Suchergebnisse

1. Introduction: Electoral Dysfunction and Political Realism -- 2. What Research Reveals: Deficits of Electoral Accountability -- 3. What Research Overlooks: Voters' Dilemma of Disempowerment -- 4. Lessons from Theory: The Blunted Blade of One-Mark Ballots -- 5. Lessons from Experience: The Cutting Edge of Ranking and Grading Ballots -- 6. America Re-Votes, 2016: Retrospective Simulations with Smarter Ballots -- 7. Conclusion: A Realist's Agenda for Research and Reform

"Shows that the Western tradition of statecraft, long considered the method of tyrants and oligarchs, can steer our thinking about democracy in bold new directions"--

Through its potential to contribute to mass suffering, economic disruption, and social unrest, climate change poses a security threat to the constitutional identities of states (as democratic, autocratic, or hybrid regimes). This paper proposes a conceptual framework of mediated causality for climatic impacts on constitutional identity and engages in novel theory-building for one mediating vector of change: the post-fossil energy transition. Theories of the "oil curse" and of "carbon democracy" are compared and critiqued for their contributions to understanding the potential impacts of decarbonized energy systems on democracy. Two counterintuitive conclusions emerge. First, transitioning away from petroleum may not result in increased democratization, as the oil curse implies. Second, post-fossil energy systems are unlikely to become structurally decentralized, as advocates of "energy democracy" suppose, and may even need to remain centralized in order for popular mobilization around energy to help maintain or reinvigorate democratic rights.

Abstract
Through its potential to contribute to mass suffering, economic disruption, and social unrest, climate change poses a security threat to the constitutional identities of states (as democratic, autocratic, or hybrid regimes). This paper proposes a conceptual framework of mediated causality for climatic impacts on constitutional identity and engages in novel theory-building for one mediating vector of change: the post-fossil energy transition. Theories of the "oil curse" and of "carbon democracy" are compared and critiqued for their contributions to understanding the potential impacts of decarbonized energy systems on democracy. Two counterintuitive conclusions emerge. First, transitioning away from petroleum may not result in increased democratization, as the oil curse implies. Second, post-fossil energy systems are unlikely to become structurally decentralized, as advocates of "energy democracy" suppose, and may even need to remain centralized in order for popular mobilization around energy to help maintain or reinvigorate democratic rights.

What does the trend of "realism" in political theory portend, if anything, for how social and political scientists do their work? We can best see where realism's rubber hits the road by re-examining the methodological comparison between political science and political journalism, according to which the academic field has long harbored assumptions of its own superiority. When the comparison between these two approaches to knowledge about politics is explicitly made, political science is typically justified by reference to distinctive (and higher) purposes and methods. Here, we reconsider conventional assumptions by reconstructing the journalistic practices and methodological reflections of two early figures in the American muckraking tradition, Lincoln Steffens and R. S. Baker. While their purposes were similar to those upheld by advocates of a publicly engaged political science, their methods, somewhat more surprisingly, are also applicable to the academic profession. Several anti-scholastic lessons on method—relevant to qualitative, quantitative, and interpretive approaches alike—emerge from the muckrakers' example. The realist movement in political theory is congruent with the proposition that political science's superiority complex is less easily defended and more obstructive to good research practice than even the most civically engaged researchers commonly assume.

Attempts to respond to "democratic deficits" in modern constitutional republics must contend with the broad scholarly trend of electoral skepticism. While generally casting doubt on periodic competitive elections' suitability as vehicles of accountability, electoral skepticism does not necessarily entail an absolute devaluation of elections. Some normative and empirical research responds to this trend by refocusing attention on values other than popular power, such as civil peace, which might be served by periodic competitive elections. Another response short of abandoning the value of popular power, however, is to draw out possibilities for institutional design from the restricted conditions under which previous study has found electoral accountability to be plausible or likely. This second task requires an empirically informed exercise in political theory. Pursuing it in a programmatic and policy-relevant way requires descending from the grand, systemic level of constitutional structures and electoral formulae to intermediate (or middle-range) institutional conditions of accountability, such as rules about parties, campaigns, and election administration. My analysis reinterprets principal-agent models to develop four general types of crucial condition for electoral accountability, and then ramifies this scheme by reference to recent empirical research. The result is a "top ten" list of specific institutional factors that could be theoretically decisive in helping or hindering electoral accountability. These ten conditions could guide future research designs and reform proposals alike.

Attempts to respond to "democratic deficits" in modern constitutional republics must contend with the broad scholarly trend of electoral skepticism. While generally casting doubt on periodic competitive elections' suitability as vehicles of accountability, electoral skepticism does not necessarily entail an absolute devaluation of elections. Some normative and empirical research responds to this trend by refocusing attention on values other than popular power, such as civil peace, which might be served by periodic competitive elections. Another response short of abandoning the value of popular power, however, is to draw out possibilities for institutional design from the restricted conditions under which previous study has found electoral accountability to be plausible or likely. This second task requires an empirically informed exercise in political theory. Pursuing it in a programmatic and policy-relevant way requires descending from the grand, systemic level of constitutional structures and electoral formulae to intermediate (or middle-range) institutional conditions of accountability, such as rules about parties, campaigns, and election administration. My analysis reinterprets principal-agent models to develop four general types of crucial condition for electoral accountability, and then ramifies this scheme by reference to recent empirical research. The result is a "top ten" list of specific institutional factors that could be theoretically decisive in helping or hindering electoral accountability. These ten conditions could guide future research designs and reform proposals alike.

A basic theory of electoral accountability is widely accepted by academic opinion: voters cause politicians to gain or lose office through periodic elections, thereby influencing policy through the threat of electoral sanction. Empirical studies run the gamut from findings of strong support for this theory, to mixed or conditional support, to weak or negative results. When electoral processes are analyzed in terms of two distinct causal linkages within a three-part chain of accountability, however, positive findings are revealed as weaker than they appear while a compelling trend emerges toward findings ranging from conditional to negative in the last two decades. This trend is visible in three topical areas—economic voting, political corruption, and ideological congruence—and it holds for both presidential and parliamentary regimes as well as for a variety of electoral systems. The new electoral skepticism's unsettling results and insightful methods may help to improve future research and reform efforts alike.

A basic theory of electoral accountability is widely accepted by academic opinion: voters cause politicians to gain or lose office through periodic elections, thereby influencing policy through the threat of electoral sanction. Empirical studies run the gamut from findings of strong support for this theory, to mixed or conditional support, to weak or negative results. When electoral processes are analyzed in terms of two distinct causal linkages within a three-part chain of accountability, however, positive findings are revealed as weaker than they appear while a compelling trend emerges toward findings ranging from conditional to negative in the last two decades. This trend is visible in three topical areas—economic voting, political corruption, and ideological congruence—and it holds for both presidential and parliamentary regimes as well as for a variety of electoral systems. The new electoral skepticism's unsettling results and insightful methods may help to improve future research and reform efforts alike.