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AbstractObjectiveDespite declining and historically low membership, labor unions remain important and relevant actors in American politics. Accordingly, we have learned a good deal about the economic and political consequences of labor unions and union membership. However, we know less about the dynamics, determinants, and political consequences of public attitudes toward organized labor.MethodsI use a variety of survey data to (1) track public support for labor unions over time, (2) to examine the microlevel determinants of labor attitudes, and (3) to examine how such attitudes shape voting behavior in national elections.ResultsFirst, I show that American public opinion has consistently been "pro‐labor" and that such sentiment is growing in recent years, despite historically low levels of union membership. Second, I show that while the strongest individual‐level correlate of union support is labor union affiliation, pluralities, and in some cases majorities, of nonunion‐affiliated Americans hold "pro‐labor" attitudes as well. Finally, I show that labor union attitudes significantly predict (among both union and nonunion‐affiliated Americans) support for the Democratic presidential candidate, net of partisanship, ideology, core political values, and macroeconomic conditions.ConclusionOverall, these results show that low levels of union membership do not imply an "anti‐union" mass public. These findings also demonstrate that attitudes toward labor unions are politically consequential.

Core values, which can be defined as abstract prescriptive beliefs about government and society, help ordinary citizens to reason about politics in a principled and efficacious manner. As such, core values have appeal for mass politics and representative democracy. To fulfill this role, core values should possess several characteristics. Chief among these are resistance to elite influence and trans‐situationalism, that is, the ability to guide political evaluations across different contexts. Despite their importance for mass politics, it is unclear as to how well core values fulfill these criteria. I examine this here by testing whether core values can be systematically primed by electoral campaigns. That is, I test whether core values can be made, by political elites, to matter more in certain situations over others. I do this by using observational data from the 2012 and 2016 ANES, along with data from a nationally representative survey experiment, originally fielded in 2005. Overall, I find little evidence to suggest that electoral campaigns can prime citizens' core values. These findings have implications for our understanding of value systems, electoral campaigns, and public opinion.

Authoritarianism, an individual-level predisposition that favors security, conformity, and certainty, has been powerfully linked with cultural conservatism and support for "strongman" politicians but weakly and inconsistently linked with public opinion toward economic issues. In examining this latter relationship, past work has tended to pose a dichotomous question, is authoritarianism associated with economic liberalism/conservatism or not? Here, I diverge from this approach and argue that authoritarianism is associated with support for one specific program—Social Security. I argue that the unique framing of this program, which emphasizes rule-following, certainty, and deservingness, should resonate with authoritarian-minded individuals. I test this with survey data, primarily from the American National Election Studies (ANES). Overall, I find a positive and substantively significant relationship between authoritarianism and support for Social Security but not for other types of domestic social welfare spending. These findings help us better understand the correlates of mass support for Social Security as well as the policy consequences of authoritarianism. These findings also suggest that Social Security will likely remain popular in an increasingly authoritarian Republican Party.

Despite decades of rising inequality, there has been little observed increase in American public support for redistribution. This is puzzling because majorities of Americans profess to be aware of and opposed to high inequality. I argue that this lack of responsiveness is not due to public ignorance of, nor apathy toward, inequality but rather, in part, to negative feelings toward immigrants, a growing, politically salient, and negatively stereotyped "out-group" that is widely viewed as a target of redistributive spending. To test this, I combine data on state-level income inequality with survey data from the 1992 to 2016 Cumulative ANES. I find that growing inequality can prompt support for redistribution but that this depends, in part, on peoples' immigration attitudes. Overall, these results suggest that immigration has important implications for economic redistribution in an era of high, and rising inequality.

AbstractImmigration is one of the most salient and important issues in contemporary American politics. While a great deal is known about how cultural attitudes and economics influence public opinion toward immigration, little is known about how attitudes toward government influence support for immigration. Using cross-sectional data from the American National Election Studies (ANES), panel data from the ANES and General Social Survey, as well a Mechanical Turk (MTurk) survey experiment, I show that political trust exerts a positive and substantively meaningful influence on Americans' support for immigration. Politically trustful individuals, both Democrats and Republicans, are more supportive of pro-immigration policies. These findings underscore the political relevance of trust in government and show that public attitudes toward immigration are not driven solely by feelings about immigrant groups, partisanship, core political values, nor personality traits, but are also affected by trust in government, the actor most responsible for managing immigration policy.

ObjectiveWhy, despite positive feelings toward the poor and working classes, relative to the rich and big business, has American public support for redistribution failed to appreciably increase during an era of high, and rising, income inequality?MethodsI argue that this puzzling disconnect is due, in part, to a lack of general political knowledge. Using survey data from the 2012 American National Election Study, I test how political knowledge conditions the relationship between people's economic class group attitudes and their support for redistribution.ResultsPeople with low (high) levels of political knowledge weakly (strongly) connect their class attitudes with support for redistributive spending and progressive taxation. Data from four ANES panel studies show that this does not result from the less knowledgeable holding weak "nonattitudes" toward these class groups. Rather, consistent with Converse's classic work, I attribute this to less knowledgeable individuals lacking awareness about how redistributive policies benefit different social groups.ConclusionThese findings help us to better understand an important puzzle in American politics: why a mass public that purports to favor the poor and working classes over the economic elite has not turned more strongly in favor of redistribution during an era of historic inequality.

The United States has become increasingly unequal. Income inequality has risen dramatically since the 1970s, yet public opinion toward redistribution has remained largely unchanged. This is puzzling, given Americans' professed concern regarding, and knowledge of, rising inequality. I argue that trust in government can help to reconcile this. I combine data on state-level income inequality with survey data from the Cumulative American National Election Studies (CANES) from 1984 to 2016. I find that trust in government conditions the relationship between inequality and redistribution, with higher inequality prompting demand for government redistribution, but only among politically trustful individuals. This holds among conservatives and non-conservatives and among the affluent and non-affluent. These findings underscore the relevance of political trust in shaping attitudes toward inequality and economic redistribution and contribute to our understanding of why American public opinion has not turned in favor of redistribution during an era of rising income inequality.

ObjectivesThe United States has become increasingly unequal over the past several decades. Despite this, public opinion toward redistribution has remained largely unchanged. This is puzzling, given Americans' professed concern regarding, and knowledge of, rising inequality. I argue that the decline of labor unions, an organization that promotes anti‐inequality attitudes among its members, can help us to understand this.MethodI use panel data from the 50 U.S. states from 1978 to 2012 and ordinary least squares regression to examine how state‐level unionization levels condition the relationship between income inequality and support for redistributive spending.ResultsI find that in contexts where labor unions are stronger, higher levels of income inequality prompt greater support for welfare spending.ConclusionThese findings illustrate an additional mechanism through which labor unions can check income inequality and help us to understand why the American public has not turned in favor of redistribution during an era of rising economic inequality.