Preface the problem of human values -- Beginnings in the empirical study of human values -- A brief history of values -- Types of values -- Values in psychology -- Connections to motives, traits, and habits -- Connections to ideology and attitudes -- Components of values -- Forces that shape values -- Personal influences on values -- Social influences on values -- When and how values matter -- Effects on prejudice and well-being -- When values matter -- How values matter -- Epilogue where do we go from here?
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AbstractThe present research tested the extent to which perceptions of early childhood experiences with parents predicted general views of the self (i.e., self‐esteem) and others (i.e., humanity‐esteem), and whether attachment self‐ and other‐models mediated these links. Two studies used a new measure of humanity‐esteem (Luke & Maio, 2004) to achieve these ends. As expected, indices that tapped a positive model of the self in relationships were associated with high self‐esteem and indices that tapped a positive model of others in relationships were associated with high humanity‐esteem. Also, early attachment experiences with fathers and mothers predicted self‐esteem and humanity‐esteem, respectively, and these direct relations were mediated by the attachment models. The studies, therefore, provide direct evidence that attachment measures predict general favorability toward the self and others, while revealing novel differences in the roles of childhood experiences with fathers and mothers. No variables, it is held, have more far‐reaching effects on personality development than a child's experiences within the family: for, starting during his first months in his relation with his mother figure, and extending through the years of childhood and adolescence in his relation to both parents, he builds up working models of how attachment figures are likely to behave towards him in any of a variety of situations; and on those models are based all his expectations, and therefore all his plans, for the rest of his life. Bowlby (1973; p. 369)
We introduce a single-item implicit measure of global self-esteem. The measure is based on the mere-ownership effect and asks participants to indicate how much they like their name. Six studies attested to the validity of this measure. In addition to showing high test–retest reliability (r = .85), the studies found that Name-Liking was (a) unrelated to impression management, (b) positively related to the Name-Letter-Task, the Self-Esteem IAT, explicit self-esteem measures, and self-reported subjective well-being, (c) more strongly related to explicit measures of global than domain-specific self-esteem, (d) more strongly related to self-esteem judgments made spontaneously as well as under cognitive load, and (e) predicted observer-reported anxiety during an anxiety-inducing interview whereas an explicit measure of self-esteem did not.
We tested whether mere source attribution is sufficient to cause polarization between groups, even on consensual non-divisive positions. Across four studies (N = 2182), using samples from Germany, the UK, and the USA, agreement with aphorisms was high in the absence of source attribution. In contrast, atheists agreed less with brief aphorisms when they were presented as Bible verses (Studies 1 and 2), whereas Christians agreed more (Study 2). Democrats and Republicans (USA) and Labour supporters and Conservative supporters (UK) agreed more with politically non-divisive aphorisms that were presented as originating from a politician belonging to their own party (e.g., Clinton, Trump, Corbyn) than with the same aphorisms when they were presented as originating from a politician belonging to the rival party (Studies 3 and 4). This source attribution effect was not moderated by education, amount of thinking about the aphorisms, identification with the ingroup, trust, dissonance, fear of reproach, or attitude strength. We conclude that source attribution fundamentally interferes with epistemic progress in debate because of the way in which attributions of statements to sources powerfully affects reasoning about their arguments.
In: Twin research and human genetics: the official journal of the International Society for Twin Studies (ISTS) and the Human Genetics Society of Australasia, Band 14, Heft 3, S. 233-239
The present research examined the extent to which relations between social values and personality are due to shared genetic or environmental factors. Using the Rokeach (1973) Value Survey and a scoring key from Schwartz and Bilsky (1990), seven value scores (enjoyment, achievement, self-direction, maturity, prosocial, security, and restrictive conformity) were derived in a sample of twins. As expected, all of the value scales were found to have a significant genetic component, with values ranging from 36% for enjoyment to 63% for prosocial, and there were numerous significant phenotypic correlations found between the value scales and personality scores. Most important, bivariate genetic analyses revealed that some of these phenotypic correlations could be attributed to common genetic or environmental factors.
The COVID‐19 pandemic poses an exceptional challenge for humanity. Because public behaviour is key to curbing the pandemic at an early stage, it is important for social psychological researchers to use their knowledge to promote behaviours that help manage the crisis. Here, we identify human values as particularly important in driving both behavioural compliance to government guidelines and promoting prosocial behaviours to alleviate the strains arising from a prolonged pandemic. Existing evidence demonstrates the importance of human values, and the extent to which they are shared by fellow citizens, for tackling the COVID‐19 crisis. Individuals who attach higher importance to self‐transcendence (e.g., responsibility) and conservation (e.g., security) values are likely to be more compliant with COVID‐19 behavioural guidelines and to help others who are struggling with the crisis. Further, believing that fellow citizens share one's values has been found to elicit a sense of connectedness that may be crucial in promoting collective efforts to contain the pandemic. The abstract nature of values, and cross‐cultural agreement on their importance, suggests that they are ideally suited to developing and tailoring effective, global interventions to combat this pandemic.
In: Sweetman , J , Maio , G R , Spears , R , Manstead , A S R & Livingstone , A G 2019 , ' Attitude toward protest uniquely predicts (normative and nonnormative) political action by (advantaged and disadvantaged) group members ' , Journal of Experimental Social Psychology , vol. 82 , pp. 115-128 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2019.01.001 ; ISSN:0022-1031
We find evidence that explicit (but not implicit) measures of general attitude towards protest uniquely predict normative and nonnormative political action tendencies, and behavior, over and above extant models of political action. Protest attitude uniquely predicts both the political action tendencies of members of disadvantaged groups and willingness to engage in solidarity-based action on behalf of such groups. Furthermore, we find some evidence that protest attitude is able to account for the effects of mobilization messages over a political issue; these messages increase political action tendencies by making attitude towards protest more positive. The results indicate that overall attitude toward protest reflects a wide array of affective, cognitive, and behavioral factors associated with protest that more specific, established predictors of collective political action do not tap. As such, general protest attitude offers an important addition to extant models of collective political action and efforts to examine the psychological processes underpinning political cognition and action.
Politicians, philosophers, and rhetors engage in co-value argumentation: appealing to one value in order to support another value (e.g., "equality leads to freedom"). Across four experiments in the United Kingdom and India, we found that the psychological relatedness of values affects the persuasiveness of the arguments that bind them. Experiment 1 found that participants were more persuaded by arguments citing values that fulfilled similar motives than by arguments citing opposing values. Experiments 2 and 3 replicated this result using a wider variety of values, while finding that the effect is stronger among people higher in need for cognition and that the effect is mediated by the greater plausibility of co-value arguments that link motivationally compatible values. Experiment 4 extended the effect to real-world arguments taken from political propaganda and replicated the mediating effect of argument plausibility. The findings highlight the importance of value relatedness in argument persuasiveness.
In: Maio , G R , Hahn , U , Frost , J-M , Kuppens , T , Rehman , N & Kamble , S 2014 , ' Social values as arguments : similar is convincing ' , Frontiers in Psychology , vol. 5 , 829 . https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00829 ; ISSN:1664-1078
Politicians, philosophers, and rhetors engage in co-value argumentation: appealing to one value in order to support another value (e.g., "equality leads to freedom"). Across four experiments in the United Kingdom and India, we found that the psychological relatedness of values affects the persuasiveness of the arguments that bind them. Experiment 1 found that participants were more persuaded by arguments citing values that fulfilled similar motives than by arguments citing opposing values. Experiments 2 and 3 replicated this result using a wider variety of values, while finding that the effect is stronger among people higher in need for cognition and that the effect is mediated by the greater plausibility of co-value arguments that link motivationally compatible values. Experiment 4 extended the effect to real-world arguments taken from political propaganda and replicated the mediating effect of argument plausibility. The findings highlight the importance of value relatedness in argument persuasiveness.
Crises in obesity and changes in the environment illustrate the need to change problematic behaviors and lifestyles in large segments of the population. This article uses social psychological theory and research to understand methods for facilitating lifestyle change. A basic assumption in the social psychological perspective is that the environment and the person interact to determine behavior. Both factors are important for understanding "upstream" and "downstream" approaches to lifestyle change (McKinlay, 1993; Verplanken & Wood, 2006) and consideration of one factor without the other may be disastrous. We review evidence from within and outside of the health context to illustrate the upstream and downstream approaches and then describe implications for public policy and intervention. The evidence and recommendations encompass a wide range of behaviors, ranging from speeding and intoxicated driving to eating an unhealthy diet and energy conservation. When armed with the relevant social psychological theory and evidence, lifestyle change campaigns are likely to be successful.