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The article provides comparative analysis of the current theocratic political system of Afghanistan, which was revived practically in the form that it was shaped in the late 1990s, and the previous regime of "democratic authoritarianism" of President Ashraf Ghani. The theocratic regime formed by the Taliban is characterized by authoritarian methods of governance. The main aspects of living of Afghan society are defined by religious norms, the observance of which is guaranteed by the theocratic state. The supreme leader, Haibatullah Akhundzada, has broad powers in domestic and foreign policies of Afghanistan. The author emphasizes the similarities between the modern Afghan regime and the previous one, in which authoritarianism masqueraded as democracy. The importance of the parliament was insignificant, the opposition had no real power, the pseudo-democratic regime relied on the support of security apparatus, elections were rigged, the state witnessed large-scale corruption and discrimination against ethnic minorities. All real power was concentrated in the hands of the president who had extensive constitutional powers, including the right to appoint ministers, Supreme Court judges, and all provincial and district level officials. Like the previous regime, the Taliban tends to "Pushtunize" power and concentrate it in the hands of the authoritarian ruler and his inner circle. Unlike the regime of President Ashraf Ghani, where Kabul was the center of gravity, Kandahar has now become the center of political power in Afghanistan. In general, the author concludes that, despite a number of fundamental differences between the regime of "democratic authoritarianism" of Ashraf Ghani and the theocratic regime of Haibatullah Akhundzada, certain similarities are not uncommon.

The relationship between Turkey and the Taliban* from the late 1990s to date has gone through periods of decline, when Ankara sided with the collective West and the pro-Western governments of Afghanistan, and recovery, when Turks attempted to mediate in the Afghan conflict and then forged links with the new Taliban* government. In light of these circumstances, the author analyzes the long-standing historical ties between Turkey and Afghanistan in the context of the shared Islamic culture of the two peoples. The author notes the Taliban's accumulated grievances against the Turkish side are noted, including the provision of a forum for the Afghan opposition forces to exchange views as well as Ankara's demands for the principle of inclusivity in the formation of authorities and respect for human rights in Afghanistan. It is possible that Ankara could become more or less involved in the internal Afghan conflict, which contradicts its own policy of a neutral player in Afghanistan. The author draws attention to the Taliban's* pragmatic approach to the development of relations with Turkey, especially in the areas of economy and education. The author concludes that, despite some difficulties in its relations with the Taliban government, Ankara is determined to increase its geopolitical influence in the region with a focus on Central Asia and thus tries to enhance its value for its NATO allies. The analysis reveals Turkey's desire to strengthen its presence in Afghanistan and become an important regional player. However, in the current circumstances, the Turks do not yet have an opportunity to have a serious impact on Kabul. * the organization is banned on the territory of the Russian Federation

This article reflects on the reasons for the collapse of the asymmetrical alliance between the US and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRA), which had existed for 20 years. Particular attention is paid to the roles of both countries within the alliance as senior and junior partners. The goals of the two players are not always the same, which are sometimes contradictory. The level of Afghan influence on American strategy and the cost to the U.S. of managing the alliance are demonstrated, as well as attempts by the Afghan side to manipulate the senior partner with a high degree of dependence on it. The legal basis for the US-IRA alliance is outlined. The author notes the initial lack of a clear U.S. strategy outlining overarching goals, the sequence of steps required to achieve these goals, and the resources allocated to carry out these actions. The rapidly changing political and military environment in Afghanistan has contributed to frequent changes in US strategies. The paper shows that, as a result, Washington was actually forced, along with security, to engage seriously in nation-building in Afghanistan, which was not part of its plans. The ignorance of US officials about the socio-cultural and political conditions in the IRA was an important factor contributing to failures at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The complexity of implementing a state-building strategy was also due to the overly broad range of objectives and the large number of actors involved in Afghanistan. Complicating factors were the unrealistic timeline for reconstruction of the IRA, the endless infusion of funds into Afghan institutions to address insecurity and the corruption of the Afghan government. It is concluded that the foundation of the bilateral asymmetric alliance has been undermined by the US-Taliban arrangements, and Washington's decision to withdraw US troops from the IRA has led to its collapse.

The nature of the Taliban–al-Qaeda relationship has long been a major controversy among experts. Some argue that the Taliban and al-Qaeda are synonymous in many respects and that their ideology and objectives are closely intertwined. Some believe that this is a relationship of convenience or necessity for both groups, while others insist on deeper personal and ideological ties. Given this public discourse, the author analyzes the ambivalent relationship between al-Qaeda and the Taliban over the past 25 years, which has always been of business nature (comprehensive assistance in exchange for sanctuary), but never a political alliance. Al-Qaeda's globalist plans to create a mythical caliphate have always contradicted the Taliban's modest goals: to restore order in the country by pacifying corrupt warlords, to form an efficient government that enforces Sharia law, and to achieve international recognition. At the initial stage, the al-Qaeda leadership did not comply with the restrictions imposed on them by the Taliban and behaved independently, which resulted in foreign intervention and the loss of power. The author concludes that the strategic goals of al-Qaeda posed a direct threat to the nationally oriented goals of the Taliban. However, in the 2000s, the Taliban's ties to al-Qaeda were important for spreading the insurgency in Afghanistan, although al-Qaeda's military contribution on the battlefield was very modest. The author focuses on the weakening of opportunities and the degradation of the influence of al-Qaeda under powerful pressure from the coalition forces, the Afghan and Pakistani governments. In recent years, al-Qaeda, amid the victories of the Taliban, has begun to rebuild its positions in Afghanistan. The article shows the dependence of the al-Qaeda leadership, which has nowhere to hide, on the new regime in Kabul, which allows the Taliban to better control the militants of this terrorist organization.

The article is devoted to analysis of terrorist threats in Afghanistan and Pakistan, identifies their similar external and essential characteristics. Afghanistan is remarkable for the highest level of terrorist threats. Drivers of terrorist activity are the Taliban insurgency, more than 20 radical Islamist groups affiliated with Al-Qaida and partly with ISIL. Relying on the Afghan Taliban cooperation, Al-Qaida tries to regain its position in Afghanistan. Radical groups, consisting of foreign terrorist fighters are active in eastern, north-eastern and northern provinces of Afghanistan. Strengthening of the radical groups in the northern part of Afghanistan is a potential threat to the states of Central Asia. It can encourage the dissemination of extremist ideology in the region. Despite heavy casualties, ISIL tries not to lean back in Afghanistan. Pakistan's security is tied with the situation in Afghanistan. The terrorist elements operating in Af-Pak region always played a major role in destabilization of the country. The paper also highlights that increasing presence of militant groups in Pakistan contributed to the deepening of religious differences in Pakistani society. The presence of the supporters of Al-Qaida in the region also complicates the security situation in Pakistan. The author emphasizes existing trend of cultivation of extremist ideologies to get political support of conservative hardliners and to flirt with extremist groups in Pakistan's ruling circles. In recent years Islamabad could decrease the level of terrorist threats in Pakistan by conducting major military operations.

The article analyzes the interconnection between the direction of Turkey's struggle against terrorism with modern Islamist and nationalist ideas of Turkey. A majority of Turkish citizens following the Hanafi school of Islam, have historically opposed the purist religious doctrine of the Salafists. The author emphasizes that neither Turkey's secular tradition nor its predominant, moderate Islamic theology has made Turkish citizens immune to radicalization. Modern Turkish history has produced several violent Islamist organizations advocating Salafi views in line with the Islamic State's ideology. Turkish jihadists have been found among the ranks of foreign fighters in several recent conflict zones abroad. The article proves that when the uprisings began in Syria in 2011, Turkey threw its full support behind the opposition – harboring and mobilizing dissidents, arming rebels, and allowing free passage along the Syrian-Turkish border. Jihadists began to exploit the security vacuum, including ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra (now Hayat Tahrir al-Sham), the Syrian affiliate of al-Qaeda. The article also addresses the problems of Ankara's indifference at the first stage towards the ISIL's activities within and across Turkish territory. While the crossings between Turkey and ISIL territory officially were closed in 2014, smuggling through the frontier continued apace and Ankara only later started to engage ISIL militarily. The author concludes that the period of active struggle against al-Qaeda in Turkey (2003-2011) gave way after 2012 to a reduction in counterterrorism operations and now supporters of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham thank Turkey for protecting them against Syrian government forces, Russia and Iran.

The coronavirus pandemic has already caused high numbers of deaths, massive economic disruption, and had a huge impact on daily lives of millions of people. In short, – this is everything terrorist organizations affiliated with the ISIL and Al-Qaida would want to achieve with their attacks. The global pandemic serves as inspiration and influences the modus operandi of terrorists, both in terms of tactics and target selection. Since the pandemic started, the ISIL and Al-Qaida have persisted in operations across African, Asian and European countries, leaving hundreds of people dead. These attacks clearly show that terrorism has continued worldwide during the COVID 19 pandemic. Terrorist groups are looking at ways to take advantage of instability, increase recruitment and sympathizers among the vulnerable and terrified, encourage conventional and even biological attacks. Terrorist networks have encouraged followers to weaponise their own illness by trying to infect others. Terrorist groups also use the pandemic to gain visibility. The ISIL has been exploiting hashtags related to the coronavirus to redirect users to its radical propaganda. Terrorists have also found inspiration in the global pandemic with regard to their target selection, in particular critical health infrastructures. In Afghanistan, the Taliban has adopted a different approach to COVID 19 assisting efforts to limit the spread of the virus, including by declaring ceasefires in areas under its control. Hezbollah is working to fight the virus and maintain order within Lebanon. Because they control informal economies, groups like the Taliban or Lebanon's Hezbollah are better placed to benefit from coronavirus than the ISIL or Al-Qaida. In general, terrorist groups are taking advantage of COVID 19 lockdowns to spread hatred and intensify social media efforts to recruit young people spending more time online.

Abstract: The article analyzes the reasons that prompted the Arab states to consolidate their efforts and create the League of Arab States. Attention is focused on the deep differences that existed between the states that came forward with the idea of strengthening Arab unity and determined the nature of this regional organization and the features of its charter, which provided its members with the opportunity to preserve their political system, sovereignty and the specifics of foreign policy.The heterogeneous nature of LAS had an impact on its the goals and objectives. The focus of this organization was to protect pan-Arab interests and support all Arab states in achieving political independence.The aggravation of the situation in Palestine after the Second World War became a central item on the agenda of all the Arab League meetings. This organization indicated its position on the Palestinian issue in the preparatory period for its official proclamation. The article discusses the activities of the Arab League, aimed at introducing a complete boycott of Israel, which, amid expansion of the Arab League, other Arab states also joined. The Arab-Israeli conflict, due to the targeted efforts of the Arab League, consolidated the Arab geopolitical community and contributed to the formation of a national Arab identity. The LAS in its documents built a common Arab narrative, having two underpinnings: the recognition of the Palestinian Arab people as a victim of the Western powers and Zionists, as well as foreign policy of Israel.The article traces the relationship between the activities of the Arab League and the changes that have occurred in the regional and international environment. The gradual transition of the Arab League to the search for a political settleme maintain Arab unity by using the traditional tool – the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict. The LAS member-states should have taken a pan-Arab stance on the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in order to preserve national identity. The refusal of all Arab League members to accept the American settlement plan, proposed by D. Trump administration in early 2020, was a confirmation that this regional organization retains its position as a defender of Arab unity and pan-Arab interests.