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This book examines the origins, development and reasons for change of the first Soviet economic system. Programmes are compared with outcomes and theory with practice in the fields of nationalization, workers' control and management, money and planning, industrial organization and food procurement. The organization of military supply and industry is examined separately, to emphasize that the initial approach to economic organization was affected not only by external events, but also by ideology, class struggle and social pressures. The economic and social analysis, which lay behind policy-making, was often distorted by prejudice, and the economic system, which emerged was the result of efforts to replace market relations by administrative measures. Unexpected and unwanted outcomes induced some leaders to rethink initial policies, while others continued to adhere to rigid programmes, even after the conclusion of civil war

Political and economic rapprochement is taking place between Russia and China in a number of fields: energy, arms production, trade in national currencies and strategic projects in transport and supporting infrastructure. This development, fostered by Western policies and actions, including sanctions related to Ukraine, appears to be strengthening despite reservations related to uneasy precedents, contrasting visions and uncertain economic projections. Chinese policies aiming at European markets via the revival of the Silk Road assist this development. The One Belt-One Road is projected as an alternative, or supplement, to the maritime routes made unsafe by contiguous countries' unrest, criminality and the assertive control of the seas by the United States. While Russia, promoting friendly investment structures, moves eastwards to develop the Russian Far East bordering China, the latter expands westwards engaging in laborious negotiations with Central Asian countries and costly investments in infrastructure and logistics. In each area, the article maintains that both countries, despite economic and political competition and fear of losing control, have interest in cooperation and discusses the areas where this is taking place, albeit slowly and with difficulty. Whether economic cooperation can develop into a strategic alliance including defence is discussed in the light of joint military exercises, arms trade and plans to broaden the scope of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (of which India and Pakistan have recently become members), and the Common ASEAN Community. This path is difficult and marred by members' conflicting interests. But some positive outcomes should not be ruled out.

This paper argues that Russia has embarked on a difficult path to economic sovereignty and heightened security to withstand rising antagonism from the West that culminated with the application of punitive sanctions against Russia's positioning on Ukraine. With the aim of lessening economic dependence on trade with the EU, its major trade partner for decades, Russia tries to work out a patriotic model of growth based on two vectors: import and trade partner substitution. The pursuit of self-sufficiency in foodstuffs adds an important pillar to security concerns as reflected earlier in the 2010 Doctrine on Food Security. But import substitution will be costly and difficult to manage. Fiscal balances and exchange rates will need to adjust to the new challenges. Finding new partners eastwards is also complicated. Trade with China, in hydrocarbons or other commodities, requires massive infrastructural work that neither the government nor private investors can afford in a situation of financial stringency. Investment from China is slow to materialize as the economic slowdown also impinges on China's projects. Nonetheless important deals on gas and infrastructure have been agreed and are pursued despite difficulties. A favourable institutional framework aimed at attracting investors to the Far East is in place. It will be up to the local administrations to make the best of it and venture capital to run the risk. The outlook is long-term, but both Russia and China have learnt from history to be patient.

This paper argues that Russia has embarked on a difficult path to economic sovereignty and heightened security to withstand rising antagonism from the West that culminated with the application of punitive sanctions against Russia's positioning on Ukraine. With the aim of lessening economic dependence on trade with the EU, its major trade partner for decades, Russia tries to work out a patriotic model of growth based on two vectors: import and trade partner substitution. The pursuit of self-sufficiency in foodstuffs adds an important pillar to security concerns as reflected earlier in the 2010 Doctrine on Food Security. But import substitution will be costly and difficult to manage. Fiscal balances and exchange rates will need to adjust to the new challenges. Finding new partners eastwards is also complicated. Trade with China, in hydrocarbons or other commodities, requires massive infrastructural work that neither the government nor private investors can afford in a situation of financial stringency. Investment from China is slow to materialize as the economic slowdown also impinges on China's projects. Nonetheless important deals on gas and infrastructure have been agreed and are pursued despite difficulties. A favourable institutional framework aimed at attracting investors to the Far East is in place. It will be up to the local administrations to make the best of it and venture capital to run the risk. The outlook is long-term, but both Russia and China have learnt from history to be patient.

This paper examines the plans for modernisation of the Russian economy in the light of the challenges posed by both the global crisis to Russia in 2008–09 and the possible resurfacing of the crisis in 2012–13. Both developments help to understand the weaknesses of a process of change that after twenty years seems still to be incapable of supporting a sustainable and competitive market economy. Will liberal forces make their way through to finally challenge the obstacle to competition with accession to WTO? This paper addresses this question taking into account the possible impact of the reform-minded components of the new government formed in May 2012, but also that of forces hostile to change. The third mandate (2012–2018) of President Putin and his personal approach focused on the accelerated developments of some branches and far eastern regions send contrasting signals with regard to the balance between state and market policies in the pursuit of medium to long term goals. Whether new programmes are feasible under increasing competition from abroad after the 2012 entry into WTO and the controversial corporatist political system are also questions discussed by this paper.

Economic growth in China is impressive, but underlying weaknesses may erode in time its potential unless measures are taken to further liberalise the economy & reduce the costs of growth. While the contribution of the private sector to growth is becoming dominant, the interference of the party/state with the economy is still an impediment to a better allocation of capital. That is needed to eliminate waste & free resources for both private use & social needs, in particular those of the rural areas whose incomes do not keep up with the pace of growth. On the basis of official data, China has been able to contain state debt & reduce the general public deficit, but the macroeconomic picture suffers from lack of transparency. Recurrent needs of bank consolidation in the near past, the persistence of a large state-dominated banking sector & a more than opaque capital market together with a long established practice of easy credit to state enterprises as well as fiscal engineering on the part of the provincial governments raise the problem of how solid are the financial foundations for growth & how long will the contingent liabilities of the public sector remain tolerable. Excessive capacity built in several sectors could badly suffer from a possible slow down in the world economy. China needs to contain the costs of growth, improve equity & efficiency of public spending, limit growing income disparities & last, but not least, enhance the role & autonomy of the Central Bank in support of stabilisation. More clarity is also needed on the exchange rate regime policy & possible move to managed floating from gradual capital movements' liberalisation. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.