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Working paper
Profit-Maximizing Sale of a Discrete Public Good via the Subscription Game in Private-Information Environments
In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics, Band 10, Heft 1
ISSN: 1935-1704
We analyze a symmetric Bayesian game in which two players individually contribute to fund a discrete public good; contributions are refunded if they do not reach a threshold set by the seller of the good. We characterize the distributions of players' private values that can support a symmetric equilibrium in continuous piecewise-linear strategies, and we calculate these strategies. Allowing the seller to charge an entry fee before players make their private contributions, we show these piecewise-linear equilibrium strategies maximize the seller's expected profit over all incentive compatible selling mechanisms.
SSRN
Working paper
Endogenous information quality: A job-assignment application
In: Journal of economics, Band 65, Heft 2, S. 163-180
ISSN: 1617-7134
Parallel imports, demand dispersion, and international price discrimination
In: Journal of international economics, Band 37, Heft 3-4, S. 167-195
ISSN: 0022-1996
Preemptive Investment, Toehold Entry, and the Mimicking Principle
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 22, Heft 1, S. 1
ISSN: 1756-2171
Strategic Behavior, Private Information, and Decentralization in the European Union Emissions Trading System
In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 43, Heft 3, S. 413-432
ISSN: 1573-1502
Strategic Behavior, Private Information, and Decentralization in the European Union Emissions Trading System
In the European Union Emissions Trading System, the supply of carbon permits is determined in a decentralized manner by Member States. Alternatively, the supply could be determined by an EU central authority. We analyze whether decentralization leads to lower total abatement costs under various assumptions about the behavior of Member States and the privacy of information about their abatement costs. If Member States do not behave strategically, then decentralization is preferred, regardless of whether abatement costs are private information. If the Member States behave strategically, then decentralization may or may not be preferred, depending on the degree of uncertainty about abatement cost parameters, the variation in emission endowments, and the number of Member States.
BASE
Bilateral Oligopoly, Private Information, and Pollution Permit Markets
In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 43, Heft 4, S. 553-572
ISSN: 1573-1502
Equilibria and comparative statics in two-player contests
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 21, Heft 3, S. 738-752
Sent Seeking With Private Values
In: Public Choice, Band 119, Heft 1/2, S. 161-178
Rent Seeking with Private Values
In: Public choice, Band 119, Heft 1-2, S. 161-178
ISSN: 0048-5829
We study a rent-seeking contest in which the players' valuations of the prize are private information. We determine a Bayesian equilibrium & give conditions under which the equilibrium exists. Although players are ex ante symmetric, increased possibilities for ex post lopsidedness lead to less aggressive bidding. (Lopsidedness increases as players' values become less positively correlated or as the variation in possible values increases.) We also compare the private-information contest to a related public-information contest in which the realizations of values are common knowledge. The contests are equally efficient & players are indifferent between the two, but risk-averse sellers of the prize are not. 1 Table, 3 Figures, 1 Appendix, 5 References. Adapted from the source document.
Sent Seeking With Private Values
In: Public choice, Band 119, Heft 1, S. 161-178
ISSN: 0048-5829
Dynamic R&D Competition with Learning
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 28, Heft 4, S. 751
ISSN: 1756-2171
Coalition-proof information exchanges
In: Journal of economics, Band 63, Heft 3, S. 259-278
ISSN: 1617-7134