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For the past two decades, experiments in decentralization and federalization havebeen developing in Africa, Asia, and the formerly communist states of EasternEurope. Many of the powers previously in the hands of the central governmentor its deconcentrated structures have been transferred to lower government layers.Additionally, local governments are gradually emerging as development actors.Whatever the reasons for decentralization, the transfer of new functions to localgovernments can be substantive, at least in intent.The Political Economy of Decentralization in Sub-Saharan Africa offers a newpolicy-oriented implementation model, applied systematically in parallel in BurkinaFaso, Ghana, Kenya, and Senegal. The book studies the individual countries andcompares similar issues based on the same blueprint. The analysis is not intendedto assess whether the chosen decentralization model is the right one, which doesnot exist. Rather, it examines decentralization achievements in specific nationalsettings and compares those achievements with the announced objectives. Thedivergences revealed enable decision makers to choose appropriate directionsfor country reform.This method does not transpose textbook solutions to the states. The referenceframework offers an analytical approach contextualized to each country thatintegrates not only economic arguments, but also sociopolitical ones. The authorspropose an analytical guide founded on political and institutional economy. Theyanalyze decentralized policies that help stakeholders to identify the issues, pointout stumbling blocks, and ensure coherent decisions on decentralization. The bookis an asset to all those involved in negotiating and implementing approaches todecentralization.

International audience ; The contemporary tensions between patents and competition no longer reside in the traditional trade-off between the exclusionary right given to an inventor to encourage innovation, and the welfare loss induced by the market power associated to this right. They rather result from three important distortions of the patent system that create conflicts between patents and competition on the product market, the technology market, and the innovation market. The first distortion is related to the existence of dubious or weak patents: too many patents are granted to applications of bad quality according to the patentability criteria. This increases the uncertainty attached to patents, reduces the credibility of the system and calls into question the justification of the patent as a protective mechanism. Second, the configuration of a patent, originally designed in the context of an isolated innovation, is not quite adapted to the context of sequential innovations. While sequential patents requires fine limitations between successive generations of innovations, the strengthening of intellectual property rights, including the extension of the patentable subject matters, opened the door to opportunistic behavior and adversely affected the technological exchanges. Third, the emergence of complex technologies, in which the use of a large number of fragmented patents is necessary to produce a new product, implies the necessity to coordinate the behavior of numerous patent holders. Some entrants in these complex technologies are struck by the imperfect coordinated behavior of these patent holders as illustrated in different settings such as the pooling of complementary patents and the licensing of essential patents by the Standard Setting Organisation members. Very often, patents serve to create ambushes or to capture unjustified rents through excessive license fees, which in turn create barriers to entry for new competitors in the innovation market. Two important consequences of these distortions are derived. First, the resolution of the conflicts cannot rely exclusively on the application of the antitrust law. Second, the distortions lead to a very expensive judicial implementation of the patent system. ; Cet article présente trois distorsions du système de brevets qui sont à l'origine de tensions importantes entre brevet et concurrence sur trois marchés: le marché des produits, le marché de la technologie et le marché de l'innovation. La première distorsion trouve son origine dans la qualité des brevets: trop de brevets accordés ont une qualité douteuse, ce qui ne manque pas d'accroître l'incertitude attachée à ce titre de propriété intellectuelle et la crédibilité générale du système de brevets. La seconde distorsion née du fait que la configuration d'un brevet répond davantage aux conditions d'innovations isolées qu'à celles d'innovations séquentielles où diverses innovations dépendent de celles qui les ont précédé. Alors que la séquentialité requiert une délimitation très fine des revendications accordées à chaque innovation, l'élargissement des domaines brevetables et le renforcement des droits des détenteurs ont ouvert la voie à une série de comportements opportunistes qui affectent les échanges technologiques. La troisième distorsion enfin naît de l'émergence de technologies complexes nécessitant le recours à des vastes ensembles de savoir-faire fragmentés et protégés chacun par un brevet. La constitution de pools de brevets permettant un usage simultané des différents brevets est souvent à l'origine de stratégies malveillantes qui affectent le fonctionnement des marchés de l'innovation. Deux conséquences de ces trois distorsions sont notables. Premièrement, la résolution des conflits ne peut se faire par le seul recours au droit de la concurrence. Deuxièmement, les distorsions rendent le coût juridique d'implémentation des brevets très onéreux.

International audience ; The contemporary tensions between patents and competition no longer reside in the traditional trade-off between the exclusionary right given to an inventor to encourage innovation, and the welfare loss induced by the market power associated to this right. They rather result from three important distortions of the patent system that create conflicts between patents and competition on the product market, the technology market, and the innovation market. The first distortion is related to the existence of dubious or weak patents: too many patents are granted to applications of bad quality according to the patentability criteria. This increases the uncertainty attached to patents, reduces the credibility of the system and calls into question the justification of the patent as a protective mechanism. Second, the configuration of a patent, originally designed in the context of an isolated innovation, is not quite adapted to the context of sequential innovations. While sequential patents requires fine limitations between successive generations of innovations, the strengthening of intellectual property rights, including the extension of the patentable subject matters, opened the door to opportunistic behavior and adversely affected the technological exchanges. Third, the emergence of complex technologies, in which the use of a large number of fragmented patents is necessary to produce a new product, implies the necessity to coordinate the behavior of numerous patent holders. Some entrants in these complex technologies are struck by the imperfect coordinated behavior of these patent holders as illustrated in different settings such as the pooling of complementary patents and the licensing of essential patents by the Standard Setting Organisation members. Very often, patents serve to create ambushes or to capture unjustified rents through excessive license fees, which in turn create barriers to entry for new competitors in the innovation market. Two important consequences of these distortions are ...

International audience ; The contemporary tensions between patents and competition no longer reside in the traditional trade-off between the exclusionary right given to an inventor to encourage innovation, and the welfare loss induced by the market power associated to this right. They rather result from three important distortions of the patent system that create conflicts between patents and competition on the product market, the technology market, and the innovation market. The first distortion is related to the existence of dubious or weak patents: too many patents are granted to applications of bad quality according to the patentability criteria. This increases the uncertainty attached to patents, reduces the credibility of the system and calls into question the justification of the patent as a protective mechanism. Second, the configuration of a patent, originally designed in the context of an isolated innovation, is not quite adapted to the context of sequential innovations. While sequential patents requires fine limitations between successive generations of innovations, the strengthening of intellectual property rights, including the extension of the patentable subject matters, opened the door to opportunistic behavior and adversely affected the technological exchanges. Third, the emergence of complex technologies, in which the use of a large number of fragmented patents is necessary to produce a new product, implies the necessity to coordinate the behavior of numerous patent holders. Some entrants in these complex technologies are struck by the imperfect coordinated behavior of these patent holders as illustrated in different settings such as the pooling of complementary patents and the licensing of essential patents by the Standard Setting Organisation members. Very often, patents serve to create ambushes or to capture unjustified rents through excessive license fees, which in turn create barriers to entry for new competitors in the innovation market. Two important consequences of these distortions are derived. First, the resolution of the conflicts cannot rely exclusively on the application of the antitrust law. Second, the distortions lead to a very expensive judicial implementation of the patent system. ; Cet article présente trois distorsions du système de brevets qui sont à l'origine de tensions importantes entre brevet et concurrence sur trois marchés: le marché des produits, le marché de la technologie et le marché de l'innovation. La première distorsion trouve son origine dans la qualité des brevets: trop de brevets accordés ont une qualité douteuse, ce qui ne manque pas d'accroître l'incertitude attachée à ce titre de propriété intellectuelle et la crédibilité générale du système de brevets. La seconde distorsion née du fait que la configuration d'un brevet répond davantage aux conditions d'innovations isolées qu'à celles d'innovations séquentielles où diverses innovations dépendent de celles qui les ont précédé. Alors que la séquentialité requiert une délimitation très fine des revendications accordées à chaque innovation, l'élargissement des domaines brevetables et le renforcement des droits des détenteurs ont ouvert la voie à une série de comportements opportunistes qui affectent les échanges technologiques. La troisième distorsion enfin naît de l'émergence de technologies complexes nécessitant le recours à des vastes ensembles de savoir-faire fragmentés et protégés chacun par un brevet. La constitution de pools de brevets permettant un usage simultané des différents brevets est souvent à l'origine de stratégies malveillantes qui affectent le fonctionnement des marchés de l'innovation. Deux conséquences de ces trois distorsions sont notables. Premièrement, la résolution des conflits ne peut se faire par le seul recours au droit de la concurrence. Deuxièmement, les distorsions rendent le coût juridique d'implémentation des brevets très onéreux.

International audience ; The contemporary tensions between patents and competition no longer reside in the traditional trade-off between the exclusionary right given to an inventor to encourage innovation, and the welfare loss induced by the market power associated to this right. They rather result from three important distortions of the patent system that create conflicts between patents and competition on the product market, the technology market, and the innovation market. The first distortion is related to the existence of dubious or weak patents: too many patents are granted to applications of bad quality according to the patentability criteria. This increases the uncertainty attached to patents, reduces the credibility of the system and calls into question the justification of the patent as a protective mechanism. Second, the configuration of a patent, originally designed in the context of an isolated innovation, is not quite adapted to the context of sequential innovations. While sequential patents requires fine limitations between successive generations of innovations, the strengthening of intellectual property rights, including the extension of the patentable subject matters, opened the door to opportunistic behavior and adversely affected the technological exchanges. Third, the emergence of complex technologies, in which the use of a large number of fragmented patents is necessary to produce a new product, implies the necessity to coordinate the behavior of numerous patent holders. Some entrants in these complex technologies are struck by the imperfect coordinated behavior of these patent holders as illustrated in different settings such as the pooling of complementary patents and the licensing of essential patents by the Standard Setting Organisation members. Very often, patents serve to create ambushes or to capture unjustified rents through excessive license fees, which in turn create barriers to entry for new competitors in the innovation market. Two important consequences of these distortions are ...

International audience ; The contemporary tensions between patents and competition no longer reside in the traditional trade-off between the exclusionary right given to an inventor to encourage innovation, and the welfare loss induced by the market power associated to this right. They rather result from three important distortions of the patent system that create conflicts between patents and competition on the product market, the technology market, and the innovation market. The first distortion is related to the existence of dubious or weak patents: too many patents are granted to applications of bad quality according to the patentability criteria. This increases the uncertainty attached to patents, reduces the credibility of the system and calls into question the justification of the patent as a protective mechanism. Second, the configuration of a patent, originally designed in the context of an isolated innovation, is not quite adapted to the context of sequential innovations. While sequential patents requires fine limitations between successive generations of innovations, the strengthening of intellectual property rights, including the extension of the patentable subject matters, opened the door to opportunistic behavior and adversely affected the technological exchanges. Third, the emergence of complex technologies, in which the use of a large number of fragmented patents is necessary to produce a new product, implies the necessity to coordinate the behavior of numerous patent holders. Some entrants in these complex technologies are struck by the imperfect coordinated behavior of these patent holders as illustrated in different settings such as the pooling of complementary patents and the licensing of essential patents by the Standard Setting Organisation members. Very often, patents serve to create ambushes or to capture unjustified rents through excessive license fees, which in turn create barriers to entry for new competitors in the innovation market. Two important consequences of these distortions are derived. First, the resolution of the conflicts cannot rely exclusively on the application of the antitrust law. Second, the distortions lead to a very expensive judicial implementation of the patent system. ; Cet article présente trois distorsions du système de brevets qui sont à l'origine de tensions importantes entre brevet et concurrence sur trois marchés: le marché des produits, le marché de la technologie et le marché de l'innovation. La première distorsion trouve son origine dans la qualité des brevets: trop de brevets accordés ont une qualité douteuse, ce qui ne manque pas d'accroître l'incertitude attachée à ce titre de propriété intellectuelle et la crédibilité générale du système de brevets. La seconde distorsion née du fait que la configuration d'un brevet répond davantage aux conditions d'innovations isolées qu'à celles d'innovations séquentielles où diverses innovations dépendent de celles qui les ont précédé. Alors que la séquentialité requiert une délimitation très fine des revendications accordées à chaque innovation, l'élargissement des domaines brevetables et le renforcement des droits des détenteurs ont ouvert la voie à une série de comportements opportunistes qui affectent les échanges technologiques. La troisième distorsion enfin naît de l'émergence de technologies complexes nécessitant le recours à des vastes ensembles de savoir-faire fragmentés et protégés chacun par un brevet. La constitution de pools de brevets permettant un usage simultané des différents brevets est souvent à l'origine de stratégies malveillantes qui affectent le fonctionnement des marchés de l'innovation. Deux conséquences de ces trois distorsions sont notables. Premièrement, la résolution des conflits ne peut se faire par le seul recours au droit de la concurrence. Deuxièmement, les distorsions rendent le coût juridique d'implémentation des brevets très onéreux.

International audience ; The contemporary tensions between patents and competition no longer reside in the traditional trade-off between the exclusionary right given to an inventor to encourage innovation, and the welfare loss induced by the market power associated to this right. They rather result from three important distortions of the patent system that create conflicts between patents and competition on the product market, the technology market, and the innovation market. The first distortion is related to the existence of dubious or weak patents: too many patents are granted to applications of bad quality according to the patentability criteria. This increases the uncertainty attached to patents, reduces the credibility of the system and calls into question the justification of the patent as a protective mechanism. Second, the configuration of a patent, originally designed in the context of an isolated innovation, is not quite adapted to the context of sequential innovations. While sequential patents requires fine limitations between successive generations of innovations, the strengthening of intellectual property rights, including the extension of the patentable subject matters, opened the door to opportunistic behavior and adversely affected the technological exchanges. Third, the emergence of complex technologies, in which the use of a large number of fragmented patents is necessary to produce a new product, implies the necessity to coordinate the behavior of numerous patent holders. Some entrants in these complex technologies are struck by the imperfect coordinated behavior of these patent holders as illustrated in different settings such as the pooling of complementary patents and the licensing of essential patents by the Standard Setting Organisation members. Very often, patents serve to create ambushes or to capture unjustified rents through excessive license fees, which in turn create barriers to entry for new competitors in the innovation market. Two important consequences of these distortions are derived. First, the resolution of the conflicts cannot rely exclusively on the application of the antitrust law. Second, the distortions lead to a very expensive judicial implementation of the patent system. ; Cet article présente trois distorsions du système de brevets qui sont à l'origine de tensions importantes entre brevet et concurrence sur trois marchés: le marché des produits, le marché de la technologie et le marché de l'innovation. La première distorsion trouve son origine dans la qualité des brevets: trop de brevets accordés ont une qualité douteuse, ce qui ne manque pas d'accroître l'incertitude attachée à ce titre de propriété intellectuelle et la crédibilité générale du système de brevets. La seconde distorsion née du fait que la configuration d'un brevet répond davantage aux conditions d'innovations isolées qu'à celles d'innovations séquentielles où diverses innovations dépendent de celles qui les ont précédé. Alors que la séquentialité requiert une délimitation très fine des revendications accordées à chaque innovation, l'élargissement des domaines brevetables et le renforcement des droits des détenteurs ont ouvert la voie à une série de comportements opportunistes qui affectent les échanges technologiques. La troisième distorsion enfin naît de l'émergence de technologies complexes nécessitant le recours à des vastes ensembles de savoir-faire fragmentés et protégés chacun par un brevet. La constitution de pools de brevets permettant un usage simultané des différents brevets est souvent à l'origine de stratégies malveillantes qui affectent le fonctionnement des marchés de l'innovation. Deux conséquences de ces trois distorsions sont notables. Premièrement, la résolution des conflits ne peut se faire par le seul recours au droit de la concurrence. Deuxièmement, les distorsions rendent le coût juridique d'implémentation des brevets très onéreux.