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Conventional wisdom holds that "institutions matter." Here, Andrew MacIntyre reveals exactly how they matter in the developing world. Combining an eye for current concerns in international politics with a deep knowledge of Southeast Asia, MacIntyre explores the impact of institutions on effective governance. He examines the "national political architecture"—the complex of rules that determine how leadership of a state is constituted and how state authority is exercised. The Power of Institutions sets out an intriguing conundrum: one well-established body of literature decries the evils of highly centralized political systems, while an equally vigorous school of thought outlines the dangers of political fragmentation. MacIntyre presents the problems associated with institutional extremes, common in developing countries, as the "power concentration paradox." Either extreme is likely to be associated with distinctive governance problems. MacIntyre illustrates his wider arguments by focusing on Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. He shows how their diverse political architectures influenced their responses to the Asian economic crisis and played into pressures for political reform. The Power of Institutions makes clear why the configuration of political institutions is one of the most pressing challenges in many parts of the developing world today

Die politische Ursachen der asiatischen Wirtschaftskrise 97-98 werden systematisch aus institutioneller Perspektive untersucht. Insbesondere gilt das Interesse den institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen der nationalen Politik, ihrem Umfeld und den Investitionen. Anstatt des typischen Konflikts zwischen glaubwürdiger Festlegung auf politische Massnahmen und flexibler Reaktion erweist sich das Fehlen irgendeines der beiden Elemente als Risikofaktor für Investoren. Eine Veto-Spieler Struktur dient als Hintergrund für ein einfaches Modell eines U-förmigen Zusammenhangs zwischen der Zahl der Veto-Spieler im politischen System und dem politischen Risiko für Investoren. Institutionelle Vetos hinsichtlich der Regierungsautorität senken das politische Risiko für Inbestoren bis zu einem gewissen Punkt, ab dem zusätzliche Veto-Spieler unwillkommene Starrheiten in der Politik befördern. Vier Fallstudien illustrieren diesen Sachverhalt: Thailand, Philippinen, Malaysia, Indonesien, die Hauptakteure der südostasiatischen Finanzkrise. Es wird die These vertreten, dass, die institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen der nationalen Politik einen starken und vorhersagbaren Einfluss auf die Politikergebnisse und die Reaktionen der Investoren hatten. (SWP-Jns)

I develop a systematic argument about the politics of the 1997–98 Asian economic crisis. I focus on institutions—specifically, the connection linking the institutional framework of national politics, the policy environment, and investment. I seek to resolve the tension between the literatures on credible policy commitment and policy flexibility, arguing that if either is severely undersupplied, the risk associated with the policy environment rises rapidly for investors. Building on a veto player framework, I develop a simple model of a U-shaped relationship between the number of veto players in a political system and policy risk to investors. Institutional vetoes on executive authority lower policy risk for investors but only up to a point, after which additional veto players promote unwelcome policy rigidity. I illustrate this using four cases: Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, the four main Southeast Asian countries involved in the financial crisis. I argue that the institutional framework of national politics had a powerful and predictable influence on policy responses and investor reactions.

Argues that the crisis of President Suharto's "New Order" regime resulted from a centralized political system and mishandling of the economy; possible reform policies and US interests.