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Happiness economics studies economic and social factors that determine or are re­lated to happiness. Happiness economics results are intended to inform economic and social policy. This article examines the feasibility and expediency of economic measures of happiness. It argues that economic measures of happiness are not valid in the sense that happiness is immeasurable phenomenon and that the measures are not reliable in the sense that the established level of happiness is not going to be correct. The invalidity is implied by the subjective theory of value and the unreliability, in turn, is implied by the invalidity. Happiness economics invokes assumptions that are false: happiness is not subject to be measured in a cardinal scales of measurement and to be intersubjectvely aggregated. Every individual scale of happiness can be only ordinal and these individual orders cannot be aggregated into intersubjective order due to the lack of intersubjective definition of happiness and due to the impossibility of aggregation of subjective preferences into an intersubjective rank. The validity of economic measures of happiness is further undermined by their unreliability: there is no common definition of happiness; different cultures do not have the same con­ cept of happiness as we want to measure it; different cultures are prone to different valuation of happiness; personal valuation of happiness is relative and prone to be context sensitive; people do not always adequately assess their perceptions; demons­trable preferences do not necessarily match the real preferences that are revealed during the choice of an actual action. Moreover, the intention to use happiness econo­mics results to inform economic and social policy meet a moral problem. Happiness economics, through policy decisions, can transfer to the public a particular definite understanding of happiness instead of allowing spreading different possible alternati­ve understandings of happiness. ; Laimės ekonomika tiria laimės jausmą lemiančius ar su šiuo jausmu susijusius ekonominius ir socialinius veiksnius. Jos atradimais norima informuoti ekonominės ir socialinės politikos sprendimus. Šiame straipsnyje neigiamas ekonominių laimės rodiklių pagrįstumas ir patikimumas. Nepagrįstumas kyla iš subjektyvios vertės teorijos – laimės negalima išreikšti kardinalia matavimo skale ir negalima agreguoti tarpasmeninio laimės jausmo. Iš laimės kaip subjektyvaus dalyko kyla ir laimės rodiklių nepatikimumas. Straipsnyje taip pat teigiama, kad ekonominių laimės matavimų rezultatų taikymas politiniuose sprendimuose vertintinas kaip nemoralus.

The article argues that economic measures of happiness are invalid and unreliable. The invalidity is implied by the subjective theory of value: happiness cannot be measured in the cardinal scales of measurement and it cannot be intersubjectively aggregated. The unreliability also follows from the subjective nature of happiness. The article concludes that the application of happiness economics to inform policy decisions should be seen as immoral. Adapted from the source document.

Happiness economics studies economic and social factors that determine or are re­lated to happiness. Happiness economics results are intended to inform economic and social policy. This article examines the feasibility and expediency of economic measures of happiness. It argues that economic measures of happiness are not valid in the sense that happiness is immeasurable phenomenon and that the measures are not reliable in the sense that the established level of happiness is not going to be correct. The invalidity is implied by the subjective theory of value and the unreliability, in turn, is implied by the invalidity. Happiness economics invokes assumptions that are false: happiness is not subject to be measured in a cardinal scales of measurement and to be intersubjectvely aggregated. Every individual scale of happiness can be only ordinal and these individual orders cannot be aggregated into intersubjective order due to the lack of intersubjective definition of happiness and due to the impossibility of aggregation of subjective preferences into an intersubjective rank. The validity of economic measures of happiness is further undermined by their unreliability: there is no common definition of happiness; different cultures do not have the same con­ cept of happiness as we want to measure it; different cultures are prone to different valuation of happiness; personal valuation of happiness is relative and prone to be context sensitive; people do not always adequately assess their perceptions; demons­trable preferences do not necessarily match the real preferences that are revealed during the choice of an actual action. Moreover, the intention to use happiness econo­mics results to inform economic and social policy meet a moral problem. Happiness economics, through policy decisions, can transfer to the public a particular definite understanding of happiness instead of allowing spreading different possible alternati­ve understandings of happiness.

Geriausio paaiškino išvedimas (GPI) dabartinėje analitinėje epistemologijoje ir mokslo filosofijoje yra plačiai tyrinėjama episteminė teorija, teigianti, kad hipotezės buvimas geriausiu paaiškinimu yra pakankama šios hipotezės teisingumo sąlyga. Straipsnyje teigiama, kad GPI analizuotina ne tik kaip episteminė, bet ir kaip psichologinė bei ontologinė teorija. Pirma, aptariami kognityviųjų mokslų tyrimai, kurie leidžia teigti, jog GPI teisingai aprašo žmonių samprotavimų praktiką: paaiškinimas suvokiamas kaip teisingumo požymis; teiginiai, kurie yra geresni paaiškinimai, priimami kaip labiau tikėtini; aiškinimo vertybės bei turimas žinojimas daro įtaką teiginių tikimybės vertinimui. Antra, straipsnyje aptariama, kokia turėtų būti pasaulio ontologija, kad GPI kaip episteminė teorija būtų teisinga. Realizmas apie išorinį pasaulį, gamtos vienodumas, turimo žinojimo teisingumas bei aiškinimo vertybių palankumas tiesai yra būtinos ir pakankamos sąlygos tam, kad GPI būtų teisinga.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: geriausio paaiškinimo išvedimas, abdukcija, psichologija, ontologija, aiškinimo vertybės.Psychological Adequacy and Ontological Commitments of Inference to the Best Explanation Adolfas Mackonis
SummaryThe article explicates psychological and ontological aspects of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). IBE is a psychological theory, because cognitive science studies support IBE as descriptively true and psychologically adequate theory, i.e., people perceive best explanations as true and follow the rule of IBE in their reasoning. Moreover, different features of IBE imply that conclusions of IBE can be true only in a world with a very particular ontological constitution. Realism about the external world, the uniformity of nature, the truth of background knowledge and the truth-conduciveness of explanatory virtues are necessary and sufficient for IBE to be truth-conducive. Therefore, IBE is an epistemic theory only because at the same time it is committed to a particular ontology.Keywords: inference to the best explanation, abduction, psychology, ontology, explanatory virtues.

History and Philosophy of Science in the Journal of Baltic European StudiesAdolfas Mackonis

Inference to the best explanation (IBE) is considered to be the main means of discovery and justification of scientific hypotheses and theories. The article investigates this inference and its relationship to the main kinds of inference: deduction, induction and abduction. IBE has an abductive inference mechanism, but, contrary to abduction, infers not a possible, but a true conclusion. IBE is an inductive inference, because it is underdetermined by the rules of deduction and by evidence. The article claims that despite its abductive and inductive features which demonstrate that it is not and cannot be deductive inference, IBE nevertheless makes pretense to an absolute truth of its inference, i.e. claims for an almost deductive validity.