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ObjectiveThis article seeks to explain the puzzle of why incumbents spend so much on campaigns despite most research finding that their spending has almost no effect on voters.MethodsThe article uses ordinary least squares, instrumental variables, and fixed‐effects regression to estimate the impact of incumbent spending on election outcomes. The estimation includes an interaction term between incumbent and challenger spending to allow the effect of incumbent spending to depend on the level of challenger spending.ResultsThe estimation provides strong evidence that spending by the incumbent has a larger positive impact on votes received the more money the challenger spends.ConclusionCampaign spending by incumbents is most valuable in the races where the incumbent faces a serious challenge. Raising large sums of money to be used in close races is thus a rational choice by incumbents.

This paper investigates the extent to which interest groups use their campaign contributions to affect election outcomes as opposed to influencing candidate policy choices directly. It also reveals how much value interest groups place on gaining one more favorable vote in the House of Representatives. The empirical estimates suggest that gaining influence dominates helping favored candidates win the election as a means to affect defense spending policies. Political action committees differ in interesting ways, however, with the more ideological peace groups placing greater emphasis on changing electoral outcomes than do investor lobbies representing the defense industry.

Objective. This article examines how third‐party candidates influenced the 2000 presidential election.Methods. Two surveys provide information on a hypothetical election between only George Bush and Al Gore. The determinants of voting behavior in this election are then used to estimate how votes cast for third‐party candidates would have been partitioned between Bush, Gore, and abstentions had the other candidates dropped out of the race.Results. The estimates suggest that the Ralph Nader votes would have gone primarily to Gore (giving him the win in Florida) while Bush would have received more of the Pat Buchanan votes. The results also show that Nader's presence in the race gave Gore an incentive to position himself farther to the left ideologically. Bush's ideological position was not affected by Buchanan's participation.Conclusion. The third‐party candidates' participation was a critical factor in George Bush's Electoral College victory over Al Gore.

This article examines how third-party candidates influenced the 2000 presidential election. Two surveys provide information on a hypothetical election between only George Bush & Al Gore. The determinants of voting behavior in this election are then used to estimate how votes cast for third-party candidates would have been partitioned between Bush, Gore, & abstentions had the other candidates dropped out of the race. The estimates suggest that the Ralph Nader votes would have gone primarily to Gore (giving him the win in FL) while Bush would have received more of the Pat Buchanan votes. The results also show that Nader's presence in the race gave Gore an incentive to position himself farther to the left ideologically. Bush's ideological position was not affected by Buchanan's participation. The third-party candidates' participation was a critical factor in George Bush's Electoral College victory over Al Gore. 5 Tables, 5 Figures, 1 Appendix, 16 References. Adapted from the source document.

This paper examines how protests spread across countries in the 2011 Arab Spring. Based on the diffusion literature, we form hypotheses about the factors that influence the transmission of protests across borders. To test the hypotheses, we use an events data set measuring media reports of protests, government reforms, and acts of repression on a daily basis by country. We show that the strength of the protest movement in one country is significantly affected by protest activities in other countries over the previous 1 or 2 weeks and that protests were more likely to spread between countries that had high levels of bilateral trade. When we examine periods longer than 2 weeks, we find that protests spread across borders only when they were successful in pressuring Arab governments into enacting reforms and when the protests did not lead to government reprisals. In all our models, government repression in one country significantly stifled protests in other countries. Each country was thus significantly affected by the choices that governments in other Arab League nations made, and this interdependence meant that governments had incentives to cooperate with each other in their responses to the Arab Spring protests.

This article examines the relationship between economic openness and internal conflict. The article first discusses different theoretical perspectives on how openness affects a country's internal stability and how internal conflict affects openness. Next, empirical estimates of the relationship between conflict and openness are presented, where conflict is measured with both a civil war dummy variable and an events dataset. The correlation between openness and conflict in the data is negative: more open countries have less internal conflict by some measures. However, internal conflict affects the level of openness, which suggests that openness should be treated as an endogenous variable. When the effect of openness on conflict is estimated using instrumental variables or full information maximum likelihood to control for endogeneity, openness does not significantly reduce internal conflict. There is robust evidence, on the other hand, that conflict within a country reduces its international trade. Together, these results suggest that the negative correlation between openness and conflict emerges because stability facilitates international trade rather than because trade flows reduce internal conflict.

Objective. This article investigates the extent to which opposing candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives adopt differing policy stances and examines explanations for policy divergence.Methods. We use a Congressional Quarterly survey of 1996 House candidates to measure policy divergence on eight issues. We then test explanations for this divergence: party pressures, primaries, third‐party candidates, campaign contributions, candidate preferences, and uncertainty.Results. Primaries, third‐party challenges, and contributions play little role in explaining policy divergence. We find that party and candidate preferences contribute to differences in the policy platforms of opposing candidates while uncertainty weakens the pressure for policy convergence.Conclusion. Imperfect information weakens pressure on candidates to adopt positions favored by the majority of voters in a district. This lack of pressure allows candidates to indulge their personal and party preferences in taking policy stances.

Objective. This article investigates the extent to which opposing candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives adopt differing policy stances & examines explanations for policy divergence. Methods. We use a Congressional Quarterly survey of 1996 House candidates to measure policy divergence on eight issues. We then test explanations for this divergence: party pressures, primaries, third-party candidates, campaign contributions, candidate preferences, & uncertainty. Results. Primaries, third-party challenges, & contributions play little role in explaining policy divergence. We find that party & candidate preferences contribute to differences in the policy platforms of opposing candidates while uncertainty weakens the pressure for policy convergence. Conclusion. Imperfect information weakens pressure on candidates to adopt positions favored by the majority of voters in a district. This lack of pressure allows candidates to indulge their personal & party preferences in taking policy stances. 4 Tables, 31 References. Adapted from the source document.