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In order to study the macroeconomic effects of public finances, we construct a computable general equilibrium model with overlapping generations, endogenous growth and endogenous retirement age. We calibrate this model on Belgian data. We show that it is able to replicate the observed increase in labor income tax and a substantial part of the drop in the retirement age recorded over the last fifty years. In addition, we find that the sharp increase in government expenditures financed by labor income taxation and the building up of a high level of public debt may have significantly contributed to this evolution. This model further suggests that a policy aimed towards a reduction in the public debt as well as a pension reform implying a lower taxation on old workers would constitute politically feasible alternatives to reduce the negative impact on aging by generating an endogenous increase of the retirement age.

In order to study the macroeconomic effects of public finances, we construct a computable general equilibrium model with overlapping generations, endogenous growth and endogenous retirement age. We calibrate this model on Belgian data. We show that it is able to replicate the observed increase in labor income tax and a substantial part of the drop in the retirement age recorded over the last fifty years. In addition, we find that the sharp increase in government expenditures financed by labor income taxation and the building up of a high level of public debt may have significantly contributed to this evolution. This model further suggests that a policy aimed towards a reduction in the public debt as well as a pension reform implying a lower taxation on old workers would constitute politically feasible alternatives to reduce the negative impact on aging by generating an endogenous increase of the retirement age.

Empirical papers show that labor income and capital income are differently taxed all over the world. We investigate whether this may correspond to individual preferences. We tackle this question in an overlapping generations general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents: young versus old and low skilled versus high skilled individuals. Taxes finance unemployment benefits and government consumption. High skilled agents prefer capital income taxes, while young unskilled and old agents prefer labor income taxation.

Empirical papers show that labor income and capital income are differently taxed all over the world. We investigate whether this may correspond to individual preferences. We tackle this question in an overlapping generations general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents: young versus old and low skilled versus high skilled individuals. Taxes finance unemployment benefits and government consumption. High skilled agents prefer capital income taxes, while young unskilled and old agents prefer labor income taxation.

Empirical papers show that labor income and capital income are differently taxed all over the world. We investigate whether this may correspond to individual preferences. We tackle this question in an overlapping generations general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents: young versus old and low skilled versus high skilled individuals. Taxes finance unemployment benefits and government consumption. High skilled agents prefer capital income taxes, while young unskilled and old agents prefer labor income taxation.

We model how a Beveridgean pay-as-you-go pension system may be supported by a majority of heterogeneous voters in a general equilibrium OLG model. The introduction of heterogeneity creates intragenerational transfers among workers which may lead to different optimal taxation rates within young individuals and to a positive taxation rate as outcome of the political choice. We underline the general equilibrium effects of a PAYG pension system on the interest rate, on future wages and therefore on the future level of pensions. We obtain an equilibrium tax rate and pension level that do not depend on population growth rate and on the capital stock.

We model how a Beveridgean pay-as-you-go pension system may be supported by a majority of heterogeneous voters in a general equilibrium OLG model. The introduction of heterogeneity creates intragenerational transfers among workers which may lead to different optimal taxation rates within young individuals and to a positive taxation rate as outcome of the political choice. We underline the general equilibrium effects of a PAYG pension system on the interest rate, on future wages and therefore on the future level of pensions. We obtain an equilibrium tax rate and pension level that do not depend on population growth rate and on the capital stock.

A quel rythme réduire la dette publique ? Quel budget consacrer aux soins de santé ? Et quel mode de financement de la sécurité sociale adopter face au vieillissement de la population ? Ces choix mettent en balance l'intérêt de différentes générations. Nous identifions les gagnants et les perdants de différentes options politiques.

The introduction of the euro and closer coordination of economic policies in the European Union are fuelling a debate on Europe's representation in the international financial institutions. A single EU representation at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) would affect the balance of power in the institution through a fundamental reallocation of quotas and executive directors among its membership. A reduction in the number of European executive directors, and in the total voting power of Europe and in its contribution to the Fund's general resources, could go hand in hand with an increase in the Union's impact on IMF decision-making. Such a change would also weaken the cooperative nature of the Fund through a reduction in the number and impact of mixed constituencies.

International audience ; The introduction of the euro and closer coordination of economic policies in the European Union are fuelling a debate on Europe's representation in the international financial institutions. A single EU representation at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) would affect the balance of power in the institution through a fundamental reallocation of quotas and executive directors among its membership. A reduction in the number of European executive directors, and in the total voting power of Europe and in its contribution to the Fund's general resources, could go hand in hand with an increase in the Union's impact on IMF decision-making. Such a change would also weaken the cooperative nature of the Fund through a reduction in the number and impact of mixed constituencies.

The introduction of the euro and closer coordination of economic policies in the European Union are fuelling a debate on Europe's representation in the international financial institutions. A single EU representation at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) would affect the balance of power in the institution through a fundamental reallocation of quotas and executive directors among its membership. A reduction in the number of European executive directors, and in the total voting power of Europe and in its contribution to the Fund's general resources, could go hand in hand with an increase in the Union's impact on IMF decision-making. Such a change would also weaken the cooperative nature of the Fund through a reduction in the number and impact of mixed constituencies.

A quel rythme réduire la dette publique ? Quel budget consacrer aux soins de santé ? Et quel mode de financement de la sécurité sociale adopter face au vieillissement de la population ? Ces choix mettent en balance l'intérêt de différentes générations. Nous identifions les gagnants et les perdants de différentes options politiques

A quel rythme réduire la dette publique ? Quel budget consacrer aux soins de santé ? Et quel mode de financement de la sécurité sociale adopter face au vieillissement de la population ? Ces choix mettent en balance l'intérêt de différentes générations. Nous identifions les gagnants et les perdants de différentes options politiques