maintain short-term survival, regimes have sacrificed long-term stability, but the impacts of such moves transcend the typically linear constructed audiences within securitization moves. A key contribution of this article is to consider the extent to which audiences within the Middle East, both intended and unintended, transcend the linear audiences found within conventional processes of securitization. The article uses two case studies as a means of exploring the extent to which securitization can be applied to the Middle East. Such an approach helps us to identify the logics that are involved within the process of securitization, with consideration of the idea that we can populate a broad framework about the universal application of securitization to context specific cases.

Over the past year, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has experienced a period of rapid transformation under the direction of a new Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, the son of the current King. Domestically, Bin Salman has overseen political reform in the upper echelons of the al-Saud ruling family, whilst embarking on a more pro-actively anti-Iranian foreign policy. This article looks at the actions of the new crown prince to explore the impact of Bin Salman's influence on both the Kingdom and the Middle East more broadly.

This article explores the emergence of Hizballah, the Party of God, and the development of its ideas of resistance at a local and regional level. It begins by considering the emergence of Hizballah and the Lebanese context through the lens of Giorgio Agamben's work on bare life. It suggests that these conditions existed in Lebanon—amidst the Shi'a community—and asks how people came together to reject the condition of 'being thus'. Conventional approaches suggest that this occurred through Hizballah's ideas of resistance, yet this has largely been under-conceptualized. To do this, it looks at the role of the Karbala Narrative in helping the group draw support from Shi'a Muslims in Lebanon, while also locating itself at the vanguard of resistance in the Middle East. With the emergence of Da'ish in the summer of 2014, this position was challenged. By reflecting on speeches from prominent Hizballah figures, the severity of the threat can be seen, justifying the Party of God's involvement in Syria. It concludes by arguing that the need to maintain its geopolitical influence has required military action in Syria, which has ultimately led to the creation of bare life.

Five years after people took to the streets in protest at political organisation across the Middle East, the consequences of these actions remain. As the protests gained traction, states began to fragment and regimes sought to retain power, whatever the cost. While a great deal of focus has been upon what happened, very little attention has been paid to the role of agency within the context of the fragmenting sovereignty and political change. This article contributes to these debates by applying the work of Giorgio Agamben to the post-Arab Uprisings Middle East, to understand the relationship between rulers and ruled along with the fragmentation of the sovereign state. The article argues for the need to bring agency back into conceptual debates about sovereignty within the Middle East. It concludes by presenting a framework that offers an approach building upon Agamben's bare life.

This paper uses Giorgio Agamben's State of Exception as a theoretical approach that allows us to see how emergency legislations operate in the region as mechanisms of control and dominant paradigms of governance. Relying on Egypt as a case study, this paper traces the significance of emergency rule throughout Mubarak's era up until Al Sisi's 2014 Constitution. It applies a four-stage analytical framework to investigate whether or not Egypt was indeed ruled by the exception throughout its turbulent recent history, while under the guise of Emergency Rule. In doing so, we aim to provide an analysis of the legal structures that shape Egyptian politics, while also adding to debates on the State of Exception, particularly on its application in the non-Western world.

In early February 2011, people took to the streets of Manama, Bahrain, protesting against the political system of the Al Khalifa monarchy. Although initially occurring along non-sectarian lines, the protests were quickly framed as such and, as a consequence, the nature of the protests changed. This article engages with this process of sectarianism, exploring how space became contested and how such sites took on political – and sectarian – meanings. In the article, we argue that by framing the protests in such a way, the Al Khalifa regime was able to create a master narrative that impacted upon all facets of Bahraini society, at home and abroad.

In recent years work produced on the emergence of ISIS has predominantly focussed upon ideological and tactical dimensions. This chapter takes a different approach to understand the emergence of the group, focussing upon the regulation of life and the concept of sovereignty. Using the theory of Giorgio Agamben, we suggest that Iraq has been existing under a state of exception since 2003 and the establishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority. The state of exception, a political-legal term, allows for the suspension of the norm of the law to preserve the law, but in doing so, marginalises people from politics in a situation referred to as bare life. This chapter argues that ISIS was able to cultivate support from disenfranchised Sunni communities residing within these conditions of bare life, as a consequence of the legal structures established by the CPA and ensuing governments. In addition, we must also consider the role played by informal structures—such as religion and tribalism—to gain a more nuanced understanding of the concept, along with how people then reside in bare life. As the state of exception and bare life continues, the defeat of ISIS will not rid Iraq of violence or extremism.

In this article, we examine ways in which critics of liberalism come to adopt, without acknowledgement, 'liberal' forms of public reason in responding to homogenising tendencies of fundamentalist doctrines. We focus on the divergent approaches of John Gray and Slavoj Žižek, arguing that the former upholds a comprehensive form of liberalism, while the latter upholds a political form popular among policy makers who endorse a 'fundamentalism'/'extremism' dichotomy. We argue that the latter fails to recognise that 'philosophical' unreasonableness often translates into political unreasonableness. Examining these non-liberal approaches not only indicates the apparent value of reason as reciprocity, it also supports a long-held charge against liberalism: that it is not able to uphold its promise of accommodating radical forms of diversity.