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ObjectiveThis article seeks to explain the puzzle of why incumbents spend so much on campaigns despite most research finding that their spending has almost no effect on voters.MethodsThe article uses ordinary least squares, instrumental variables, and fixed‐effects regression to estimate the impact of incumbent spending on election outcomes. The estimation includes an interaction term between incumbent and challenger spending to allow the effect of incumbent spending to depend on the level of challenger spending.ResultsThe estimation provides strong evidence that spending by the incumbent has a larger positive impact on votes received the more money the challenger spends.ConclusionCampaign spending by incumbents is most valuable in the races where the incumbent faces a serious challenge. Raising large sums of money to be used in close races is thus a rational choice by incumbents.

This paper investigates the extent to which interest groups use their campaign contributions to affect election outcomes as opposed to influencing candidate policy choices directly. It also reveals how much value interest groups place on gaining one more favorable vote in the House of Representatives. The empirical estimates suggest that gaining influence dominates helping favored candidates win the election as a means to affect defense spending policies. Political action committees differ in interesting ways, however, with the more ideological peace groups placing greater emphasis on changing electoral outcomes than do investor lobbies representing the defense industry.

Objective. This article examines how third‐party candidates influenced the 2000 presidential election.Methods. Two surveys provide information on a hypothetical election between only George Bush and Al Gore. The determinants of voting behavior in this election are then used to estimate how votes cast for third‐party candidates would have been partitioned between Bush, Gore, and abstentions had the other candidates dropped out of the race.Results. The estimates suggest that the Ralph Nader votes would have gone primarily to Gore (giving him the win in Florida) while Bush would have received more of the Pat Buchanan votes. The results also show that Nader's presence in the race gave Gore an incentive to position himself farther to the left ideologically. Bush's ideological position was not affected by Buchanan's participation.Conclusion. The third‐party candidates' participation was a critical factor in George Bush's Electoral College victory over Al Gore.

This article examines how third-party candidates influenced the 2000 presidential election. Two surveys provide information on a hypothetical election between only George Bush & Al Gore. The determinants of voting behavior in this election are then used to estimate how votes cast for third-party candidates would have been partitioned between Bush, Gore, & abstentions had the other candidates dropped out of the race. The estimates suggest that the Ralph Nader votes would have gone primarily to Gore (giving him the win in FL) while Bush would have received more of the Pat Buchanan votes. The results also show that Nader's presence in the race gave Gore an incentive to position himself farther to the left ideologically. Bush's ideological position was not affected by Buchanan's participation. The third-party candidates' participation was a critical factor in George Bush's Electoral College victory over Al Gore. 5 Tables, 5 Figures, 1 Appendix, 16 References. Adapted from the source document.

We study the relationship between trade openness and democracy using a data set with capital-labor ratios, trade flows, and regime type for 142 countries between 1960 and 2007. We are among the first to test a prediction that emerges from the model of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006): Relative factor endowments determine whether trade promotes democracy or not. The statistical results from two-stage least squares estimation indicate that trade is positively associated with democracy among labor-abundant countries but that trade has a negative effect on democracy in capital-abundant countries. The results are not robust, however, and thus we conclude that the evidence in support of their argument is relatively weak. (International Interactions (London)/FUB)

This paper uses an events data set for the post-Cold War era to measure the impact of trade interdependence on three different types of dyadic interactions: political, military, and economic. The paper extends the literature on trade and peace by estimating a model in which trade and interstate interactions are treated as endogenous. We also move beyond the common measure of conflict as the use of force to consider different types and levels of conflict that fall short of war. We find that trade significantly raises net cooperation on political and economic interactions, but trade does not improve net cooperation over military issues. By allowing for mutual causality between cooperation and trade, we show that more cooperation on political and military issues leads to greater trade between countries. Moreover, the impact of overall cooperation on trade is larger than the effect of trade on cooperation. An important lesson from the paper is that the relationship between trade and net cooperation depends on the type of interstate relations being examined. The general findings are supported even after performing a number of robustness checks.

Abstract
This paper examines representatives' voting on the HEALTH Act of 2003, which proposed a limit on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice lawsuits. The estimates show that the more campaign contributions a representative received from law firm PACs, the less likely he or she was to vote for the bill, while money from insurance and health care industry PACs increased the likelihood of an aye vote. These effects remain after controlling for the endogeneity of campaign contributions. Other factors affecting voting decisions include party affiliation, representative ideology, whether or not the representative was an attorney, the change in state malpractice premiums and payouts, and the change in the number of doctors in the state. There is no strong evidence that the AMA's strategy of naming certain states as being in "crisis" increased the probability that representatives from those states supported the bill.

This paper examines voting by US Representatives on the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Uruguay Round Agreement, & most-favored nation status for the People's Republic of China. Using recent political economy models of trade policy to formulate an empirical specification of congressional voting behavior, we find evidence that campaign contributions influenced legislators' votes on the NAFTA & Uruguay Round bills. Labor group contributions were associated with votes against freer trade, while business contributions were associated with votes in favor of freer trade. Economic conditions in each member's district as well as the broad policy views of the legislators also affected representatives' voting decisions. 4 Tables, 34 References. Adapted from the source document.