Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Copyright -- Contents -- Introduction: Social Innovation in the Twenty-First Century -- Part 1: Foundations -- Ch.1: Renewing Social Entrepreneurship -- Ch. 2: High-Performance Leadership -- Ch. 3: Rethinking Billionaire Philanthropy -- Part 2: Metrics and Models -- Ch. 4: Measuing Corporate Virtue and Vice -- Ch. 5: Powering the Social Project -- Ch. 6: Market Creation -- Ch. 7: The Decade of Delivery -- Ch. 8: The Impact Triangle -- Part 3: Learning and Incubating -- Ch. 9: Social Impact Leadership Development -- Ch. 10: Social Innovation Practicum -- Ch. 11: Design for Extreme Affordability -- Part 4: Applications -- Ch. 12: Disrupting Education -- Ch. 13: Social Innovation Meets a Global Pandemic -- Ch. 14: Human and Planetary Health -- Ch. 15: Corporate Carbon Reduction Pledges -- Acknowledgments -- Glossary -- Index -- About the Editor.

Recent movements to deprofessionalize American state legislatures have been driven partly by the notion that professional legislators spend more than their citizen counterparts. This article explores the relationship between legislative professionalism and government spending, a connection complicated by the possibility that legislators in high‐spending states may choose professional institutions to handle their responsibilities more effectively. I employed propensity score matching, an increasingly used technique of causal inference, to disentangle the relationship. Contrary to previous academic work and popular notions, I found that professional legislatures do not spend significantly more than part‐time bodies do, if one accounts for the fact that legislatures in high‐spending states have a greater need to be professionalized and therefore select those structural frameworks. These findings have important implications for the study of the effects of legislative institutions on public policies more generally and attest to the utility of recently developed techniques of causal inference to disentangle these relationships.

Does complete public financing of campaigns enhance electoral competition? Arizona and Maine implemented similar clean elections programs for state-level races in 2000, providing an opportunity to examine the consequences of public financing. Employing two measures of competitiveness, I find that clean elections programs in both states significantly increased competition in districts where challengers accepted public funding. These findings suggest that public monies do not simply attract low-quality challengers and that access to campaign funds is an important determinant of competitiveness. As a result, while public financing programs are not panaceas for uncompetitive elections, such programs can enhance competition in races where money is accepted. Adapted from the source document.