Suchergebnisse

"During the Korean War nearly a thousand British servicemen, along with a handful of British civilians, were captured by North Korean and Red Chinese forces. In various camps in the vicinity of Pyongyang and villages along the Yalu River these men found themselves subjected to a prolonged effort by the enemy to undermine their allegiance to the Crown and enlist them in various propaganda campaigns directed against the UN war effort. British Prisoners of the korean War is the first academic study to examine in detail exactly what happened to the major groups of British military and civilian prisoners held in different locations at various junctures between 1950 and 1953. It explores the extent to which factors such as exposure to the actions of the North Koreans as against the Red Chinese, evolving physical conditions, enemy re-education efforts, communist attempts at blackmail, British attitudes towards the Americans, and personal background and leadership qualities among captives themselves influenced the willingness and ability of the British prisoners to collaborate or resist. Thanks to the availability of hitherto classified or underutilized source materials, it is now possible to test the common popular assumption-based on official accounts and memoirs from the 1950s-that, in marked contrast to their American cousins, British captives in the Korean War were pretty much immune to communist efforts at subverting their loyalty. The results suggest that British attitudes and actions while in enemy hands were rather more nuanced and varied than previously assumed."--Publisher's website

An examination of education in current affairs and citizenship within the British Army in the 20th century, of its function and effects. The author explores in particular the controversial question of the part played in Labour's 1945 election victory by the rank and file of the British Army

Conclusions concerning how many World War II U.S. Navy submariners should be classified as psychiatric casualties have long been based on a pioneering study by two navy physicians, Commander Ivan Duff, MD, and Captain Charles Shilling, MD, that was first made public in the Journal of the American Psychiatric Association shortly after the war. This article seeks to show that, despite the longevity of the resulting published figures, there were serious problems in their approach and conclusions. The data set of the study was far from comprehensive, which, in turn, led to erroneous calculations generating a minuscule number—approximately two cases per 1,000 submariners—that in turn necessitated explanatory overreach. Reasons for the approach taken in the original work, and subsequent longevity of acceptance and celebration of the results produced, are then examined through the lens of confirmation bias.