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Constitutional bargains are seen as cornerstones of democratic transitions in much of the world. Yet very few studies have theorized about the link between constitution-making and democratization. Shifting the focus on democratization away from autocratic regime break down, this book considers the importance of inclusive constitution-building for democratization. In this pathbreaking volume, Tofigh Maboudi draws on a decade of research on the Arab Spring to explain when and how constitutional bargains facilitate (or hinder) democratization. Here, he argues that constitutional negotiations have a higher prospect of success in establishing democracy if they resolve societal, ideological, and political ills. Emphasizing the importance of constitution-making processes, Maboudi shows that constitutions can resolve these problems best through participatory and inclusive processes. Above all, The 'Fall' of the Arab Spring demonstrates that civil society is the all-important link that connects constitutional bargaining processes to democratization.

The Tunisian constitutional reform experience in the wake of the Arab Spring—through which citizens were able to meet with their representatives, participate in public deliberation over the constitution, and offer their own proposals for the constitution—offers a unique opportunity to evaluate the debate on the optimal modality of constitutional processes by revisiting both deliberative and representative theories of democracy and their predictions on how the process can improve constitutional outcomes. The statistical analysis of a dataset of more than 2,500 citizen proposals and the content of three constitutional drafts shows that 43 percent of public proposals were included in the final draft of the constitution. The results also demonstrate that public input related to rights and freedoms is more likely to be reflected in the constitution compared to other public proposals. This article suggests that more inclusive processes can lead to more democratic constitutional outcomes, although this impact is contingent upon the incorporation of particular consensus-building institutions.

Using an original data set assessing the effect of the 195 new constitutions worldwide over the past 40 years on levels of democracy, this article argues that when popular participation and group inclusion are both considered, inclusion is what matters. After showing that group inclusion generates more improvements in levels of democracy than mere participation in our data set of implemented constitutions, we address some of the prominent cases of constitution-writing failure that occur when individual participation is valued more highly than group inclusion. The article shows that even after unprecedented waves of popular participation through social media feedback (Egypt and Iceland) and focus groups and workshops (Chile), participation alone cannot generate constitutions that improve levels of democracy, or, sometimes, even the very promulgation of new constitutions. Indeed, using these cases as illustrations, we show how participation without inclusion is doomed to failure. We then show that high inclusion cases, even if they involve low participation (such as Tunisia 2014 and Colombia 1991), do generate democracy improvements.

Does public participation in constitution-making processes enhance constitutional legitimacy? Using an original public opinion survey conducted in Tunisia shortly after the adoption of the 2014 Constitution, this article examines whether public participation in constitution-making activities enhances perceived constitutional legitimacy. The results show that participants are more likely to support the constitution and its institutions than non-participants. We argue that participation increases constitutional literacy among the general public and this increased knowledge impacts the respondents' perception of the constitution. The empirical findings confirm normative assumptions of participatory model of the democratic theory and suggest that inclusive and participatory constitutional reform processes, in contrast to an elitist approach, are more likely to yield democratic constitutional outcomes which are supported by larger segments of the society.

Drawing on empirical evidence from online citizen feedback on the 2012 Egyptian Constitution, we demonstrate that despite normative skepticism about implications of participatory constitution making, citizen participation matters. Using data of more than 650,000 online votes and comments on the constitution, we find that draft provisions with higher public approval are less likely to change and those with lower approval are more likely to change. We also find that Articles related to rights and freedoms are more likely to change based on online public input. Finally, following the boycott of the Constituent Assembly by non-Islamists, changes in draft Articles based on public feedback drop sharply. These findings highlight the conditions under which participatory constitution making becomes more effective. First, consensus among citizens over the most salient issues increases the probability that those issues would be successfully incorporated in the constitution. Second, without ex ante elite agreement over the design of the constitution, it becomes difficult to account for citizen proposals amid political clash between elites.

Under what circumstances do new constitutions improve a nation's level of democracy? Between 1974 and 2014, democracy increased in 77 countries following the adoption of a new constitution, but it decreased or stayed the same in 47 others. This book demonstrates that increased participation in the forming of constitutions positively impacts levels of democracy. It is discovered that the degree of citizen participation at the 'convening stage' of constitution-making has a strong effect on levels of democracy. This finding defies the common theory that levels of democracy result from the content of constitutions, and instead lends support to 'deliberative' theories of democracy. ; https://ecommons.luc.edu/facultybooks/1137/thumbnail.jpg

The main objective of the CDD is to quantify the process of constitution-making since 1974. This is the first public release of any data on the process of constitution-making. This release includes data on 144 national constitutions promulgated in 119 countries from 1974 to 2014. The unit of analysis in the data is national constitutions. The data in this release includes only "new" constitutions and does not include suspended, re-installed, amended, or interim constitutions. In this release, only countries with a population larger than 500,000 are included. The authors intend to update the data by including all countries, expanding the time frame, and adding new variables which record the process of constitution-making.

In the August 2015 issue of American Political Science Review, Eisenstadt et al. (2015) did not cite the last three authors in the reference for Mansbridge et al. (2012). The reference appears in the reference section below.

Under what circumstances do new constitutions promote democracy? Between 1974 and 2011, the level of democracy increased in 62 countries following the adoption of a new constitution, but decreased or stayed the same in 70 others. Using data covering all 138 new constitutions in 118 countries during that period, we explain this divergence through empirical tests showing that overall increased participation during the process of making the constitution positively impacts postpromulgation levels of democracy. Then, after disaggregating constitution-making into three stages (drafting, debating, and ratification) we find compelling evidence through robust statistical tests that the degree of citizen participation in the drafting stage has a much greater impact on the resulting regime. This lends support to some core principles of "deliberative" theories of democracy. We conclude that constitutional reformers should focus more on generating public "buy in" at the front end of the constitution-making process, rather than concentrating on ratification and referendums at the "back end" that are unlikely to correct for an "original sin" of limited citizen deliberation during drafting.