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"An amazing counterblast to geopolitics and the realist school of international relations." Professor Vassilis K. Fouskas, University of East London and founding editor, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies (Routledge) "William Mallinson goes beyond the stereotypes and proposes a fresh and critical look at international relations and its theories: a powerful and thoughtful book based on deep analysis of how history and human nature shape relations between states. A long needed new angle in IR." --Pavel Kanevskiy, Professor of Political Science, Associate Dean, Faculty of Sociology, Lomonosov Moscow State University "Professor Mallinson has written a highly intellectual book on Guiccardini that sheds light on geohistory." --Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos, Ambassador ad honorem This book demonstrates that geohistory is a more effective concept than geopolitics in understanding inter-state relations, at a time of considerable confusion in world affairs, and that Francesco Guicciardini's thoughts are an efficient medium to demonstrate not only the inadequacies of geopolitics, but that a geohistorical approach can be a more responsible way of understanding international affairs. The book introduces a fresh approach, based on the individual, on which corporate characteristics and behaviour depend, often in the shape of state interests, which are unable on their own to predict actions driven by human behaviour. The book shows how show mainstream international relations theories are stuck in paradigms, inadequate in explaining why world politics is moving in a direction that nobody could predict even a decade ago. It shows how ideology can blur clear understanding. In short, it represents a new and intellectually refreshing approach and method in understanding, and tackling, the vagaries of relations between states. William Mallinson, a former British diplomat, is professor of Political Ideas and Institutions at Guglielmo Marconi University and a member of the editorial committee of the Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies. He has published numerous books and articles, of which his most recent are Kissinger and the Invasion of Cyprus, and Images in Words: Only History Exists.

A Greek grandfather born a citizen of the Ottoman Empire who became an Italian national provides the starting point for this book, which, by focusing on the real story of a family against a background of historical events, shows how what the author calls the 'minotaurs of fear and greed' can be overcome and the pseudo-theories of many a pundit of so-called international relations can be demolished. It is not every day that the son of a Cumbrian who fought in the Great War meets the daughter of his Ottoman enemy, following the next war, and then marries her. The author's grandfathers were on opposing sides in the Great War, one with the British at Gallipoli, the other in the Ottoman Army; in the next war, his father and uncle were on opposing sides to his aunt's husband. His aunt was thrice a refugee, from Ottoman Turkey, Italian Rhodes, and then again from modern Turkey. This forms the rich backcloth to this historical account of the family vicissitudes engendered by the behaviour of Greece's controversial Eleftherios Venizelos and Turkey's bombastic Kemal Ataturk. Written and spoken accounts by family members and diplomatic documents are skilfully woven into a rich tapestry of that geohistorical toilet, the Eastern Mediterranean. The book brings to life some vital aspects of modern European history, ending with a trenchant critique of Greece and Turkey today, warts and all

For hundreds of years, the Eastern Mediterranean island of Cyprus has been subjected to the — not always welcome — attentions of external powers, finally gaining some independence from Britain in 1960. Since then, Cyprus has been the object of three international crises, almost leading to war between NATO members Greece and Turkey. Following a Turkish invasion and occupation which continues to the present, tensions have continued, while Turkey continues to occupy over one-third of Cyprus, an EU member, while trying itself to gain entry to the organisation. Papers released by British government departments in January 2008 reveal the following: an increasingly submissive yet tetchy attitude in British foreign policy formulation vis-à-vis American pressure (mainly Kissinger) on Britain not to leave Cyprus; the question of the USA financing the British bases; British government criticism of Turkey's perceived intransigence in finding a solution to the Cyprus conundrum; British government criticism of Turkey's position on its continental-shelf dispute with Greece; Britain's strong support for Turkey's European aspirations, flying in the face of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Cyprus' recommendations; past and future President Clerides' seeming contentedness with the British military presence on Cyprus; and a marked difference between French and British views. The article concludes that the British government submitted to US demands and suggests that Cyprus remains a cat's paw of big-power politics.

An extrapolation, analysis and evaluation of papers recently released by the British government suggest that, backstage, the British and US governments condoned Turkish military objectives in Cyprus, at least to the extent of agreeing to take no serious action to dissuade Turkey from invading. The papers suggest British government foreknowledge of Turkey's objectives; Henry Kissinger's express delaying tactics to afford Turkey more time to consolidate its invasion; French anger at the Foreign Office for not providing them with information; British concern about a future Greek government turning to the French for support; and the British government's desire to give up its military territories in Cyprus. Overall, the picture which emerges is that the Wilson government gave in to Henry Kissinger's policies. It appears clear that Britain, despite its responsibilities and initial misgivings about Turkey's behaviour, gave the lead to the US.

Geopolitics, both in name, and in its application via geostrategy, is a controversial area of international relations. Although the practice of obtaining resources is as old as Mankind, the word came into its own with the imperial policies of the great powers in the nineteenth century, was used to justify world wars, went into decline, but was 'taken to America' and then re-exported to Europe after the last war by the likes of Henry Kissinger. Nowadays, the term is used unconsciously by politicians obsessed with power, often to justify war. This book tears apart the simplistic thinking of geopolitics, and proposes its replacement with the authors' own method of 'geohistory', a method based on recognising that at the base of any analysis and evaluation of the international situation lie human characteristics