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Warlord Survival -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Map of areas of relevance -- Map of Afghanistan provinces -- Introduction: Why Warlord Survival? -- 1. Warlords, States, and Political Orders -- 2. The Game of Survival -- 3. Ismail Khan, the Armed Notable of Western Afghanistan -- 4. Dostum, the Ethnic Entrepreneur -- 5. Massoud and Fahim: The Mujahid and the Violent Entrepreneur -- Conclusion: Beyond Warlord Survival -- Notes -- Index --

A recent wave of civil conflict scholarship examines rebel governance, the process through which insurgent groups organize local affairs in areas under their control. While current research predominantly focuses on the supply side of rebel governance, the attention given to the demand side has been relatively limited. In this study, we take stock of recent scholarship on the dynamic relationship between rebels and civilians to theoretically explore the supply side of rebel governance and develop a new demand-side typology that captures the key factors influencing civilian preferences regarding the nature of rebel rule. Specifically, we argue that demand for rebel governance is mainly shaped by the interaction between civilians' perceptions of the state and civilian–rebel compatibility, which we define as civilians' perceptions of the compatibility of the rebel group with their own values, ideology, identity, and preferred modes of socio-political organization. To illustrate our main theoretical points, we draw upon insights gleaned from multiple insurgencies. Our study significantly enhances our understanding of how rebel–civilian interactions mold the fabric of political order in civil war environments.

Abstract
A recent wave of civil conflict scholarship examines rebel governance, the process through which insurgent groups organize local affairs in areas under their control. While current research predominantly focuses on the supply side of rebel governance, the attention given to the demand side has been relatively limited. In this study, we take stock of recent scholarship on the dynamic relationship between rebels and civilians to theoretically explore the supply side of rebel governance and develop a new demand-side typology that captures the key factors influencing civilian preferences regarding the nature of rebel rule. Specifically, we argue that demand for rebel governance is mainly shaped by the interaction between civilians' perceptions of the state and civilian–rebel compatibility, which we define as civilians' perceptions of the compatibility of the rebel group with their own values, ideology, identity, and preferred modes of socio-political organization. To illustrate our main theoretical points, we draw upon insights gleaned from multiple insurgencies. Our study significantly enhances our understanding of how rebel–civilian interactions mold the fabric of political order in civil war environments.

RésuméLa délégation de la violence en contexte de guerre civile est souvent lue comme une érosion de l'État au profit d'acteurs non-étatiques incontrôlables. Nous soulignons ici les limites de cette lecture à partir d'une analyse du conflit afghan, en particulier de l'arbitrage qui a eu lieu sous l'administration Karzai entre l'accroissement des effectifs militaires pro-gouvernementaux et leur contrôle. Nous montrons non seulement que la présence de troupes internationales a considérablement affecté cet arbitrage, mais aussi que, contrairement aux interprétations dominantes, celui-ci révèle une volonté d'appropriation du processus de formation de l'État par ses élites plus qu'un recul de l'État lui-même.

Résumé La délégation de la violence en contexte de guerre civile est souvent lue comme une érosion de l'État au profit d'acteurs non-étatiques incontrôlables. Nous soulignons ici les limites de cette lecture à partir d'une analyse du conflit afghan, en particulier de l'arbitrage qui a eu lieu sous l'administration Karzai entre l'accroissement des effectifs militaires pro-gouvernementaux et leur contrôle. Nous montrons non seulement que la présence de troupes internationales a considérablement affecté cet arbitrage, mais aussi que, contrairement aux interprétations dominantes, celui-ci révèle une volonté d'appropriation du processus de formation de l'État par ses élites plus qu'un recul de l'État lui-même. ; SCOPUS: ar.j ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

The 'Sahelistan' discourse that conflates conflict dynamics in Afghanistan and Mali is widespread in Western media and policy circles. We argue that such representations contribute to the adoption of one-size-fits-all conflict management policies. Drawing on extensive fieldwork in both places, we also argue that these standard templates of intervention shape responses from local non-state armed actors, who manipulate foreign interveners for their own (violent) purposes in similar ways. Yet, we show that this convergence in armed group behaviour still manifests itself in important variations in widely different contexts, furthering strongmen autonomy in Afghanistan, while fostering armed group fragmentation in Mali.

Can fieldwork still be done in today's most violent warzones? We contend that long-held methodological principles about power and impartiality do not hold in today's conflict-ridden environments. Research of this kind can still be pursued, but only if the scholar's place is reconceived as one of limited power and unavoidable partiality. We argue that those still able to do fieldwork in sites of increasing danger do so by virtue of building their own 'tribes,' forming and joining different social micro-systems to collect data and, in some cases, survive. Field research must, therefore, be recognized as its own form of foreign intervention. In considering the future of political science research in the most challenging war-torn settings, we examine the risks and opportunities that accompany 'tribal politics' of this kind and underline the importance of reflecting on our own positionality in the process of knowledge production.