Suchergebnisse

Elke verkiezing opnieuw moeten de politieke partijen honderden kandidaten selecteren. Maar wie zijn die kandidaten? Hoe oud zijn ze? Wat is hun beroep? Waar wonen ze?0In dit boek wordt het DNA van de kandidaten voor het eerst gedetailleerd in kaart gebracht. De auteurs beschrijven hoe het profiel van de kandidaten is geëvolueerd de voorbije 25 jaar. Is het zo dat er nauwelijks arbeiders op de lijsten staan, en was dat vroeger dan anders? Hebben de partijen effectief de neiging om uit te pakken met steeds jongere kandidaten? Hebben de talrijke vrouwelijke kandidaten van vandaag een ander profiel dan de schaarse vrouwelijke kandidaten van vroeger? Heeft de kieshervorming ertoe geleid dat kleinere gemeenten minder aan hun trekken komen bij de lijstvorming? En is dit in Vlaanderen anders dan in Wallonië? deze vragen te kunnen beantwoorden, hebben auteurs een enorme hoeveelheid gegevens verzameld over de kandidaten bij de voorbije zeven Kamerverkiezingen. In dit boek wordt al die informatie op een leesbare wijze gebundeld. Alles wat u altijd al had willen weten over de kandidaten, maar nog nooit heeft durven vragen

In various parliamentary democracies, institutional reformers have proposed to directly elect the prime minister, but it is only in Israel that this reform has been implemented. In this article, the Israeli model is compared to the proposals involving the direct election of the prime minister in France, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium. The analysis focuses on three crucial characteristics: the object of the election, the electoral system and the relationship between the assembly and the executive. It is shown that there is substantial variation among the models. Some of proposed models are close to the presidential idealtype. Other models combine a direct election of the executive with the possibility of censure by the assembly, and thus constitute a new regime type which can be labelled as 'neo-parliamentary'. The Israeli model belongs to this group, although it is atypical because of the investiture requirement. Finally, some models approach the parliamentary idealtype as they allow the assembly to replace the elected prime minister. White most models involve a concurrent but separate election of the prime minister and the assembly, it is argued that a linked election offers better possibilities to bring about an executive majority in the assembly.

The 1995 simultaneous election of three legislative assemblies (Senate, lower Chamber and regional councils) offered the Belgian voters an opportunity to split their ballot between three different parties. An analysis of Flemish individual level survey data shows that 76.1% cast a straight ticket vote, white 20.9 % split their tickets between two and 3 % between three different parties. Ticketsplitting occurs most frequently amongst voters who mention the personality of individual politicians or the issues as a reason to support a party. In addition, the likehood of ticket-splitting increases amongst the higher educated and the non-partisans. No support was found for the hypothesis that ticket-splitters in a multi-party system tend to lean towards one party on some issues and towards the other party on others. Instead, ticket-splitters generally take a position in between two parties. No evidence was found of a differential issue impact across elections, in this sense that regional issues are more critical to regional elections and federal issues to federal elections.