Suchergebnisse

1989 is marked as one of the crucial times in Philippine political history. On 18 September 1991, the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) between the US and the Philippines is set to expire. Whether the Philippine Senate, acting on the interest of the Filipino, would give a new lease of life to the US military facilities here in the country or not is the center of this article's analysis. Drawing its inputs from the political situation at that time, this article discusses the repercussion of allowing the US military bases to stay here and the non renewal of the Military Bases Agreement juxtaposed to the political actors involved and in a broader sense, our country's future such a decision entails.

This article focuses on the competing models of development in the Philippines and the dilemma that burden present polices. Starting from the Marcos Regime, this paper looks into the "technocratic authoritarian" rule used by Marcos to espouse "developmentalism" at the expense of the destruction of democratic institutions, suspension of civil liberties and suppression of internal opposition. Some of the Marcos regime's development strategies focused on the nationalization of industries and increasing the absolute number of state personnel. These policies ushered problems for the authoritarian model as it created a debt problem in our country and spread cronyism which is challenged by the expanding countryside insurgency and declining population confidence. The development model followed by President Aquino is characterized by liberalization, de- nationalization and privatization. The last model discussed is the emerging model of "Popular Democracy". Drawing its impetus on the recent trend in increase support for the popular movements and increasing community organizations, it begs the question, how should the Aquino administration go about development and democratization?

The most likely scenario in the immediate post-Marcos period shall consist of minor autocracies of military and technocratic content occurring in quick succession. Each failing to consolidate the sufficient volume of consensus required to approximate the political divisiveness of the Marcos regime in the few years succeeding 1972; each forced to rely on the political repression that proves self-destructive as such rapidly erodes legitimacy; each captive to factional turmoil as it tries to consolidate in the midst of massive economic dislocation and great popular impatience.

This essay problematizes the success of the February insurrection and its implication to the Philippine political context. Particularly, the emergence of an expanded democratic space poses numerous, albeit dangerous possibilities. This essay sheds light on those possible trajectories, cautioning that the masses will remain powerless for as long as structural sources of social power remain intact and veiled by ruling class ideologies. It argues that a clear strategy of popular empowerment should guide present efforts at consolidating the organized basis of popular democracy.

The paper attempts to look at the fate of the Filipino Left after the February Revolution that replaced an authoritarian state with a liberal democratic state. The democratic state, which was brought about by mass insurrectionary activity and occurred at a time when the elite and conservative forces lost political monopoly and the masses have developed a means to effectively intervene in the state process, has distinct populist features and anti-fascist characteristics. From the perspective of popular democrats, this is a step towards better conditions for progressive popular empowerment but the absence of the national democrats during the crucial moment weakened the progressive flank and the anti-dictatorship coalition. The national democrats entered into a political settlement with the Marcos regime while the CPP-NPA-NDF committed itself to armed revolutionary struggle pluralized the left movement. By further asserting their role as the vanguard over independent movements and ideological tendencies, they fostered tensions between themselves and the other forces. The rise of an internal debate within the CPP-NPA-NDF on the direction and courses of action to be taken have further weakened the progressive bloc. In the immediate term, the progressive bloc is predicted to be fluid and at worst turbulent. Unless progressive groups and movements possess a sense of community to start with and maintain lines of dialogues, ecumenism on the Left cannot be achieved.

The decomposition of the old conservative power blocs was hastened recently by the open break of Salvador Laurel from the Aquino camp.Without a voice in the Cabinet, distrusted by business leaders satisfied with the performance of the economy, abandoned by his followers for more promising alliances and repudiated by the middle-class groups, Laurel's political disposition became increasingly untenable.

Numerous Third World dictatorships have resorted to the cynical use of the electoral process to consolidate tyranny rather than advance democracy, deodorize the institutionalization of state terror, outmaneuver the popular movements or--in the case of US client regimes--appease occasional American breastbeating on the future of democracy and the fate of human rights.

The resurgence of the political right and the continued importance of the military establishment in the policy-making process confront popular democrats with great challenges in the present conjuncture. For progressive militants and activists, these challenges translate into definite political tasks. In the political sphere, the mechanisms for mass politicization and popular empowerment must be strengthened.

Referat, vorgetragen auf der SOA-Konferenz 'More Power to the People. Konflikteum Demokratisierung in Südostasien1 vom 12. bis 14. Februar 1993 in Bochum