Suchergebnisse

This volume provides a philosophical "applied" account of violence, engaged with both empirical and theoretical debates in other disciplines such as cognitive science, sociology, psychiatry, anthropology, political theory, evolutionary biology, and theology.

Recent studies on the so-called EEEE (extended, embodied, embedded, and enacted) cognition have demonstrated that the "environmental situatedness" of human cognition and its evolutionary component may be used to better understand cognition in general. This indicates that humans do not keep in their memory ample representations of the surroundings and their variables, but instead, they richly manipulate it by picking up information and resources, when possible and needed, that are already accessible, or that are extracted/created: it is in this perspective that we can conceptualize in a useful and deep way the concept of possibility. Information, resources, cognitive opportunities, and possibilities are actively pursued for and even created: in light of this, we may consider human cognition to be a possibility-seeking mechanism. In particular, new possibilities can be usefully seen as new "affordances": for example, environmental anchors that enable us to more effectively utilize external resources. Of course, the availability of the proper affordances, which in turn offer cognitive possibilities, is connected to important new found concepts of discoverability and diagnosticability. Abduction is still significant in these cognitive processes because it refers to all those hypothetical inferences made by human and non-human animals that are based on deft manipulations of their surroundings, either to merely "detect" affordances or to "create" manufactured external objects (e.g. artifacts) that in turn provide new affordances and cues and so new cognitive possibilities.

Abstract
Humans continuously delegate and distribute cognitive functions to the environment to lessen their limits. They build models, representations and other various mediating structures that are considered to aid thought. In doing these, humans are engaged in a process of cognitive niche construction. In this sense, I argue that a cognitive niche emerges from a network of continuous interplays between individuals and the environment, in which people alter and modify the environment by mimetically externalizing eeting thoughts, private ideas, etc., into external supports. Through mimetic activities humans create external semiotic anchors that are the result of a process in which concepts, ideas and thoughts are projected onto external structures. Once concepts and thoughts are externalized and projected, new chances and ways of inferring come up from the blend. For cognitive niche construction may also contribute to making available a great portion of chances – in terms of information and knowledge – that otherwise would remain simply unexpressed or unreachable. The central part of this article will illustrate that abduction – or reasoning to explanatory hypotheses – is also central to understanding some features of the problem of action and decision-making. Abduction prompts new affordances and subsequent possible actions and plays a key role in decision-making, as C. S. Peirce teaches: the eco-neurological perspective depicted in this article also increases knowledge about the distinction between thought and motor action, seeing both aspects as fruit of brain activity. We can say that thought possesses an essential 'motor' component reflected in brain action but not in actual movement. On the basis of this analysis I can further illustrate some problems related to the role of abducting chances in decision-making, both in deliberate and unconscious cases.

Intro -- Contents -- Chapter 1: Introduction: Externalist Perspectives on Ignorance and Cognition -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Interactions Between Externalisms and Ignorance Studies -- 1.2.1 Relational Ignorance: A New Focus for Ethical Discussions -- 1.2.2 Creative Ignorance: The Unexpected Value of the Uncomfortable State of Not-Knowing -- 1.2.3 Extended Ignorance: The Limits of Propositional Ignorance in Extended Cognition -- 1.2.4 Mindshaping, Racist Habits, and White Ignorance: How We Think and How We Could Change -- 1.2.5 Ignorance and (Im)Possibility: Between Close-Mindedness and Wonder -- 1.2.6 Mind Invasion Through Cognitive Integration: Accounting for Some Epistemic Drawbacks of Extended Cognition -- 1.2.7 Institutions as Cognitive Niches: Managing Ignorance in a Distributed Perspective -- 1.2.8 How Do We Think about the Unknown: The Implications of Persistent Ignorance in Abductive Cognition -- 1.2.9 How Do We Become Ignorant? From Ignorance as a Result to Ignorance as a Process -- References -- Chapter 2: Relational Ignorance -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Scenario One-My Trusty Calculator -- Simple Extended Cognition -- 2.3 Scenario Two-The Romantic "We" -- Mutually Shared Cognition -- 2.4 Scenario Three-My Neighbour Sally -- Socially Extended Cognition, Type I -- 2.5 Scenario Four-Dependable Jo -- Epistemic Exploitation -- 2.6 Scenario Five (Application 1)-The Social Media Hivemind -- Socially Extended Cognition, Type II -- 2.7 Scenario Six (Application 2)-The Echo Chamber -- Misplaced (Self-)Trust -- 2.8 Discussion and Concluding Comments -- References -- Chapter 3: Creative Ignorance -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Creative Cognition from the Perspective of Experimental Psychology -- 3.3 Forms of Generative Ignorance -- 3.3.1 The Importance of Ambiguity -- 3.3.2 The Ignorance of Material Engagement -- 3.3.3 Skills for Ignorance.