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This compliance study models correct and timely implementation of policies in a multilevel system as a strategic game between a central monitoring agency and multiple implementers and evaluates statistically the empirical implications of this model. We test whether compliance is determined by the anticipated enforcement decision of the monitoring agency and whether this agency is responsive to the probability of enforcement success and the potential sanctioning costs produced by noncomplying implementers. Compared to other monitoring systems, the centralized monitoring system of the European Union (EU) is praised for exemplary effectiveness, but our findings reveal that the monitoring agency refrains from enforcing compliance when the probability of success is low, and the sanctioning costs are high. This results in a compliance deficit, even though the selective enforcement activities of the monitoring agency are almost always successful before court. Adapted from the source document.

European Union research has made great strides in understanding the dynamics of the European Union decision-making process. In contrast to this progress, the dynamics unfolding after the enactment of a European Union secondary legislative act has largely been ignored. Some of these acts remain in force in their original form for several years while others are revised soon after their enactment. What factors account for this variation? We empirically analyze the proposition that in the presence of 'legislative drift,' i.e. the intertemporal variation of decision-makers' preferences, major revisions of European Union legislative acts are more likely to occur. Based on an analysis of the revision histories of 158 major European Union acts in the time period between 1958 and 2003, we find significant support for this hypothesis. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

Although member states are obliged to transpose directives into domestic law in a conformable manner and receive considerable time for their transposition activities, we identify three levels of transposition outcomes for EU directives: conformable, partially conformable and non-conformable. Compared with existing transposition models, which do not distinguish between different transposition outcomes, we examine the factors influencing each transposition process by means of a competing risk analysis. We find that preference-related factors, in particular the disagreement of a member state and the Commission regarding a directive's outcome, play a much more strategic role than has to date acknowledged in the transposition literature. Whereas disagreement of a member state delays conformable transposition, it speeds up non-conformable transposition. Disagreement of the Commission only prolongs the transposition process. We therefore conclude that a stronger focus on an effective sanctioning mechanism is warranted for safeguarding compliance with directives. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

The authors state that Golers criticism was based on other premises and so they decline dealing with his remarks to focus on the methodical question about the measuring of content-related Europeanization that they thus far treated with available qualitative indicators. Joining the GESTA and CELEX databases won't be sufficient to determine the common origin of the European influence in German legislation. While Goler found only individual cases at random, the authors defend their results by the 115 cases found between 1976 and 2005. They subsequently examine whether the categorization of initiatives influenced by Europe is really due to European activities that can be inferred from legislative contents. This makes clear that over 82 per cent of categorization using words with a clear EU-references (guidelines, commission, European Economic Community) can be determined. Adapted from the source document.

Governance beyond the nation state is intensively discussed with regard to the degree of Europeanization of the member states. For some scholars, the Europeanization degree of German legislation has already reached a share of 80%. This article applies a quantitative perspective & investigates, whether & to what extent German legislation has been stimulated by European impulses over the past 30 years. In contrast to previous studies, the analysis distinguishes between regular & important legislation & examines whether & to what extent European impulses are induced by EU legislation. The results reveal that previous estimates have dramatically overstated the influence of Europeanization on German legislation. According to our findings, a share of 80% has only once occurred in a single policy domain. Usually, this share is significantly lower, in particular for important legislation. Moreover, it is only possible to identify the reasons for half of the Europeanization impulses in the respective EU legislative database. Tables, Figures, Appendixes, References. Adapted from the source document.

Published online: 19 November 2018 ; Does party government moderate the responsiveness of public policy to public opinion? Analysing a new dataset, we examine whether the ability of governments to respond to the public on 306 specific policy issues in Denmark, Germany and the UK is affected by the extent of coalition conflict and by the fit of the considered policy changes with the government preferences. We find a systematic but relatively weak positive impact of public support on the likelihood and speed of policy change. Contrary to expectations, a higher number of coalition partners are not associated with fewer policy changes nor with weaker responsiveness to public opinion. We also find no evidence that responsiveness to public opinion is necessarily weaker for policy changes that go against the preferences of the government. Rather, it appears that public and government support for policy change are substitute resources.