Suchergebnisse

Chapter 1: Innovation: engine of economic growth (and employment) -- Chapter 2: The technological revolution: The rise of machines -- Chapter 3: The technological revolution: professions at risk and new jobs -- Chapter 4: Constraints to economic growth: Sustainability, happiness and other issues -- Chapter 5: New jobs or technological unemployment? -- Chapter 6: Many proposals, few resources: The difficult choices for the future of labour -- Chapter 7: Human beings at the centre as "shareholders" of development -- Chapter 8: Ye were not made to live with the virus: Lessons from the pandemic.

Introduction: Rising to the Occasion 1. Building Assets of Local Development 2. Unleashing and Stimulating Entrepreneurial Creativity 3. Fostering Innovation and Research 4. Leveraging Cultural Resources and Creativity 5. Making the Most of Cultural Diversity 6. Championing Social Mobility Conclusion: New Leaders, New Growth

National-level policymaking in Europe has slowed, stalled, or failed when it comes to critical actions for spurring economic growth. In Creating Economic Growth: Lessons for Europe, Marco Magnani argues that local leaders, would-be leaders and citizen movers and shakers have an opportunity to rise to the occasion to implement a low-cost set of actions to spur growth. The author challenges feelings of economic malaise that taint the next generation's dreams of prosperity. Instead he advocates the need for people to leverage traditional strengths and commit themselves to making a difference. He provides examples of newfound vitality in locales around Europe and examines in detail his native Italy for policy weaknesses and champions of renewal. Magnani proposes a six-point comeback strategy for citizen catalysts, business leaders, organizers, and elected officials in cities, towns and provinces: build human and civic capital; unleash entrepreneurial creativity; spur new innovation; stimulate cultural creativity; leverage cultural diversity; and champion social mobility. This study provides a roadmap to a new dynamism and offers the theoretical and empirical evidence to prove it.

This thesis collects three independent essays and a literature review. Two of them relate to vertical agreements. The first essay explores a retailer's choice in allocating control rights over the decision of retail prices. Results show that retailers adopt a hybrid configuration as a middle ground between two extremes, where pricing decisions are delegated, for all products, either to retailer or manufacturers. The second essay investigates the make-it-or-license-it choice of a brand owner under the risk of moral hazard when licensing the extension product to a third party. Brand licensing emerges as an equilibrium choice under brand dilution (respectively, enhancement) when the consumer perceives a large (small) distance between the extension product and parent brand. The third essay explores the issue of rating bubbles within online feedback systems by means of a field experiment. The analysis found the presence of positive social influence bias, in that high ratings affect the individual rating behavior in a significant way. The last paper is accompanied by a thorough and deep review of the literature about the consequences of online user ratings on product sales/performance (economic dimension) and product adoption/rating behavior (behavioral dimension). The topic is increasingly investigated by academic researchers and industry professionals alike. This overview presents established results and insights as issues for future research.

This paper studies pork barrel spending in a model where two symmetric parties compete for an electorate consisting of groups which have different ideological preferences. In equilibrium, party electoral promises decrease with voter ideological biases, and a "swing voter" outcome emerges. In this context, a problem of exclusion from party transfer plans arises which depends on ideology distribution. Groups with extreme ideological preferences are excluded from these plans, and also within moderate groups a share of voters receives a nil transfer from the parties. This exclusion problem is generally reduced if a transformation of the electorate occurs which decreases the polarization of the distribution of ideology.