Suchergebnisse

The decision made in October 2012 by Afonso Dhlakama, the leader of the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO), accompanied by a motley group of his former rebel fighters, to pull out from the government of Mozambique and to go back to his former rebel base in Gorongosa, Central Mozambique, has sparked widespread, yet well-founded fears that Mozambique might be heading back to armed conflict involving the same players and precipitated by some of the grievances that were thought to be resolved through the post-Rome Accords dispensation a good 22 years ago. For the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, this development is particularly ominous as it comes at a time when the region is faced with other continuing or broken down peace initiatives notably in Madagascar and the DRC. The elusive peace and security processes in Antananarivo and Kinshasa have resulted in either full scale military offensives as in the eastern Congo or in an unstable politico-security environment as being witnessed in Madagascar. In both these two cases, the SADC has been trying to mediate and find sustainable peaceful solutions without much reported progress. This article critically analyses the SADC's capability to successfully and sustainably resolve and transform conflicts, using this unstable political and security development in Mozambique as a case in point. It interrogates the extent to which the current dispensation in Mozambique has succeeded in addressing the grievances that were, during the negotiations that culminated in the signing of the Rome Accords, recognised as having caused the brutal 16-year civil war of 1976-1992. The article posits that the October 2012 move by RENAMO, regardless of whether it is resolved through dialogue or it leads to another shooting war, presents a critical challenge to the SADC Conflict Resolution and Management Mechanisms as conceived, developed and practiced to date. Whilst peace has been prevailing in Mozambique for over 20 years, the article analyses whether or not the reneging of RENAMO revolves around the underlying causes of the pre-1992 conflict which remained unaddressed. The article concludes with a set of recommendations on how best the SADC could tackle this recurring conflict in Mozambique while, at the same time, drawing critical lessons that will assist in generally improving and streamlining its current conflict resolution and management mechanisms and practices.

Conflict recurrence in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) provides a litmus test to the Southern African Development Community's (SADC's) capacity to sustainably resolve the conflict and build peace. The surrender of the March 23 (M23) rebels, followed by overtures to incorporate the same into the Congolese military and political institutions, seem not to have made much significant impact on the security stability in the eastern part of the country. Armed activities by militia groups such as the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR), the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), and various Mayi Mayi groups are likely to cause a recurrence of a fully fledged armed conflict in eastern Congo. Whilst the UN Mission for the Stabilisation of Congo (MONUSCO), along with its Intervention Brigade continue to make efforts to support the Congolese government to address the security situation in the country, this article presents a critical analysis on the prospects and constraints of SADC to sustainably resolve the conflict and build peace in the context of conflict recurrence. For purposes of conflict resolution and peacebuilding, the DRC falls within SADC's area of sub-regional responsibility, which overlaps that of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). The paper looks at the political/diplomatic and military/ security initiatives that SADC can take to complement the current efforts of critical role players such as MONUSCO and ICGLR in sustainably resolving the recurring conflict and building peace.It also analyses the prospects of such sub-regional initiatives. Considering the conflict matrix of the eastern Congo conflict with specific reference to its recurrence, an examination of the likely constraints that SADC could encounter in trying to resolve the eastern Congo conflict will be presented. Policy suggestions will be proffered on what can be done to encounter such constraints.The research adopted a qualitative approach premised on interviews. Secondary sources, including key policy documents and statements of the SADC, AU, ICGLR and UN, were utilised. To complement the primary sources, structured opportunity interviews were conducted at seminars and workshops with academics and senior political and security analysts conversant with the SADC conflict and peace dynamics.

From the time it deployed in the eastern DRC in 2013 up to the first quarter of 2016, arguably no much tangible progress has been made by the United Nations Force Intervention Brigade (UN FIB). The security situation in eastern Congo continues to be unstable. This instability has serious direct security threats and spillover effects on respective neighbouring countries that are either part of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) or the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). There are certain constraints that the FIB has continued to encounter in the context of regional and international political and strategic dynamics surrounding eastern Congo recurring conflict. This paper argues that one of the contributing factors behind the challenges encountered by the UN Force is the fact that both the ICGLR and the SADC efforts at enhancing peace enforcement in the eastern DRC have been overshadowed by the self-interests of international actors. Arguably, this scenario has impacted negatively on the ICGLR/SADC synchronised efforts towards the effectiveness of the FIB. The paper makes some recommendations on how best to attain sustainable synergy between the ICGLR and SADC in order to enhance the strategic and operational efficiency and the effectiveness of the UN FIB in the eastern Congo conflict.

This article makes a critical analysis of Zimbabwe's contribution to peacekeeping and peace-support operations in the period 1980 to 2000. It argues that this contribution has brought in a new thrust of peacekeeping operations of coercing the other party to the negotiating table. The article demonstrates the complexity of traditional peacekeeping operations where member states (and in this case Zimbabwe) have made notable contribution to the cause of peacekeeping operations, not only through traditional methods and principles of peacekeeping but also through various other methodologies such as peace-support efforts. Using the 1980 to 2000 time frame, in case studying Zimbabwe's contribution to peace support operations, this article demonstrates that even developing countries have the capacity and political willingness to shape international activities.

The recurring conflict in Eastern DRC has had devastating effects on civilians, mostly in Kivus. From the beginning of January 2002 till the end of May 2017, many conflict resolution efforts have been put together by regional and international communities. However, there has not been any sustainable mechanism to resolve the conflict. The situation regarding the security of Eastern Congo continues to be volatile. This paper seeks to identify the responsible party that would help mitigate the recurring conflict in Eastern Congo. Using the three distinct categories of actors in Conflict Transformation, the paper argues that the lack of coordination among these actors who constitutes the three Track levels have affected unity of purpose and the level of commitment as far as transforming the Eastern Congo Conflict. The divergent interests among the respective actors to outmaneuver one another when it comes to agenda setting regarding respective peace initiatives on conflict, could be the rationale behind the absence of a workable formula in transforming conflict in the Eastern DRC. The paper proffer strategic policy suggestions toward a workable Conflict Transformation mechanism that equitably addresses the root causes of the conflict and fairly incorporates the relevant stakeholders in an effort to find a sustainable solution.