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In the year 1274, Sir Hugh LaPape, knight, vassal, and retainer of his liege lord, Edward the First of England, stood on a hill outside the city of Florence, Italy, and wept. Four years before, Sir Hugh had set off for the Holy Land at the call of his king, leaving behind him a beautiful palace with tall towers, shining in the morning sun. Now he surveyed the remains of that palace, a pile of rubble, in growing anger. Although a vassal of the English king, Sir Hugh had some years before removed himself from England to Florence, Italy, where he became attached to the Guelphs, a party that was disputing control of the city with the rival Ghibbelines. The Guelphs were grateful for Sir Hugh's assistance and, after the Ghibbelines were driven away, ceded him land outside the city walls on which he constructed his palace. While Sir Hugh was at the Crusades, the Ghibbilines threatened to retake Florence and the Guelphs razed the palace to the ground to prevent its tall towers from being used as vantage points to guide the fire of bombards against the city. Not happy with this course of events but accepting the unpleasant reality before him, Sir Hugh returned to London where in 1275 he filed suit against certain Florentine merchants living there on the then--prevalent theory that citizens of a city or state could be sued for injuries caused by their municipal government. The merchants defended by arguing that they could not be called to account in England for acts done in Florence because that was wholly a matter for Florentine law. In 1281, the King's Council ruled for the merchants, stating:. "it is not the custom of England that anyone answer in the Kingdom of England for any trespass made in a region outside . [Therefore,] the aforesaid merchants do go without a day. And the aforesaid Hugh to take nothing by his complaint and to be in mercy." Thus, the court concluded that it had neither judicial nor prescriptive jurisdiction to try in England any case that arose abroad.

CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS By Louis Henkin New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. Pp. viii, 125 This short book brings to bear Professor Henkin's vast experience as a teacher and scholar in United States foreign relations law on a contemporary examination of constitutional separation of powers principles in determining the appropriate roles of the three federal governmental branches in the conduct of foreign affairs. In this context, the author asks, "Is our two-hundred year old constitution satisfactory for its third century?" After an excursion through the principal issues most germane to an answer, he concludes that "there is no need for radical constitutional surgery . .but that, where appropriate, we [should] be guided in constitutional construction by principles of constitutionalism and democracy." The remainder of the book seeks to identify these principles and to examine their past and future role in guiding the nation's conduct of foreign affairs.

I think it is safe to say that no other body of law has changed as much during the Twentieth Century as has the law applicable to international matters. When the late Judge Phillip C. Jessup coined the term "transnational law,"' he did so with the recognition that human affairs could not properly be confined by the artificial territorial boundaries of nation-states. When the Vanderbilt International, the original incarnation of the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, sought a new name to mark its transition from duplicated to printed format, it selected Jessup's characterization to emphasize global interdependence, rather than the political competition suggested by the older, and more familiar, term. Taken together, these articles are important vignettes from selected legal areas, emphasizing the continuing importance of thinking of the world in a transnational, rather than an international, context. In fact, the interests of all of us can be served by nothing less.

The fundamental principles that guide determinations about the appropriate relationship between state and national authority in matters affecting the foreign affairs of the United States began to evolve even before the ratification of the Constitution in 1789. The centralization of governmental power in this field is reflected in microcosm in the three great state papers of the United States. The nation began in 1776 as "United Colonies" that were "Free and Independent States" under the Declaration of Independence; developed into a "firm league of friendship" under the Articles of Confederation in 1781; and became a "more perfect union" created by the people, not by its constituent political units, under the Constitution in 1789.

The question whether the United States Government should pay ex gratia compensation to the survivors of those killed in the accidental destruction of Iranian Airlines Flight No. 655 raises some important issues of law and policy. In the following comments, I have attempted to provide a brief overview of the issues involved. …

The ultimate authority of the International Court of Justice flows from the same source as the ultimate authority of all other judicial bodies. Every court's decisions are an authoritative source of law in a realistic sense only because they are accepted as such by the community whose controversies the court is charged to resolve. In the case of the World Court, it is the community of nations that confers that authority and under the Court's Statute, its jurisdiction is conferred solely by the consent of the nations whose disputes it is called to adjudicate. It is for this reason that the case Nicaragua v. United States and the actions of both the Court and the United States Government in connection with it are of special importance to those who are concerned with international law.